A History of the British Army, vol. 10

CHAPTER XIX

Its issue alarming to the British . General Brown’s subsequent movements Drummond plans a stroke upon his communications Advance of the British to Lundy’s Lane The action of Lundy’s Lane

CHAPTER: XIX

Ar the close of 1813, it will be remembered, the 1814. Americans could place to their credit one substantial gain, the destruction of Captain Barclay’s fleet upon Lake Erie. This the British had countered on land by the reconquest of the whole of the lost peninsula of Niagara and the capture of Fort Niagara on the American frontier. Thereby they acquired the absolute control of the harbour of refuge where the river Niagara enters Lake Ontario, and a fortress lying on the flank of any American force that might attempt the invasion of Canada. The winter of 1813-14 was unusually mild and open, which practically frustrated all operations on both sides, owing to the extreme diffi- culty of transport by land in the absence of frozen snow. In January Drummond proposed to march seventeen hundred men by land from the Niagara frontier to Detroit, cross Lake Erie on the ice to Put in Bay Island, and seize the two English prizes Detroit and Queen Charlotte which had been taken by Perry and left in that anchorage. The plan was a sound one, and would have redressed the balance of naval power on Lake Erie in England’s favour; but it proved to be impossible of execution because the water was still unfrozen. On the American side for the same reason as little was done. Wilkinson on the 13th of February broke up the cantonments in which he had remained since his ridiculous campaign of 1813, and divided his force into three parts, two of which took up quarters at Plattsburg and Burlington upon Lake Champlain, and

CHAPTER: XIX

June was now come, and the Government of the United States at length formulated its plan of campaign for the summer. Once again it was decided to make the principal effort in Upper Canada, against Mackinaw and the Niagara Peninsula, instead of against Kingston and Montreal. How Secretary Armstrong was induced to abandon his own correct strategical views does not appear. He combated at least the project of wasting force upon Mackinaw, when the capture of York, which

CH. XIX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 105

was the object of the expedition on the Niagara frontier, 1814. would in itself cut off and reduce the distant fort on June. Lake Huron; but he eventually submitted to the superior ignorance of his colleagues. It was therefore determined that five thousand troops and three thousand volunteers under Brown should, under protection of part of the Erie squadron, be landed on the north coast of the lake between Fort Erie and Long Point, some eighty miles to west of it, and advance northward against Burlington Heights, so as to sever the British communications between their forts on the Niagara and York. The rest of the Erie squadron was to escort an armament of about a thousand men to Mackinaw. As subsidiary operations General Izard was to make a diversion against Montreal from Plattsburg; and fifteen armed boats, supported by posts from Izard’s army, were to interrupt the passage by water between Kingston and Montreal. Thus the object which should have been primary was made secondary, and that which should have been secondary was made primary, according to the approved practice of the amateur strategist. Prevost for his part had both in March and May ¢ been dabbling in negotiations for an armistice, hoping : no doubt to suspend hostilities pending the termination of the war in Europe, which event might dispose the United States to agree to an amicable settlement. The idea did not commend itself to Yeo, who was consulted by Prevost, nor to the British Government, which did not receive any report of the proceedings until after the conclusion of the Peninsular War ; but, as Sir George’s efforts came to nothing, there is no object in dwelling further upon them. Meanwhile it must be noted that no reinforcements reached Prevost until June, when they began to arrive from various quarters; the Six- teenth and two companies of artillery from Cork at the ___ beginning of the month; the Nineteenth from the West Indies; and the Sixth and Ejighty-second from the Peninsular army at the end of June. Prevost had been so often disappointed over the coming of promised

CHAPTER XX

the Penobscot . : 5 : : : : el39 The expedition against Washington . : 5 eats LAO Landing of the British from the Patuxent . ; : LAL The American dispositions . : : : : : . 142 The affair of Bladensburg . : : : : ; elas The burning of Washington ; 4 j : : has Panic of the Americans. : 3 ; LAG The expedition proceeds from Bene : : ; SRL Ay The affair of North Point . P ‘ ; : : rds Advance to Baltimore found impossible : : : . 149 The expedition sails for Jamaica . : , 3 ; hrd9 Projects for attack on New Orleans. : . : A LEO

