Battle of Mukden

Background

Russia and Japan went to war in 1904 over rival ambitions in Manchuria and Korea. Japan opened with a surprise attack on the Russian base at Port Arthur and laid siege to it, while its field armies pushed north along the railway. At Liaoyang in the late summer of 1904 Japan won but failed to exploit the victory, and the Russians fell back in good order. By the winter both armies faced each other in long entrenched lines along the Sha river, south of Mukden, the rail centre of southern Manchuria.

Kuropatkin struck first. In late January 1905, at Sandepu (Heikoutai), he sent Grippenberg's Second Manchurian Army against the Japanese left before the besiegers of Port Arthur could come north. Seven Russian divisions attacked two of Oku's in a snowstorm and came close to success, but the attack fell apart, at a cost of roughly 8,000 Japanese and more than 10,000 Russian casualties. Grippenberg was replaced by Kaulbars.

Port Arthur had surrendered at the start of January, and Nogi's Third Army was now free to join Ōyama. Time otherwise favoured Russia: the single Trans-Siberian line was bringing about 30,000 men a month to Mukden, and the Baltic Fleet was on its way east. Japan's trained manpower was nearly spent. Ōyama and his chief of staff Kodama therefore sought not another Liaoyang but the destruction of the Russian army; Ōyama is said to have called it the Sekigahara of the campaign. The Russians were planning a new offensive of their own, and the Japanese moved first.

The armies

The two armies were of similar size. The 1911 Britannica put each at about 310,000; modern counts give about 250,000–270,000 Japanese against 276,000–292,000 Russians, with roughly 1,000 guns on the Japanese side and 1,200 field guns on the Russian. Japan had far more machine guns, about 200–250 to Russia's 56.

Kuropatkin held a front of some 140–150 km but only 20–25 km deep. Linevich's 1st Manchurian Army (about 107,000) held the hills on the east, Bilderling's 3rd (about 68,000) the centre, and Kaulbars's 2nd (about 100,000) the open plain on the west. A general reserve of about 45,000 men and 144 guns stood near Mukden. Much of the Russian cavalry served under Rennenkampf.

Ōyama had five armies in a crescent. From east to west: Kawamura's new Fifth (Yalu) Army, one veteran Port Arthur division and two reserve divisions, in the mountains; Kuroki's First; Nozu's Fourth in the centre, with heavy siege artillery including 28 cm howitzers; and Oku's Second on the plain. Nogi's Third Army waited hidden behind Oku, and the general reserve stood well back at Yentai.

The cold was extreme, down to about −22 °C. Frozen ground deadened shellfire, and the Hun river was frozen hard enough to cross. Valitutto judges the Russians dogged in defence but poor in attack.

The battle

The eastern feint, 20–26 February. Kawamura's Fifth Army began moving through the eastern mountains on 18–19 February and fell on Alekseev's detachment at Qinghecheng, which gave way after fighting on 23–24 February. The Russians took Kawamura for Nogi, as Ōyama intended. Kuropatkin sent reserves east, including the 1st Siberian Corps taken from his weak western wing. Kuroki's First Army joined the attack on Linevich from 24 February. As the temperature fell on 26 February, Rennenkampf brought Kawamura to a halt; Russian reinforcements under Danilov held the line in the east by 2 March, and Kuroki was stopped at the Gaotulin pass on 3 March.

Nogi's march, 27 February – 2 March. On 27 February Nozu's heavy guns opened on the Russian centre while Nogi's Third Army swung out round the open western flank, its 1st Division and cavalry covering nearly 20 km on the first day against weak Cossack screens. Not until 28 February did Kuropatkin grasp the danger from the west and begin to form a front facing west of Mukden. On 1 March Oku attacked Kaulbars from the south; one Japanese assault at Ssu-fang-tai cost about 700 dead. Nogi's first attacks on 1–2 March made little progress, and the Russians counter-attacked hard on 2 March.

