Battle of Laon

Background

The Allies had invaded France in the winter of 1813–1814, and Blücher's Army of Silesia was pressing towards Paris. After a costly success at Craonne on 7 March, which let Blücher occupy Laon, Napoleon turned north-east to halt that advance. He hoped to beat Blücher a second time; the battle ended that hope and left Blücher in a position between the two main Allied armies.

Laon is a hill town and road junction, and its high ground gave the Allies strong defensive and observation positions. Blücher withdrew to it, and Prussian and Russian contingents gathered there. Napoleon planned a pincer: he would go in by the Soissons road from the south-west, while Marmont, detached with about 10,000 men, advanced along the Reims road from Berry-au-Bac and attacked from the east. The two wings were separated by marsh and willow groves.

On 8 March heavy fog hid the French movements. The fighting, on the road south-west towards Soissons through Chivy and Etouvelles, was a night attack led by Ney that routed the Allied jägers at Etouvelles and, after about four hours, took Chivy. Marmont's arrival was delayed: he left Berry-au-Bac too late and was held up at Festieux by fog. Blücher was 71 and ill, and Gneisenau, his chief of staff, was to take over on 11 March.

The armies

The Allies had about 90,000 men, perhaps as many as 100,000, and held the high ground. In napoleon-empire.org's breakdown, Wintzingerode's 25,000 held the west behind Clacy, Bülow's 17,000 held the centre with about 50 guns on the ramparts, Yorck and Kleist's 24,000 held the east on the Reims road between Laon and Athies, and Osten-Sacken and Langeron had about 25,000 in reserve. Ardon and Semilly, villages at the foot of the hill, were forward strongpoints. Bodart's comparison, quoted by Wikipedia, was 75,000 Allied infantry to 40,000 French, 25,000 cavalry to 10,000, and 480 guns to 260. Blücher, fevered, believed the French had 90,000, which napoleon-empire.org says was Blücher's own estimate of his enemy's strength.

The French were far fewer. Wikipedia gives about 40,000 under Napoleon and 14,000 under Marmont; napoleon-empire.org and Morris's essay give about 25,000 under Ney, Mortier and Charpentier on the southern road (Charpentier having replaced the wounded Victor) with Marmont's roughly 10,000 on the Reims road. Many were the young conscripts of 1814 and 1815 whom napoleon-empire.org calls the 'Marie-Louise'. Ney commanded the rearguard, and Napoleon believed on the 9th that he faced a rearguard rather than Blücher's whole army.

The battle

8–9 March: the southern road. Fog hid the French. Ney's night attack took Etouvelles and, after about four hours, Chivy. Under the same fog on the 9th the French seized Semilly and Ardon, the forward villages. Gourgaud's flanking column, delayed by snow and bad roads, reached Semilly about 05:30 and met heavy musketry. When the fog lifted about 11:00 it exposed the small French numbers, and Blücher, watching from the ramparts, ordered Woronzoff to retake Semilly and Bülow to attack Ardon, with Wintzingerode threatening the French left. Wintzingerode's corps retook Semilly and pushed the French from Clacy; Ney's exhausted troops were driven back until the cavalry reserve and Guard cavalry steadied the line. Napoleon reached the field about 13:00 and realised he faced Blücher's whole army. An assault by the Young Guard on Clacy failed under heavy artillery fire. At about 16:00–17:00 Napoleon committed the Guard, and Ney recaptured Clacy and Semilly, but Russian artillery stopped the French reaching the Porte de Soissons, and at Ardon the French took the suburb and lost it again.

9 March: Marmont at Athies. Marmont's corps came up the Reims road and fought Yorck's division at Athies; by about 18:00 it held the village, which the Prussians set on fire before leaving. Instead of withdrawing to Festieux, Marmont bivouacked on the open plain between Athies and the Lavergny woods, with poor pickets, and went to sleep at the Château d'Eppes, a few kilometres off. Yorck and Kleist, supported by Langeron and Osten-Sacken, surprised the camp in the evening or night. The French fled towards Berry-au-Bac. Two groups halted the rout: Colonel Fabvier's 400 cavalry, returning from a failed link-up with Napoleon, and about 125 Old Guard hunters with a clothing convoy at Festieux, who drove the Prussian cavalry from the village approaches. The loss was about 3,500 men, 45 guns and 120 caissons by napoleon-empire.org and Wikipedia; Morris's essay says about 2,000 surrendered at once.

10 March: Napoleon's last attacks. Blücher had ordered pursuit of Marmont, but he was now ill and refused to give orders; Langeron declined to command, and Gneisenau cancelled the offensive and recalled the pursuers. Napoleon, learning of Marmont's defeat, still ordered attacks to hold the town. From 09:00 the Russians assaulted Clacy five times and were repulsed by the young conscripts. Napoleon ordered Ney against Semilly, Mortier against Ardon and Charpentier against Laon from Clacy; Meunier and Curial reached the foot of the ramparts at Ardon but were thrown back by Bülow. Once the recalled Allied troops returned Napoleon gave up, and from about 15:00–16:00 his forces withdrew towards Soissons, with Ney commanding the rearguard.

11–12 March. Gneisenau, misled by French demonstrations against Laon, made cautious attacks on Ney's rearguard that were repeatedly repulsed.

Aftermath

French losses were about 6,000 to 7,500 by Wikipedia, up to 9,000 by napoleon-empire.org, and the Allies' about 3,500 to 4,000. Marmont's corps accounted for about half the French loss on History of War's estimate. The Allies did not pursue and remained largely inactive for about a week or almost two weeks. Napoleon used the respite to win his last success of the campaign at Reims on 13 March. But Arcis-sur-Aube on 20–21 March and La Fère-Champenoise on 25 March followed, Paris fell after Montmartre on 30 March, and Napoleon abdicated a few days later.

The argument is about what the battle cost. Morris's essay holds that the Allies could replace their losses while Napoleon, with manpower and materiel nearly exhausted after Craonne and Laon, could not, and that Gneisenau's cancellation of the pursuit saved Napoleon from destruction; napoleon-empire.org likewise says Blücher's staff recalled the troops and that Napoleon's reputation deterred the Allies from exploiting their advantage. Wikipedia lists the battle as a Coalition victory because Napoleon withdrew and the Allies kept their position.

Wargaming it

Laon is a lopsided scenario with a clear shape. The Allies hold a hill and a town; the French have the initiative and the worse odds. At a divisional scale, roughly one base per 1,000 men, it is a small game: about 90 bases to 54.

There are really two games. One is Napoleon's frontal approach on the southern face, where Ney's infantry fight for the villages of Ardon and Semilly below the hill and the Allied artillery on the high ground makes every attack costly. The other is the Reims-road action, where Marmont's isolated corps stops for the night and is overrun by Kleist and Yorck. Run the second as a surprise scenario in which the French player has to decide whether to halt, and the Allied player has to attack after dark. Give the French poor pickets and exposed artillery, as the sources describe.

The what-ifs are in command. An Allied player with Blücher fit can pursue; one with Gneisenau cannot. A French Marmont who keeps moving, or Napoleon who keeps his forces concentrated and reads the fog, changes the game. Fog until 11:00 is a good rule: it hides the Allied strength, so the French player commits on false assumptions, as Napoleon did.

Maps and pictures