A History of the British Army, vol. 7

VOL. VII D

1809. leaving Tyrol to its own resources. The skill and gallantry of the peasants enabled them, fortunately, still to hold their own ; but, meanwhile, Eugene was able to follow up the Archduke John, and, after inflicting May 20. further losses upon him, to join Napoleon on the 20th at a very critical time. For the Archduke Charles, in spite of all reverses, had refused to relax his hold of the northern bank of the Danube over against Vienna ; and, in attempting to dislodge him on the 21st and 22nd, Napoleon met at Aspern and Essling with a reverse so serious as narrowly to escape disaster. His situation was the more perilous, inasmuch as the two bridges by which he crossed the Danube were swept away by a flood, leaving him no means of retreat. Under cover of darkness he withdrew his troops into the island of Lobau, and put forth all his energy to retrieve his position. He had lost in the fight one of his oldest comrades and ablest commanders, Lannes, Duke of Montebello, and little short of twenty-five thousand men. He now called to him every soldier that could be spared from all quarters for a supreme effort.

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It is very evident, therefore, that, notwithstanding all the efforts of Kleist and of the Court of Vienna, the British Ministers were not disposed to send a large force to North Germany unless Prussia openly declared war against France. I cannot myself believe that they were wrong. Thrice had British troops been sent to the Continent in reliance upon the support of Prussia, and even with the hope of heartening her to action, and thrice had the expectations of the British Government been disappointed. It was true that circumstances were now changed. Prussia had been humbled to the dust ; but the temper of her people was rapidly rising, and three great men — Stein, Scharnhorst, and Gneise- nau — had come forward to work out her salvation. Still Stein had been banished since November 1808 by Napoleon's order, and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau only with infinite difficulty held their own against treacher- ous opponents at the Court of Frederick William. The King, as we have seen, had so far shrunk from draw- ing the sword ; and, looking to the early failures of Austria in Bavaria, it was not likely that he would forsake his attitude of quivering neutrality. The success of the Archduke Charles at Aspern, how- ever, promised to bring about a change, and the Emperor Francis sent a special envoy to Konigsberg to press Frederick William once more to take up arms. The envoy, Count Steigentisch, arrived on the 15th of June, and found the monarch much shaken by Schill's escapade. At his first interview the King received him coldly ; at the second he showed greater warmth and pressed him to stay at Konigsberg ; at the third he told him to be gone, because his presence gave umbrage to the embassies of Russia and France Prussian patriots were deeply disgusted, and deter- mined that the only possible means of bringing their

VOL. VII D

This intelligence Ministers naturally regarded as conclusive. Time was pressing. The best part of the campaigning season was already past ; the Archduke Charles and Napoleon were both girding themselves for a decisive battle on the Danube, and, if the weight of England was to make itself felt on the main continent of Europe, it must be thrown into the scale at once. Happily the tidings that Sir Arthur Wellesley had on the 1 2th of May defeated Soult at Oporto showed that the British troops were not idle ; but this stroke was not such as could be immediately felt at Vienna. On the 10th of June the arrival of the news of Aspern 1 Memorandum of Decken in W.O. I. 11 19.

CHAPTER XXXIII

with England, to accept the Continental System, and to 1 809. pay an indemnity of nearly three and a half millions sterling. The rupture with England was in itself nothing very formidable in the matter of actual aggression, being understood on both sides to be merely formal ; but, on the other hand, the marriage of Napoleon with an Austrian Archduchess seemed to portend at least the elimination of Austria, as an active helper against France, from any future coalition. From Prussia less than ever was now to be expected ; from Russia, bound as she was by the Treaty of Tilsit, there was as yet equally no hope ; so that England was left without an ally in Europe except the formless and inefficient governments of Spain and Portugal. And the hardest part of the trouble was that all the mis- carried enterprises of the past year had only narrowly missed brilliant success. The Austrians had won a victory at Aspern and had only just been beaten at Wagram. Wellesley's campaign had been wrecked rather by Cuesta and Venegas than by Soult ; while, though he had retreated from Talavera, he had at least delivered Portugal and helped the Spanish insurgents to deliver Galicia. Even the landing in the Scheldt had, as we know, caused a panic in Paris and treachery in Fouche. Could British Ministers have seen the Emperor's letters to Clarke during the month of August, his reiterated statements that Flushing was impregnable, the violent reproaches over his subordinate's slowness in enrolling troops, and his pungent criticism of his generals in Spain, they would have perceived that their perseverance was beginning to tell. Their great enemy was slowly losing his sense of reality and his hold upon facts, owing to the vast extension of the business, both civil and military, which he was attempting in his own person both to survey and to direct.

