Battle of Aughrim

Background

The Boyne in July 1690 did not end the war in Ireland. The Jacobites fell back behind the Shannon, holding Sligo, Athlone and Limerick, and William's own siege of Limerick failed that summer. Their command was split between a 'peace party' around Tyrconnell, which wanted terms, and a 'war party' around Patrick Sarsfield, which appealed to Louis XIV. Louis sent the Marquis de St Ruth, a career officer in Louis XIV's army, who reached Limerick on 9 May 1691 with arms and supplies to last until autumn. He restored much of the army's confidence.

The Williamite commander was the Dutch general Godert de Ginkel. He took Athlone on 30 June after a bloody siege and crossed the Shannon; St Ruth could not relieve the town and fell back west towards Ballinasloe. Tyrconnell wanted the army back at Limerick, and most of the Jacobite generals preferred to avoid a pitched battle and wear the enemy down with cavalry raids. St Ruth, keen to redeem the loss of Athlone, overrode them and chose to fight.

He picked his ground well: Kilcommodon Hill, a long, low ridge beside the village of Aughrim, about five miles south-west of Ballinasloe on the road to Galway and Limerick. Even Berwick, who thought little of St Ruth, praised the choice. Ginkel advanced cautiously from 10 July and found his road blocked at Aughrim on the morning of 12 July (22 July New Style). By then each army was about 20,000 strong.

The armies

Ginkel's army of about 20,000 was as mixed as William's had been at the Boyne: English, Scots and many Anglo-Irish Protestants, with Dutch, Danish and French Huguenot contingents. It was stronger in cavalry. Ginkel had advanced cautiously; his infantry attack was planned and led by the Scot Hugh Mackay, and the Huguenot Marquis de Ruvigny led squadrons of horse on the right.

The Jacobite army of about 20,000 was mostly Irish, under French generals: St Ruth in command and the Chevalier de Tessé as his second. It had more infantry than the Williamites, at least 30 regiments, largely inexperienced and poorly equipped, under the major-generals William Dorrington and John Hamilton. Its 4,000 or so cavalry and dragoons, under Dominic Sheldon, Henry Luttrell and others, were much better trained and equipped than the foot. Sarsfield had quarrelled with St Ruth, and accounts disagree on where he was posted; the participant Robert Parker, usually followed, puts him with the cavalry reserve in the left rear, under orders not to move without instructions.

St Ruth's position made up for much of his army's weakness. A broad bog, passable on foot but not by cavalry, covered his front. Old field ditches, hedges and banks on the slope gave the Irish foot ready-made breastworks.

The battle

The position (morning, 12 July). The Jacobite infantry lined Kilcommodon Hill behind the bog, Dorrington's division on the left and centre and Hamilton's on the right. On the left the only way across was a narrow causeway past the ruined castle of Aughrim, held by about 200 musketeers of Walter Burke's regiment, with two battalions at the causeway's end and Luttrell's horse behind them. On the right, firmer ground along the Tristaun stream at Urraghry was the weak point, and St Ruth put good infantry and much of his cavalry there under de Tessé. The Williamites crossed the River Suck at dawn and formed up opposite, but a heavy mist lasted until about 2 p.m.

Skirmishing and the decision to attack (2-5 p.m.). The armies cannonaded each other, and Ginkel probed the Jacobite right at Urraghry with Danish horse and Enniskillen dragoons. He meant to put off the main battle until the next day. At a council around 4 p.m. Mackay argued for an immediate attack: hit the Jacobite right first to draw in their reserves, then force the causeway on the left.

The attack on the right and centre (about 6 p.m.). Battle was joined in earnest around six. Continental cavalry charged at Urraghry while Mackay's English and Scots regiments waded the bog, in places waist-deep, and climbed into the hedges. The Irish foot held their fire until close range, then counter-charged, clubbing with reversed muskets. Williamite foot were driven back into the bog, colonels Erle and Herbert were captured, and the Jacobites spiked a Williamite battery. Hamilton's men mauled La Melonière's Huguenot brigade. St Ruth is said to have declared that the day was theirs.