CHAPTER XX

Advance of General Keane upon New Orleans

CH. XX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 149

1814.coming of two West India regiments, and presently Nov. sailed for the mouth of the Mississippi. Its destination, as was too often the case throughout this war, had already been proclaimed in the West Indian newspapers, and possibly was no secret in any quarter by the autumn of 1814. In May, very soon after taking over the command of the North American and West Indian stations, Admiral Cochrane had despatched to the mouth of the Apalachicola river a frigate, whose captain, Pigot by name, after negotiation with the Creek and Choctaw Indians, had reported that, with the aid of a few British officers and sergeants, these savages could gain possession of Baton Rouge, from which base the conquest of New Orleans and the Lower Mississippi would be a simple matter. Accordingly Cochrane in August had sent an officer and a few non-commissioned officers, together with arms and ammunition, to the Indians, and seconded Pigot’s recommendation to the Government in Downing Street. His views found all too ready acceptance with Ministers, who had already resolved to despatch a formidable force to New Orleans under Sir Rowland Hill.’ As it happened, the political situation was not such as to permit the intended number of troops to be spared from Europe ; and the expedition was therefore limited to six thousand men, of which one brigade, under Major-general Lambert, was to join the main body in the Mississippi itself. After the death of Ross, moreover, Sir Edward Pakenham, Wellington’s brother-in-law, and lately his Adjutant-general, was appointed to the supreme command. It is easy to see that the choice of New Orleans as an objective was due to naval advice, and that this advice was due chiefly to the desire for prize-money.

CH. XX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 151

The city was the great depdt for the exportation of 1814. cotton and sugar; and it was estimated that the crops of these two commodities alone, stored up within it, were worth in England some three-and-a-half millions sterling, which tobacco, hemp, lead and shipping would increase to fully four millions. The seizure of so rich a hoard, if it could be easily and cheaply effected, might conceivably be the most telling blow that England could strike at the United States, a country upon which it is notoriously difficult to inflict vital injury. But this was not the reason why the naval officers recommended it. Prize-money had for nearly two centuries been the motive for all amphibious operations recommended by the Navy ; and this of New Orleans was no exception. If any naval officers had shown stronger lust of prize than others, they were the Scots ; and all three of the Admirals engaged in this expedition— excellent men in their own profession—were by a singular coincidence Scotsmen, Cochrane, Cockburn and Malcolm. Cochrane at the outset estimated that three thousand British soldiers would suffice to drive the Americans entirely out of Louisiana, as they would be joined by all the Indians, disaffected French and Spaniards ; a piece of folly so childish that it ought to have warned the British Ministers against listening to any of his projects. Listen they did, however, though in their instructions to the commanders they stated the objects of the expedition to be, first, the seizure of the mouth of the Mississippi, so as to deprive the American back-settlements of communication with the sea, and, next, the occupation of some valuable possessions which would be useful to hold in pledge against the negotia- tions for peace. The General was also authorised to encourage any movement in favour of setting up an independent Government in Louisiana and of restoring it to Spain; but at the same time to make it clearly understood that the British Government could not make such independence or transfer of allegiance an essential condition in the negotiations for peace. This

XIV HISTORY OF THE ARMY

General Constant secures Quatre Bras . Wellington’s orders for concentration . Napoleon’s plans for the 16th of June.

CONTENTS

The battle of Quatre Bras .

CHAPTER XXIV

Few engagements are more difficult to follow and to understand than the battle of Quatre Bras. It is impossible, in the first place, to say definitely what numbers of the Allies were in action at any given moment after the first hour or even half-hour. Fresh troops were constantly coming up from beginning to end of the fight, and, though many authors have tried to settle the hour at which this or that brigade or division arrived on the ground, the data upon which they have reckoned are so uncertain that no reliance can be placed upon them. The hours stated by various actors who have left narratives of the struggle are, again, so contradictory that any endeavour to reconcile them is hopeless. It is also extremely hard to discover exactly what force of cavalry was at the disposal of Ney. Some narratives! on the side of the Allies state that Roussel’s cuirassiers were present at the end of the day, but did not charge ; and indeed the ubiquity of the cuirassiers, as pourtrayed by the concurrence of many English narrators, would seem to demand the presence of more than one brigade of this particular description of cavalry. The constant mention of lancers also would seem to imply that those of Lefebvre- Desnoéttes as well as those of Piré were among the

CHAPTER XXV

meet this contingency that he had been entrusted with 1815. a force of over thirty thousand men. Further, Napoleon June 17. evidently contemplated the chance of his meeting with the entire Prussian army, or at any rate with a superior force, otherwise he would not have added the admonition that many avenues of retreat should be kept open for the infantry. The possibility that Wellington and Bliicher might unite their armies and fight a battle to cover Brussels and Liége is treated in extremely obscure language. The only line on which a single battle could be fought to cover both places would be that of the previous day, Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, or perhaps Quatre Bras and Gembloux. Did Napoleon expect Wellington and Bliicher each of them to assemble his whole army (which so far neither of them had done) and to fight another action at Quatre Bras and Gembloux, at which points the pair of them were said to be massed in strength? It must be presumed that he did, for, if the two were to fight united in a single array, they could only do so safely by converging north-west and north-east ; and not a word was said to Grouchy about exploring at all in a northerly direction or west of Gembloux.