VOL. VII D

Meanwhile Castlereagh had been labouring inde- fatigably over the work of equipping the troops and hiring transports. One hundred thousand tons of shipping were required, but no orders were given for procuring them until the 20th of May, and even then no indication was given of the amount that would be needed. Freight was both scarce and dear, owing partly to the demand for the army of Portugal ; and the tonnage was not obtained except with difficulty and at a considerable rise of price. The troops also were unready, the re-equipment of several regiments being still incomplete at the end of June.2 At last, in the second week of July, the embarkation began at Ports- mouth and Deal, and in the Downs, and Castlereagh himself went down to Deal to witness it. There on about the 22nd he received the long-expected news from the Danube. Napoleon had extricated himself with amazing skill from the island of Lobau, and the decisive battle had been fought at Wagram on the 6th of July, ending in no great advantage to either party, but in the retreat of the Archduke and in the conclusion of an armistice at Znaim on the 12th. There was, however, yet hope that the armistice would not be con- verted into a peace, especially if the British diversion proved to be effective. On the afternoon of Wednes-

VOL. VII T

reason to believe, was inaccurate in his denial,1 The 1809. situation, however, was sufficiently serious. The men, being half-starved, were losing discipline and spirit, and the news of the defeat of the Austrians at Wagram and of the armistice of Znaim had struck discourage- ment into the officers. " With the army which a fortnight ago beat double their numbers," wrote Wellesley on the 8th of August, " I should now hesitate to meet a French corps of half their strength." The mortality among the horses from want of forage was another most formidable difficulty ; and Wellesley, who had already been obliged to make over some of his ammunition to the Spaniards from want of trans- port to carry it, was fain to contemplate the necessity of destroying some of his guns.

K.G.L.

The Austrian success at Aspern had given a new turn 1^09. to the war on the Danube, which had not been wholly undone by Napoleon's costly and indecisive victory at Wagram ; and on the very day of Wagram Italy had July 6. been roused and shocked by the news that General Miollis had seized the Pope by Napoleon's order, and had carried him off with the utmost haste to the Alps. Colonel Bunbury urged Stuart to attack Civita Vecchia or Leghorn, or at least to make a demonstration on the north coast. The King of Sardinia asked him to co-operate in an attack on the Genoese Riviera. Stuart would not move. Neapolitan gentlemen came to Ischia to treat with him on behalf of the patriots of Italy, saying that if he would favour Italian independence, they would join him to a man to expel the French, but that if he came to restore Ferdinand, they would join the French and take arms against him. Stuart declined to see them or to send them any reply ; whereupon, observing Prince Leopold to be on the spot, they con- cluded that Stuart's object was to re-establish the hated King. It was very evident that the General in planning his expedition had entertained no idea beyond making a military promenade.

CHAPTER XXXIII

with England, to accept the Continental System, and to 1 809. pay an indemnity of nearly three and a half millions sterling. The rupture with England was in itself nothing very formidable in the matter of actual aggression, being understood on both sides to be merely formal ; but, on the other hand, the marriage of Napoleon with an Austrian Archduchess seemed to portend at least the elimination of Austria, as an active helper against France, from any future coalition. From Prussia less than ever was now to be expected ; from Russia, bound as she was by the Treaty of Tilsit, there was as yet equally no hope ; so that England was left without an ally in Europe except the formless and inefficient governments of Spain and Portugal. And the hardest part of the trouble was that all the mis- carried enterprises of the past year had only narrowly missed brilliant success. The Austrians had won a victory at Aspern and had only just been beaten at Wagram. Wellesley's campaign had been wrecked rather by Cuesta and Venegas than by Soult ; while, though he had retreated from Talavera, he had at least delivered Portugal and helped the Spanish insurgents to deliver Galicia. Even the landing in the Scheldt had, as we know, caused a panic in Paris and treachery in Fouche. Could British Ministers have seen the Emperor's letters to Clarke during the month of August, his reiterated statements that Flushing was impregnable, the violent reproaches over his subordinate's slowness in enrolling troops, and his pungent criticism of his generals in Spain, they would have perceived that their perseverance was beginning to tell. Their great enemy was slowly losing his sense of reality and his hold upon facts, owing to the vast extension of the business, both civil and military, which he was attempting in his own person both to survey and to direct.

CHAPTER XXXI

Criticism of the Talavera campaign

CHAPTER XXXIII

Parliamentary criticism of the Talavera campaign

VOL. VII Q

1 It is extremely difficult to discover exactly what happened on the evening of the 27th. Napier and Mr. Oman, following Wellesley's despatch, say that Donkin's brigade was drawn up in rear of the Germans. But the Germans did not come into the line until 8 p.m. and then formed, by their own account, upon Donkin's right (Beamish, i. 207). It is absolutely certain that they cannot have been in front of Donkin, or the French, in the attack shortly to be described, must have passed through them to get at the British. Moreover, Napier {Battles of the Peninsula) says distinctly that Donkin took up his station on the hill, and "thus accidentally filled the position." So in spite of the assertion in Wellesley's memo, on the battle of Talavera, that " the German Legion were on the left of the position " in the first line, it seems that the order of the British first line from right to left was — A. Campbell's brigade, Guard's brigade, Cameron's, Langwerth's, Low's, Donkin's. That Hill's brigades considered themselves to be in second line is shown by Leslie, p. 142. Mr. Oman places Tilson's brigade on the right (southern) and Stewart's on the left (northern) flank of the reverse slope, and half a mile in rear of their place in the line of battle. But from the narrative of Leslie they can hardly have been so far back, for they were within range of round shot from the French field-guns; and it is evident from the narratives both of Leslie and Leith-Hay that Stewart's brigade was on the right and Tilson's on the left, which indeed would be the place of precedence in the division of the extreme left. That the Germans considered themselves to be in second line appears from Munster's account, p. 38.

