Battle of Pea Ridge

Background

In the winter of 1861–62 Union forces pushed Sterling Price's Missouri State Guard out of Missouri and into northwestern Arkansas. Brigadier General Samuel Curtis followed with the Army of the Southwest, about 10,250 men and 50 guns, and went into position behind Little Sugar Creek in Benton County. More than half of his men were German immigrants in the divisions of Franz Sigel, who had expected to command the army and had threatened to resign when Curtis was appointed.

On the other side, Major General Earl Van Dorn had taken over the Confederate Trans-Mississippi District with the aim of destroying Curtis and reopening the road into Missouri. His Army of the West numbered about 16,000, with Price's Missourians, Benjamin McCulloch's Texans, Arkansans and Louisianans, and about 800 Native American troops under Albert Pike.

Van Dorn ordered a light march: three days' rations, 40 rounds and a blanket, with the tents and cooking gear left behind. On 4 March he split his army and sent it north through Bentonville to get into Curtis's rear. The forced march took three days in freezing weather, and the supply trains were left behind, a decision the historian William Shea treats as crucial. Curtis concentrated his units behind Little Sugar Creek. On the night of 6 March, Colonel Grenville Dodge, with Curtis's approval, felled trees across the road Van Dorn's men were using, and the tired Confederate column lost still more time.

The armies

Curtis's army was mostly Midwestern: regiments from Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri and Ohio. It had about 50 guns, which Sigel massed on the second day. The German-born regiments formed the first two divisions under Sigel, with native-born troops in the third and fourth divisions, an arrangement meant to balance ethnicity and rank. The senior subordinates were Colonel Peter Osterhaus, Brigadier General Alexander Asboth, Colonel Jefferson C. Davis and Colonel Eugene Carr.

Van Dorn's army was a coalition. Price's Missouri State Guard and McCulloch's division were separate commands, and Pike's Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek and Seminole cavalry were new to the field. The numbers favoured the Confederates by about three to two, but the army that reached the field was hungry and tired, and its commander had left behind the wagons carrying the reserve ammunition.

By the sources, the Confederate edge in numbers was cancelled by the forced march, by Van Dorn's division of his army into two columns, and by the loss of McCulloch and McIntosh on the first day.

The battle

Contact (morning of 7 March) Van Dorn hoped both divisions would be at Cross Timber Hollow by dawn, but only the head of Price's arrived. McCulloch's division was sent by the Ford Road to join Price at Elkhorn Tavern. Curtis sent Dodge's brigade towards Elkhorn and Osterhaus north up the Ford Road with Greusel's brigade, Bussey's cavalry and twelve guns. The fighting split into two separate actions.

Leetown (about 11:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.) At 11:30 Osterhaus saw McCulloch's whole division marching east a few hundred yards away. Union guns shelled it, and McIntosh's cavalry overran Bussey's men and captured the guns, then routed two companies of the 3rd Iowa. Greusel formed nine guns at Oberson's Field, and McCulloch was shot through the heart while scouting the timber. McIntosh took command without telling many subordinates and was killed leading the 2nd Arkansas Mounted Rifles into a volley. Colonel Louis Hébert led the left wing into the woods not knowing he commanded the division, and was later captured. By about 2 p.m. Davis's division had arrived and the Confederate command had broken down. Pike assumed command about 3 p.m. and ordered a retreat at 3:30, which became a confused withdrawal.

Elkhorn Tavern (about 9:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m.) About 9:30 Confederate cavalry met the 24th Missouri in Cross Timber Hollow, and Carr deployed with Dodge's brigade near the tavern. The four guns of the 1st Iowa Battery slowed Price's advance. Vandever's brigade reached Elkhorn about 12:30 and counter-attacked. At 2 p.m. Van Dorn learned McCulloch's division would not come, and Henry Little pushed his Missouri brigade forward on his own initiative. About 4:30 Price's left turned Carr's line, Dodge's brigade collapsed at Clemon's farm, and the Union line fell back to Ruddick's field, where Davis, Asboth and Curtis joined them. At 6:30 Curtis made a brief counter-attack and recalled his men in the dark.

8 March That night Curtis refused Asboth's urging to retreat. Van Dorn's ammunition train had been sent back to Camp Stephens by mistake. By 8 a.m. Sigel's line ran from Asboth on the left through Osterhaus and Davis to Carr, and Sigel massed 21 guns on a knoll west of Elkhorn against 12 Confederate guns. One Confederate battery fled and its commander was arrested. About 9:30 Van Dorn learned his reserve ammunition was six hours away and decided to retreat by the Huntsville Road. At 10:30 Sigel attacked, and by about noon the Union lines met near Elkhorn and cheered.

This is the single CDB90 engagement 'PEA RIDGE' (7 March 10:30 to 8 March 11:30). CDB90 treats the Confederates as attackers; roles did not swap, though on the second day Curtis held the initiative.

Aftermath

Union losses were 1,384 (203 killed, 980 wounded, 201 missing). Van Dorn reported about 1,000 men, but Shea estimates about 2,000 Confederate casualties, and the American Battlefield Trust says 2,500. McCulloch, McIntosh and Colonel William Y. Slack were killed or mortally wounded, Price was wounded and Hébert was captured.

Van Dorn's army retreated for a week without supplies, and thousands of Price's men deserted. Pike returned to Indian Territory. The Confederates never again seriously threatened Missouri, and Van Dorn's army was soon moved east across the Mississippi. Curtis moved into northeastern Arkansas and took Helena on 12 July. Sigel quarrelled with Curtis over credit for the victory and was transferred to Virginia. Van Dorn said he had 'only failed in my intentions' (as quoted in Josephy, via Wikipedia), and the soldiers' joke was that nobody had been whipped at Pea Ridge except Van Dorn.

The battle is also remembered for a dispute over Pike's Native American troops. The 3rd Iowa suffered 24 killed and 17 wounded, an unusual ratio, which Wikipedia says 'suggests' that Native warriors killed wounded Union soldiers, citing James Mueller; it is an inference, and it damaged Pike's reputation for life. The battlefield is now Pea Ridge National Military Park (1956), among the best-preserved Civil War battlefields.

Wargaming it

Pea Ridge is an unusually open, even fight with two separate actions on day one and a single, artillery-led battle on day two, so it divides cleanly into scenarios. A regimental scale, with a gun standing for a battery, suits the Leetown and Elkhorn actions; brigade scale would cover the whole two days on one table.

The key terrain is the Telegraph or Wire Road running through Elkhorn Tavern and Big Mountain, which was considered impassable. Day one is a double meeting engagement, and the leadership matters: the Confederate command structure can be made to collapse at Leetown as McCulloch and McIntosh are killed and Hébert wanders off, a good command-and-control mechanism for a game. On day two, the Union player masses artillery in Sigel's concentration while the Confederate side runs down its ammunition; an ammunition-tracking rule gives the Confederate player the pressure Van Dorn faced.

The interesting 'what ifs' are on the Confederate side. If Van Dorn's march had not been delayed by Dodge's felled trees and if the whole army had come together at Elkhorn on the morning of 7 March, the Union army would have faced a single massed attack. If the ammunition train had been with the army on 8 March, Van Dorn could have fought on. The Native American units are a design issue: the sources are thin on how they fought, and a game should not extrapolate from the disputed 3rd Iowa casualties.

Maps and pictures