The race to the north, 3–6 March. Kaulbars pulled the Russian right back towards Mukden to face west and south-west, while the centre on the Sha held. Nogi was checked at Salinpu, about 10 km west of the city, on 3 March. Both sides now kept stretching their lines northwards, Nogi trying to reach the railway behind Mukden and Kaulbars trying to block him. Oku launched a frontal diversion on 5 March. The Russian counter-stroke against Nogi failed on 5–6 March; Gerngross, one of its commanders, attacked hours late with about a quarter of his men. On the evening of 6 March Ōyama's general reserve, held back at Yentai, finally reached Nogi.

The Hun river and Yuhuantun, 7–8 March. On 7 March Kuropatkin drew his centre and left back to the Hun river, and the Japanese followed slowly. West of the city a Japanese brigade under Nanbu, about 5,000 men, stormed the village of Yuhuantun and held it, losing nearly 4,000. On 8 March Oku took over part of Nogi's line so that the Third Army could push further north-west. Fighting between Nogi and Kaulbars was savage, and Kuropatkin decided to fall back on Tieling.

Retreat, 9–10 March. On 9 March the Japanese broke across the frozen Hun east of Mukden and threatened the Mandarin road behind the Russian lines. The sources disagree over whether Kuroki or Nozu made the crossing. Kuropatkin ordered a general retreat that evening, at 18:45 on one account. Through the night the Russian armies streamed north along a narrow corridor under fire from both sides, covered by rearguards that suffered heavily. Nogi had not cut the railway. The Japanese entered Mukden at about 10:00 on 10 March, and that evening Nogi's left and Kawamura's right met north of the city, closing a ring with no Russian army left inside it. Between 20,000 and 25,000 Russians were taken prisoner, most of them in the last two days.

Aftermath

Russian losses were about 88,000–100,000, including 20,000–29,000 missing and prisoners, with 58 guns abandoned. Japanese losses were about 70,000–77,000 on modern counts. The 1911 Britannica gave only 40,000–50,000. Kuropatkin was removed and given the 1st Manchurian Army, and Linevich took command. The Russians withdrew through Tieling to Sipingai, about 175 km north of Mukden, where they stayed for the rest of the war.

There was no decisive pursuit. Japan had made its supreme effort; it had nearly exhausted its trained men and junior officers, its supply lines were overstretched, and ammunition was short. Ōyama reported that he lacked both men and shells, Yamagata warned against carrying on, and Kodama was sent to Tokyo to press for peace. Russia, by contrast, had committed only a fraction of its strength and replaced its losses within a month. Tsushima in May and unrest at home pushed Russia to accept Roosevelt's mediation, and the war ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth.

The Times compared Mukden with Austerlitz and Waterloo. Japan made 10 March its Army Day. Historians still argue over Kuropatkin's handling of his reserves, which he moved east to meet a feint and could not bring back in time. Valitutto calls it a clear Japanese win but not the crushing one Japan wanted. Its long entrenched fronts, machine guns and slow attrition looked forward to 1914.

Wargaming it

Mukden is an army-group battle: around 550,000 men on a front of 140 km over nearly three weeks. For the whole battle, an operational game with divisions or brigades as units and half-day or daily turns suits it best. Nogi's march, Kuropatkin's reserves and the race for the railway all show up at that scale. Played tactically, it fragments into many separate actions. Yuhuantun, Salinpu or the Ssu-fang-tai assault make good stand-alone brigade games for one evening.

The map shows the shape of the battle: mountains in the east that slow every move, open frozen plain in the west where Nogi can march freely, the Hun river (frozen, so not a barrier), villages as strongpoints, and one railway north to Tieling that the Russians must keep open. The winter should cost both sides. Deadened artillery fire, exhausted troops and slow supply matter more than in most battles of the period.

The game turns on information. Hidden movement or dummy counters let the Russian player make Kuropatkin's mistake for himself: is the column in the eastern hills Nogi or not? The Japanese player must decide when to release the reserve at Yentai and how far north to push Nogi before the Third Army falls apart from exhaustion. Victory should reward the Japanese for cutting the railway and the Russians for getting their army away, not for holding Mukden. Useful what-ifs: a Russian offensive launched first; the 1st Siberian Corps kept in the west; the Japanese reserve placed nearer the front.

Maps and pictures