Battle of Abu-Ageila (1967)

Background

In May 1967 Egypt moved large forces into Sinai and secured the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force; on the morning of 5 June Israel opened the war with air strikes that destroyed most of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. On the ground, Brigadier-General Yeshayahu Gavish's Southern Command attacked with three divisions: Israel Tal's in the north towards Rafah and al-Arish, Avraham Yoffe's through the dunes between the two roads towards Bir Lahfan, and Ariel Sharon's on the central route.

The Abu Ageila crossroads, with the Umm Qatef ridge just east of it, controlled the central road into Sinai towards Ismailia and the Mitla and Giddi passes. In 1956 its Egyptian garrison had held out for several days against repeated Israeli attacks, a defence Egypt afterwards celebrated; between 1964 and 1967, with Soviet advisers, the position was strengthened with new mines, wire, trenches and bunkers. Under the original Egyptian plan, Qahir (‘Conqueror’), it was one of the main forward strongpoints, but late changes in May pushed forces forward and, after an Israeli deception with dummy tanks opposite Kuntilla, southwards. The 2nd Infantry Division's commander moved his command post to Qusaymah.

The Israeli plan left Sharon little choice of approach. One of Yoffe's armoured brigades was to pass through Umm Qatef by the morning of 6 June for the battle at Gebel Libni, so Sharon had to break the position quickly and directly rather than work round it through Qusaymah. As the army's director of training he had studied its defences before the war.

The armies

Israel. Brigadier-General Ariel Sharon's 38th Division numbered around 19,000 men, about 14,000 of them committed at Abu Ageila, with about 150 tanks. Lieutenant-Colonel Mordechai Zippori's 14th Armoured Brigade had Super Sherman tank battalions and mechanised infantry on half-tracks. Lieutenant-Colonel Natke Nir commanded a separate battle group of about 45 Centurions with mechanised infantry, 120 mm mortars and French SS-10 and SS-11 missiles, chosen for its tanks' better going in sand. Colonel Yekutiel ‘Kuti’ Adam's 99th Infantry Brigade had three battalions, two of them regulars and one of reservists, and had rehearsed trench assaults for two weeks. Danny Matt's 80th Paratroop Brigade, attached at the last minute, provided the heliborne force. Six artillery and mortar battalions were the largest concentration the Israeli army had yet assembled, though Egyptian 122 mm guns outranged their 155 mm howitzers by some 5,000 metres. A reduced brigade was to feint towards Qusaymah.

Egypt. Major-General Sa'di Naguib's 2nd Infantry Division, around 16,000 men, held Qusaymah with the 10th Infantry Brigade and Abu Ageila with the 12th, reinforced to about 8,000 men. The 12th Brigade's 37th, 38th and 39th Battalions held the trenches and outposts, the 352nd Battalion the second line at Ruafa Dam; about 70 guns, 66 T-34/85s of the 6th Tank Regiment and 22 SU-100s supported them. Naguib had arrived from Yemen at the end of May, and many units had been filled out with newly called-up reservists.

The battle

5 June, day: the approaches. Sharon's leading units crossed the border near al-Auja at about 08:15 Israeli time; Egyptian accounts say a border clash came an hour and a half earlier. Zippori split his brigade: one tank and one infantry battalion flanked the Egyptian 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion at Tarat Umm Basis, which fell back after about two hours, while a second group took the Turkish Track; the outposts at Umm Tarafa and Position 236 fell quickly. By mid-afternoon the armour was within range of Umm Qatef, but accurate Egyptian artillery pinned it near Umm Tarafa, and Sharon prepared a night attack. Wikipedia describes two failed frontal attacks during the day; the other sources do not.

To the north, Nir's Centurions took the outpost east of Position 181 on the Batur Track at about 09:20, but were thrown back from Position 181 itself. After a helicopter reconnaissance Nir sent two tank groups round its flanks and his infantry in from the front, with napalm strikes; the Egyptians abandoned it in the late afternoon, and Nir lost eight tanks and several officers. A company sent towards Awlad Ali beat off an Egyptian tank counter-attack at about 18:45 and fell back. At 22:00 Sharon told Nir to bypass Awlad Ali; he reached Abu Ageila around midnight with seven or eight tanks and attacked Ruafa Dam, where the 12th Brigade had its headquarters.