VOL. VII Q

1 Arteche, upon the evidence of various writers, decides that this second attack must have been made. The French deny it, and Leslie and Leith-Hay of the Twenty-ninth say nothing about it, though the former speaks of picquets of French appearing at various places, firing a volley, and disappearing. Possibly these were some stray parties of the French 24th of the Line, which could not find their corps. All English writers who passed the night before the battle of Talavera upon the spot, agree that it was one of extreme disquietude and unrest. Even Wellesley, who, with his staff around him, was lying on the ground in rear of the British position, made constant inquiries as to the hour, betraying his anxiety for the coming of dawn.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

Massena enlists the captured Portuguese troops Massena's advance delayed for lack of supplies Movement of Reynier to join Massena Defeat of Romana at Fuente Cantos Foolish proposals of the Portuguese Regency Wellington's complaints against British officers Reinforcements arrive at Lisbon . Advance of the French upon Coimbra . Concentration of the British troops Massena's march harassed by Trant Wellington takes up a position at Bussaco Skirmish of the Light Division about Sula Description of the ground at Bussaco Dispositions of the British troops Ney's misconception of the situation Conference of the French Marshals Battle of Bussaco British and French casualties Massena's faulty directions for the fight Reasons for the failure of the French attack Gallantry of the British troops Wellington's use of artillery at Bussaco

CHAPTER XXXIX

March of the French from Bussaco upon Coimbra

VOL. VII 2 L

1 8 10. fire, first from the three batteries at the head of the Sept. 27. combe, and farther on from a battalion of Cacadores in a wood on their left flank. Maucune's men, however, cleared the wood and pushed on till they met Pack's five Portuguese battalions, whom they engaged bravely enough, but with no result. The second brigade, that of Marcognet, finding itself under heavy fire of shrapnel- shell from Ross's guns as well as from the remaining three batteries, halted on the road ; and Ney, seeing that the French attack had failed at all points, recalled Marchand's division. Massena had still Junot's division and Mermet's division of the Sixth Corps, twenty thousand fresh men, to throw into the fight ; but besides Hill's troops on the right and Cole's on the left, both of which had by this time closed in towards the centre, Wellington had also Spencer's entire division, which, except for some skirmishing of the light companies against a feint attack, had not fired a shot. Massena therefore gave up the attempt to carry the position, and by two o'clock both armies were mingling amicably over the stream at the foot of the hill, and ministering to the wounded. A small party of French later in the day occupied Sula from mere bravado, but was quickly turned out by a company of the Forty-third ; and these were the last shots fired at the battle of Bussaco.

CHAPTER XXXIX

for ever from the defence of Lisbon. To Trant this 18 10. was a matter of no moment, for his base was in the north, so that to him such a retreat would simply mean a march home ; 1 but the essence of Wellington's campaign was to preserve the capital. He had made the place safe, as he thought, by the fortified lines of Torres Vedras ; and, with a certain refuge behind him, it was not worth his while to risk anything till he reached it. In such a case, it will be asked, why did he fight at Bussaco ? All histories agree in calling it a political battle, fought to reassure the British Parliament and the Portuguese Regency ; and all histories admit that it had its effect. But this seems to be not quite the whole truth. Unless Wellington deliberately lied to his brother and to Liverpool, he reckoned upon checking Massena for good at Bussaco, and was not a little disappointed at his failure to do so. Meanwhile, the French army drew off* by divisions in succession, Sainte-Croix's dragoons leading the way, with the infantry of Junot's corps next after them. Ney did not march until the night of the 28th, nor did Reynier follow until the 29th. About four hundred Sept. 29. unhappy Frenchmen, too severely injured to be moved, were left behind and were taken by the German Hussars to the convent. The rest were carried off", a great many of them on stretchers ; and an officer of Ney's corps has recorded that the night- march of the 28 th was the most distressing that he ever made, the corpses of the wounded who died and were left by the roadside being sufficient to guide the rear columns through the darkness.2 The British cavalry watched the decampment by patrols from Mealhada ; but until late on the 29th Wellington was still without certain reports as to Massena's ultimate direction, though the foremost of the enemy's vanguard on that day reached Avellao de Cima, less than twenty miles north of Coimbra, and a little to