A History of the Peninsular War, vol. 1

16 January 1809

Battle of Corunna

TO THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA

FROM THE TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU TO THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA

SECTION VIII

VI. The battle of Corunna

MOORE AT SALAMANCA

But what between the Junta's folly in hindering the landing of the troops, and the unfortunate lack of money in the second half of October, all-important time was lost. Baird ought to have been near Salamanca by November 13 : as a matter of fact he had only reached Astorga with three brigades of infantry and some artillery, but without a single mounted man to cover his march, on November 22. There he received, to his infinite dismay, the news that Blake had been routed at Espinosa on November 11, and Belvedere at Gamonal on November 10. There was now no Spanish army between him and the French : the latter might be advancing, for all he knew, upon Leon. He heard of Soult being at Reynosa, and Lefebvre at Carrion : if they continued their advance westward, they would catch him, with the 9,000 infantry of the Corunna column, marching across their front on the way to Salamanca. Appalled at the prospect, he halted at Astorga, and, after sending news of his situation to Moore, began to prepare to retreat on Corunna, if the marshals should continue their move- ment in his direction. This, as we have already seen, they did not: Napoleon had no knowledge of the position of the British troops, and instead of ordering the dukes of Dalmatia and Dantzig to push westward, moved them both in a southerly direction. Soult came down to Sahagun and Carrion : Lefebvre, on being relieved by the 2nd Corps, moved on Madrid by way of Segovia. Thus Baird, left entirely unmolested, was in the end able to join Moore.

MOORE'S ADVANCE TO SAHAGUN

move 1. Frere's uncontrolled expressions showed that he was entirely i unfit for a diplomatic post, and cannot be too strongly reprobated. At the same time we are forced to concede that his main thesis was perfectly true : nothing could have been more unhappy than that the aid of a British army of 33,000 men should have been promised to Spain : that the army should have marched late, in isolated divisions and by the wrong roads : that after its van had reached Salamanca on November 13, it should not have taken one step in advance up to December 5 : that just as Madrid was attacked it should tamely begin to retreat on Corunna and Lisbon. Moore was only partly responsible for all this : but it is certain that the whole series of movements had in truth been calculated to do the utmost possible mischief to the cause of Spain and of England. If Moore had died or been superseded on December 4, 1808, he would have been written down as wellnigh the worst failure in all the long list of incompetent British commanders since the commencement of the Revolutionary War.