A History of the Peninsular War, vol. 3

21–22 May 1809

Battle of Aspern-Essling

PORTUGAL

(2) Next in point of importance were the two divisions of the Young Guard under Generals Roguet and Dumoustier, nineteen battalions, with three provisional regiments of the Guard Cavalry, nearly 15,000 men in all. These units had been formed in 1809, just in time for some of them to take their share in the bloody days of Essling and Wagram. The Emperor did not make them over to the Army of Portugal, but retained them in Biscay and Navarre, close under the Pyrenees. Apparently he disliked sending any of his Guards so far afield as to render it difficult to draw them back to France, in the event (unlikely as it was at this moment) of further troubles breaking out in Central Europe. The Guard divisions stayed in Spain two years, but were never allowed to go far forward into the interior.

MASSENA BEFORE THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS

The war in Portugal, therefore, went on as a mere section of the great contest in the Peninsula; the other and less important episodes were not made wholly subordinate to it. And if this system continued Wellington was free from any real danger. He knew it himself; he studied diligently both the political position and the details of the emplacement of the imperial armies in the Peninsula. He was fortunate enough to secure whole budgets of French dispatches captured by the Ordenanca \ and all that he read confirmed him in his con- clusion. ' I calculate,1 he writes on October 27, ' that a reinforcement of 15,000 men would not now give the enemy so good an army as they had at Bussaco. He lost 2,000 killed or taken there: Trant took 5,000 at Coimbra: above 1,000 prisoners have gone through this army : many have been killed by the peasantry. They cannot have less than 4,000 sick 2, after the march they have made, and the weather to which they are exposed. The deserters tell us that almost every one is sick. From this statement you may judge of the diminution of their numbers ; and you will see that I have not much reason to apprehend anything from [Drouet's] "qui?ize beaux bataillons which fought at.Essling" 3, and which cannot be here before the middle of November. I do not think I have much to appre- hend even if Mortier is added to them. However, we shall see

27 September 1810

Battle of Bussaco

PREFACE

The reader will find several topographical notes appended at the end of chapters, the results of my first and second tours along the borderland of Spain and Portugal. Two long visits to the battlefield of Bussaco, and some days spent between the Coa and the Agueda, and behind the Lines of Torres Vedras, gave me many new topographical facts of importance. Drives and walks in the Badajoz-Elvas country, and about Coimbra, also turned out most profitable. But my notes on the battlefields of Fuentes d'Onoro and Albuera can only be utilized in my next volume, which I trust may not be long in following its predecessor into print.

APPENDICES

XI. Massena's Orders for the Battle of Bussaco . . . 549

CENTRAL PORTUGAL

however, this last is the better line for advance : — the strongest testimonial to the fact is that Wellington expected Massena to take it, and erected at the passage of the Alva almost T the only earthworks, save those of the lines of Torres Vedras, which he constructed in his preparations for the reception of the invader. When he first heard that the Marshal was moving forward from Almeida to Celorico, and was clearly aiming at the Mondego valley, he announced that he should endeavour to stop the invader on the Alva 2, not apparently thinking it at all prob- able that Massena would move by Vizeu and the north bank of the Mondego. On realizing that this was really his adversary's design, he observed with some exultation that, while there were certainly many bad roads in Portugal, the enemy had taken decidedly the worst of those open to him 3 ; moreover, he had committed himself to attack the heights of Bussaco, the most formidable position in the whole of northern Portugal. How the French commander came to make this choice we shall discuss in its proper place. Suffice it to say that Wellington had not realized how bad was Massena's information, how worthless his maps, and — what is most surprising of all — how entirely desti- tute of local knowledge were the Portuguese traitors — Alorna, Pamplona, and the other renegade officers — whom the Emperor had sent as guides and advisers to the Marshal. And in truth, the unsuspected ignorance of Massena and his advisers added an incalculable element of chance to the problem set before Welling- ton. He was obliged to make his plans on the hypothesis that the enemy would make the correct move : and not unfrequently the enemy, for reasons which the English general could not possibly foresee, made the wrong one.

WELLINGTON'S PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE

1,500 l. Many others had less than half their complement. The first thing that required to be done was to fill up the gaps, and this was accomplished during the winter of 1809-10 by a stringent use of the conscription law already existing. The line regiments in the Bussaco campaign showed, with hardly an exception, 1,200 or 1,300 effectives present — i.e. if the sick and 6 details ' are added they were nearly or quite up to their establishment of 1,500 2. The cavalry was less effective : the number of men could be filled up, but horses were hard to find, and in the end Wellington sent four of the twelve regiments to do dismounted duty in garrison, and served out their mounts to the remaining eight, which nevertheless could never show more than 300 or 400 sabres present, out of their nominal 594. Portugal is not a horse-breeding country, and the British cavalry was competing with the native for the small supply of remounts that could be procured. The artillery, on the other hand, was high in strength and very satisfactory.