1815, Waterloo

PAOB

assault — Capture of Ligny — Engagements on the hills

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1S15

I. The operations of the 1 5th of June — The battles of Ligny

CHAP. II THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 105

The Prussian centre was shattered and broken, with the exception of a few battalions which retired in good order and bravely resisted Delort's cuirassiers, who were unfortunately not backed up by the second division of Milhaud's corps.'''^ The whole infantry fled helter-skelter. Thanks to the desperate charges of Eoder's cavalry, they in some degree arrested the impetus of the French march, thus enabling Krafft, Jagow, and Langen to save part of their artillery ^^ and to rally the remains of their divisions between Sombrefife and the Koman way. But though the enemy's centre had been cut in two, they regained their former positions on both wings. Zieten and Thielmann only commenced to beat a retreat when they heard of the surrender of Ligny. The Prussians massed around La Haye, and regained with steady steps the higher summits of the hills, harassing by sudden charges from time to time, Vandamme's infantry when it pressed too closely ; their rearguard held their own at Brye till daybreak. Thielmann withdrew his corps to the rear of Sombrefte, which he occupied all night with a strong detachment. The sharpshooters again opened fire on the Brye-Sombreflfe line about half-past nine.^^

THE EETREAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY

On the evening of the battle of Ligny, the Emperor had not thought it possible to pursue the enemy any farther than the Brye-Sombreffe line. The Prussian Army, the right and left wings of which were withdrawing in fairly good order, and which continued to occupy these two villages by detachments, seemed still capable of a serious resistance. The arrival of a reserve corps debouching by the Namur road, was to be feared. And Napoleon was without news from his left. Through the whole of that day. the Prince of La Moscow had not sent him a single despatch.^ The Emperor knew from indirect information that there had been a battle at Quatre-Bras. But had Marshal Ney been victorious ? The presumptions were rather that he had been held in check, if not repulsed, for the orders prescribing a movement on the rear of the Prussian Army had not been executed There were many reasons against running the risk of a pursuit by night.^

THE BATTLE OF QUATRE-BEAS

At Frasnes, Ney continued to be as inactive and careless as at Gosselies. He did not even think of examining on the spot, the enemy's positions, or of urging toward Quatre-Bras offensive reconnaissances, in order to compel the enemy to unmask. It even seemed as if he neglected to question his generals, the commanders of his outposts, or that he paid no attention whatever to their reports. Lefebvre-Desnoettes or Colbert certainly warned him that the Netherlanders appeared to have received reinforcements, that since the morning they had extended and advanced their front, that at six o'clock

THE EETREAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY

On the evening of the battle of Ligny, the Emperor had not thought it possible to pursue the enemy any farther than the Brye-Sombreffe line. The Prussian Army, the right and left wings of which were withdrawing in fairly good order, and which continued to occupy these two villages by detachments, seemed still capable of a serious resistance. The arrival of a reserve corps debouching by the Namur road, was to be feared. And Napoleon was without news from his left. Through the whole of that day. the Prince of La Moscow had not sent him a single despatch.^ The Emperor knew from indirect information that there had been a battle at Quatre-Bras. But had Marshal Ney been victorious ? The presumptions were rather that he had been held in check, if not repulsed, for the orders prescribing a movement on the rear of the Prussian Army had not been executed There were many reasons against running the risk of a pursuit by night.^

THE EETREAT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY

On the 17th of June, toward seven o'clock a.m., Flahaut came back from Frasnes, and brought the account of the battle of Quatre-Bras to the Emperor, who was then at breakfast.* At about the same hour, a despatch from Pajol was also received at Imperial headquarters ; it was dated from BaMtre, four o'clock A.M., and announced that Pajol was pursuing the enemy, who were in full retreat toward Liege and Namur. He added that he had already made numerous prisoners.^

CHAP. VIII THE CAMPAIGN OF 1615 273

Wellington had with him only the Perponcher division, the Van Merlen cavalry, the Brunswick corps, and the Picton division, that is 22,000 men. (Moreover, presupposing the capture of Quatre-Bras by Ney, between noon and two o'clock, Perponcher's 7,200 soldiers would have been so crushed, as. to be quite useless, when the English reinforcements arrived.) The Alton division (4,000 muskets) did not debouch till half-past five, and the Cooke and Kruse divisions (7,000 men) not before seven. Thus, either Wellington would have attacked at three with Perponcher, Picton, or Van Merlen, in which case these 15,000 men, struggling against 43,000, would have been exterminated ; or rather, to prevent his two divisions being destroyed, one after the other, he would have waited not only for Brunswick, but for Alten as well, before taking the offensive ; consequently, he would not have engaged in battle until about six o'clock. By this time, one -half of Key's corps would already have been close on the Prussians' heels, and the Marshal would have had 20,000 men in a good position, whom he could oppose until nightfall against a force of 28,000, then of 32,000 assailants. Even if he were com- pelled to fall back on Frasnes, this retreat, at the approach of night, would have been without any strategical importance. Besides, it is very probable that if Wellington, on his return from the Bussy mill at about three o'clock, had found Quatre- Bras strongly occupied by the French, he would have prudently concentrated his troops on Genappe while awaiting the issue of the battle waging before Ligny. So much, at least, may be inferred from his ordinary circumspection and his British egotism.

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO

CHAPTER III

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO {continued)

CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO (continued)

CHAPTER V

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO (continued)