Battle of Adwa

Background

Italy had held the Red Sea port of Massawa since 1885 and founded the colony of Eritrea in 1890. In 1887 Ras Alula, general of Emperor Yohannes IV, destroyed an Italian column at Dogali. In 1889 the new emperor, Menelik II of Shewa, signed the Treaty of Wuchale with Italy. Its Article 17 made Italy the channel of Ethiopia's foreign relations in the Italian text, but in the Amharic text only an option the emperor might use. Italy read the treaty as a protectorate; Menelik rejected that reading and, by 1894, had brought the Tigrayan lords Ras Mengesha Yohannes and Ras Alula to submit to him.

Menelik prepared carefully. He bought modern rifles and guns from France and Russia through French Djibouti, courted sympathetic opinion in the European press, and on 17 September 1895 issued his call to arms. The army that answered was fed through a reformed system of land grants and tenant provisioning that let it stay in the field for months. Menelik and Taytu marched it nearly 600 miles north.

The Ethiopians struck first. On 7 December 1895 Ras Makonnen, Fitawrari Gebeyehu and Mengesha destroyed Major Toselli's advance force at Amba Alagi. The Italian fort at Mekele was besieged and fell in January 1896, in large part, History.com says, because Taytu had its water cut off. The army then slipped past Baratieri's entrenched main force, threatened his supply lines into Eritrea and camped around Adwa, on ground of Menelik's choosing. By late February both armies were running out of food. Baratieri wanted to wait or withdraw; Rome wanted action, and on 29 February his four brigadiers urged him to attack.

The armies

Menelik's army was a coalition. The emperor's own Shewan army and guard formed the core and the reserve; Taytu brought her own force from Semien, and the great lords their regional armies: Makonnen from Harar, Mengesha and Alula from Tigray, Mikael from Wollo with his Oromo cavalry, Tekle Haymanot from Gojjam, and others from Gondar and Lasta. Wikipedia's order of battle counts about 80,000 rifles and 42 guns, plus some 20,000 spearmen and swordsmen. The rifles were a mixture of single-shot breech-loaders, the Remington rolling-block probably the commonest, with some magazine rifles; the guns included mountain pieces and perhaps six 37mm Hotchkiss quick-firers. Ammunition was precious, and the men preferred to fire at close range.

Baratieri's field force had four brigades. Albertone's was almost all Eritrean askari, Eritrean soldiers under Italian officers; the others were largely Italian conscripts with some Bersaglieri, Alpini and Cacciatori d'Africa, and more askari battalions. Many rifles and guns were obsolete; the new Carcano rifle had not been issued. Maps were poor, boots worn out and morale low. Baratieri, a man of modest birth, was resented by his generals.

The battle

The plan, night of 29 February. Baratieri meant to march his brigades by night onto a line of heights overlooking the Ethiopian camp and wait there for an attack he hoped would break on prepared positions. Albertone was to take the left at the Kidane Mehret pass, Arimondi the centre, Dabormida the right, with Ellena's reserve behind Arimondi. The columns set off in the small hours along precipitous tracks with poor maps.

The night march. Albertone's and Arimondi's columns became entangled, and the muddle was not sorted out until about 04.00. Albertone reached what he took to be his objective at about 03.30 but, on the word of local guides, pressed on several kilometres further towards Enda Kidane Mehret. He was now far out ahead on the left, out of touch with the rest of the army.

The Ethiopian alarm. Ras Alula's spies had watched the Italians leave their camp at Entiscio and reached him by a roundabout route. He warned Menelik and the other commanders, who sent out scouts and readied their men. Menelik was at prayer at the church of St George with the Abuna Mattheos when the firing began.

Albertone destroyed, 06.00 to 10.00. At about 06.00 Albertone's vanguard, Major Turitto's 1st Indigenous Battalion, met Ethiopian forward troops near the church of Enda Mikael. Men poured down from the Enda Garima and Gessoso heights, and the forces of Tekle Haymanot, Mikael, Makonnen and others joined the attack. The askari fell back to a position on Mount Semaiata and at first held well: when the mist lifted at about 08.15 Italian firepower seemed to be telling. Fitawrari Gebeyehu was killed by machine-gun fire leading a frontal charge. Menelik and Taytu had arrived at about 08.00 and held their reserve back; now, urged by Taytu and Mengesha, Menelik committed some 25,000 men. His guard attacked frontally, Taytu's troops on the right, Mikael's on the left. From about 08.30 Albertone's brigade began to come apart. Its batteries were overrun and Albertone was captured when his mule was shot under him. At about 10.00 Major De Vito's battalion, out of ammunition, was overwhelmed in the Mariam Shewito valley.