Adam's infantry rode civilian buses to Tarat Umm Basis and then marched 8–10 km through the dunes, which the Egyptians thought impassable and had left unmined, to the northern end of the trenches. An afternoon sandstorm helped to cover the move. Late that evening Gavish proposed postponing the attack until daylight brought air support. Sharon would not wait; Oren adds that the aircraft were then needed against Jordan. Gavish sent a tank force under Colonel Avraham Adan from Yoffe's division towards Abu Ageila at 22:00, then recalled it.

Night of 5–6 June: the assault. CDB90's Abu Ageila–Um Katef (556) runs from 20:00 on 5 June to 05:00 on 6 June. From 19:00 S-58 helicopters landed the paratroopers several kilometres north of the road; the landing drew Egyptian fire, and later waves were set down farther north, leaving a longer march. At about 22:40–22:45 the six artillery battalions opened a half-hour bombardment of the guns and trenches. Adam's battalions broke into the northern end of the trenches, each vanguard carrying torches of its own colour so that the Shermans waiting before the minefield could fire just ahead of them. Around 23:30 the paratroopers reached the Egyptian gun lines and attacked the crews at close range with submachine guns and grenades; they did not destroy every battery, but the Egyptian fire was badly disrupted.

In the trenches the Egyptians recovered from the surprise and fought hand to hand. The Israelis captured the colonel commanding at Umm Qatef and, soon after midnight, reached the road through the position. The reserve battalion, sent against the third line, found none. Engineers cleared a lane through the minefield at about 02:30, but a mined tank blocked it, and only by 04:00 was Zippori's tank battalion inside the perimeter. From about 04:00 to 06:00 it fought the 288th Tank Battalion's T-34s, used as a static anti-tank line, while Nir pushed east from Ruafa Dam; Oren writes of ranges as close as ten yards. By about 06:00 resistance had collapsed into isolated pockets, and Yoffe's second armoured brigade began passing through on the central road.

Aftermath

Israeli losses are given as 32–42 killed and up to about 140 wounded, with 19 tanks destroyed; Oren gives only 14 dead and 41 wounded. Egyptian dead are not known: Oren gives 300 killed and 100 prisoners, and an Israeli commander's estimate quoted on Wikipedia is about 2,000 casualties. About 40 Egyptian tanks were lost.

Cairo learned of the fall of Abu Ageila early on 6 June. That afternoon, at about 16:30, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer ordered all Egyptian forces in Sinai back to the west bank of the Suez Canal within a day, with no phased plan; units raced for the canal, abandoning much equipment, and by 8 June most of Sinai was in Israeli hands. Sharon's men took Qusaymah on 7 June to find the 10th Brigade gone; Naguib had already crossed the canal.

The battle is studied as a model of combined-arms planning: Luttwak and Horowitz note that it demanded rigid adherence to a detailed plan from an army whose strength had been improvisation. Gawrych sets it against Egypt's successful defence of 1956 and stresses the Egyptian failings: an absent division commander, a brigade headquarters too far back, unmined dunes and tanks left idle. Egyptian official sources dispute parts of the Israeli account, saying the paratroopers first landed on Gebel Dalfa and were driven off by artillery.

Wargaming it

Abu Ageila is a set-piece night assault on a prepared position, one of the most intricate of the Arab-Israeli wars, and suits company or battalion-as-unit scale for the night fight, with platoons for the trench and gun-line actions.

The Israeli player must synchronise four or five separate efforts: a paratroop raid on the guns, an infantry brigade working down the trenches from the open flank, tanks firing in close support, engineers clearing a lane, and an armoured force arriving from the rear. A timetable, coloured-light recognition and friendly-fire risk are the heart of the game; a rule that penalises any force for firing on an unidentified unit captures the problem.

The Egyptian player has strong positions, a large artillery park that outranges the attacker's guns, and a tank reserve, but a slow command chain. Restrict Egyptian reaction until a higher-command check is passed, reflecting the division commander's absence and the brigade headquarters' isolation at Ruafa Dam.

Key terrain: the trench lines on the Umm Qatef ridge, the minefield and the road through it, the gun positions behind, Umm Shihan and Ruafa Dam. What if the Egyptians had mined the northern dunes, or the 6th Tank Regiment had counter-attacked early from Awlad Ali? What if Gavish had insisted on waiting for daylight?

Maps and pictures