The causeway (about 7-8 p.m.). Ginkel turned to his right. Dorrington had moved the two battalions at the causeway to reinforce the centre, and the defenders of the castle found their spare ammunition the wrong size for their muskets. Kirke's battalions secured ground near the castle, and Williamite horse, Ruvigny's squadrons and the Royal Horse Guards among them, got across the causeway at the third attempt. Luttrell's cavalry fell back by the track still called 'Luttrell's Pass', and the Williamite horse rode into Dorrington's flank.

St Ruth's death (shortly after 8 p.m.). St Ruth rode over to lead a counter-charge against them. Pausing to direct a battery, he was decapitated by a cannonball, around sunset. His officers tried to hide his death, but no one took command: Sheldon's reserve waited for orders that never came, and the cavalry of the left drew off. De Tessé tried a counter-attack and was badly wounded; Burke's men in the castle surrendered.

Collapse and rout (8-10 p.m.). Hamilton's foot on the right fought on against the Huguenots in the 'Bloody Hollow', but Williamite infantry now crossed the bog and pushed up Kilcommodon Hill. Around nine the Jacobite foot broke from the summit and fled towards a bog in their left rear, many throwing away their weapons, while the cavalry made for Loughrea. Sarsfield's horse made checking charges as a rearguard. Most Jacobite deaths came in this pursuit, which ended only with darkness and, by different accounts, rain or mist.

Aftermath

Aughrim is generally counted the bloodiest battle in Irish history. The Jacobites lost perhaps 4,000 to 7,000 killed, most of them in the rout, and their camp, guns and baggage. Ginkel recorded 526 prisoners, and the Jacobite writer Charles Leslie alleged that some 2,000 men were killed after being promised quarter. Two brigadiers and nine colonels were killed and two major-generals, Dorrington and Hamilton, captured; Hamilton died of his wounds. Williamite losses are put at anything from 600 to more than 3,000 killed and wounded. Most rank-and-file prisoners were held on Lambay Island, where many died.

The defeat ended the Jacobite cause in Ireland as a military force. Galway surrendered on terms on 21 July, Sligo in September, and Sarsfield's army at Limerick capitulated after a short siege, leading to the Treaty of Limerick in October 1691.

The blame has been argued over ever since: St Ruth for fighting at all, Dorrington for stripping the causeway, Sheldon for not acting without orders, Luttrell for withdrawing (a later rumour that he was bribed has no contemporary support). Berwick thought the battle lost even had St Ruth lived. In Irish tradition it became 'Eachdhroim an áir', Aughrim of the slaughter; the bones of the dead lay unburied for years. Loyalists commemorated Aughrim on 12 July until the early nineteenth century, when the Boyne took its place. A Celtic cross now marks the field, the Aughrim Interpretative Centre opened in 1991, and the M6 motorway, opened in 2009 near the battlefield, drew protests.

Wargaming it

Aughrim is a manageable size for a big-battle refight: two armies of about 20,000 on a field a few kilometres across, decided in a single evening. Brigade or regimental scale on a table covering Urraghry to Aughrim castle works well, with 15-20 minute turns from about 5 p.m. to nightfall; the morning's mist and skirmishing can be skipped.

The terrain carries the game. The bog should stop horse entirely and slow and disorder foot, the hedged slope of Kilcommodon should give the defenders strong cover, and the Aughrim causeway should be a one-unit-wide defile overlooked by the castle. Urraghry is the only open flank. Rules should give the Irish foot good morale in cover but little staying power in the open, the Jacobite cavalry quality, and the Williamites more and better-supplied horse.

The decisions are sharp. The Williamite player must choose when and where to commit, as Mackay did, and whether to risk cavalry on the causeway. The Jacobite player must manage reserves without stripping the causeway, as Dorrington did. A command rule is essential: if the Jacobite commander falls, the reserve should freeze, and a random 'cannonball' event late in the game recreates the turning point.

The 'what ifs': St Ruth surviving; Sarsfield's reserve released in time; Burke's men with the right ammunition; or the Jacobites taking their generals' advice and refusing battle.

Maps and pictures