The gap, 07.45 to noon. At about 07.45 Baratieri saw a wide gap opening between Albertone and Arimondi and ordered Dabormida to swing left to close it. Dabormida instead moved away to the right, and the gap grew. Ras Makonnen's corps drove into it. Arimondi's guns waited too long and, once fleeing askari and their pursuers were intermingled, could not fire to effect. At 09.15 Baratieri brought up Ellena's reserve; at about 10.00 the spur of Mount Belah fell, and a column of Shewan troops seized the Zeban Daaro spur, outflanking the centre. Major Galliano's battalion collapsed and Arimondi was killed. By noon two Italian brigades had ceased to exist as formations, and Baratieri ordered a general retreat towards Adi Ugri and Adi Keyh.

Dabormida, afternoon. Dabormida, isolated in the Mariam Shewito valley and fighting Makonnen's men, sent Baratieri a message at about 13.00 describing a good situation; it never arrived. From about 14.00, attacked by Shewan troops returning from the centre, he had to withdraw. The withdrawal was orderly but costly, and in its later stages Ras Mikael's Oromo cavalry charged into it. Dabormida was killed; his body was never found.

Pursuit. The retreat was poorly coordinated. A rearguard of about 100 Alpini under Pietro Cella was wiped out; Colonel Brusati held another near Yeha until about 15.00. The fugitives kept going until 03.00 on 2 March, and Baratieri reached Adi Keyh at about 09.00 that morning.

Aftermath

The Italian field force had lost perhaps half its men killed, among them two of the four brigade commanders, and some 3,000–3,800 Italians and askari were taken prisoner. All the artillery and about 11,000 rifles were left on the field. Ethiopian losses, perhaps 4,000–7,000 dead and many more wounded, were also heavy. About 800 captured Eritrean askari, regarded as traitors, had their right hands and left feet cut off; Italian prisoners were generally treated well and taken to Addis Ababa.

Menelik did not follow the Italians into Eritrea. Ras Alula urged him to, but his army was exhausted, the country was recovering from famine, and the Italian positions at Asmara and Massawa were strong. Clemm, reviewing Jonas, notes that restraint and careful treatment of the prisoners kept his hand strong for the peace talks. By the Treaty of Addis Ababa of 26 October 1896 Italy recognised Ethiopian independence and paid an indemnity that Menelik presented as the cost of keeping the prisoners. In Italy there were riots, Crispi resigned on 9 March and Baratieri was court-martialled and acquitted.

Adwa Victory Day is a public holiday in Ethiopia, and the battle became a touchstone of Pan-Africanism. Historians still argue over its weight. Jonas holds that Menelik had effectively won before the first shot through mobilisation, supply and diplomacy; Carlo Conti Rossini argued Ethiopia could not have kept its army in the field much longer; John Davis calls it 'more like a temporary respite than a true turning point'.

Wargaming it

Adwa suits a large game at battalion level, with each Italian battalion and battery a unit, Ethiopian forces grouped by the lord who led them, and turns of about twenty to thirty minutes from 06.00 to mid-afternoon. The table needs the arc of heights from Enda Kidane Mehret through Mount Semaiata and Mount Belah to the Mariam Shewito valley, with the Italian start lines behind.

The night march is the heart of it. Hidden movement or a pre-game march phase, with dice deciding where each Italian column ends up at dawn, lets the Italian player feel the brigades drift apart. Rules should reward Italian volley fire and artillery while formations hold together, and punish them hard once they are mixed with their own fugitives.

The Ethiopian player faces subtler decisions: a coalition of independent commanders, each with his own temper, a limited supply of ammunition, and above all when to commit Menelik's reserve. Holding it too long risks the loss of the forward troops; committing it too early leaves nothing to exploit the gap. A command system that makes each ras a separate player works well in multi-player games.

What ifs: Baratieri withdraws, as he wanted, and the Ethiopian army must chase him or go hungry; Albertone halts at the right pass; Dabormida obeys the order to close the gap. A campaign game from Amba Alagi through Mekele to Adwa, with supply for both sides, would test Menelik's strategy rather than only his battle.

Maps and pictures