Memoirs of British generals distinguished during the peninsular war

3–5 May 1811

Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro

SIR DAVID BAIRD. 97

Ho great distance, might not be too far advanced. By the 20th of November, the whole division was concen- trated at Astorga. On the 28th of that month. Sir John Moore, who was at Salamanca, had determined to retreat upon Portugal, and wrote to Baird, suggest- ing to him to fall back on Corunna, but deliberately, and by instalments, to prevent the enemy from becom- ing too confident. In this letter, he further directs his lieutenant, on his arrival at Corunna, to embark and sail for the Tagus, adding, in an emphatic sentence, ^^for when the French have Spain y Portugal cannot he defended^^ If he could have lifted up his head in 1810 and 1811 from his lonely grave on the ramparts of the Spanish fortress, he would have seen in the lines of Torres Vedras, on the mountain ridge of Busaco, on the plains of Fuentes d'Onoro, and in the long trail of Mas- sena's retreat, a direct falsification of his own prophecy. Sir David Baird prepared to obey the instructions of his superior, and made his arrangements for a retreat on the line indicated ; but urged by the remonstrances of Komana and. the Spaniards, he delayed as long as it was possible. There have been discrepancies of opinion and contradictory statements by various writers of excellent authority respecting these transactions ; but we think it appears clearly demonstrated that Baird acted under orders, and commenced no retrograde movement on his own authority. Sir David had reached Villa Franca, on the road back to Corunna, when another communi- cation from Sir John Moore stopped him, and in the words of the missive, instructed him to face to the right

EOBERT CBAUFDRD. 249

watched them £rom Santarem^ General Craufurd obtained leaye to go to England on his private affairs. During his absence the command of the light division devolved upon Sir William Erskine. Craufurd returned in time for the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, fought on the 5th of May, 1811^ and was received with a shout of welcome when he galloped unexpectedly up to the fronts just as the action was about to commence. In this battle^ it has been observed hj sound military authority that there was less skill than error on both sides. Massena, had he been as active and enterprising as he had shown himself in earlier campaigns^ might have turned the advantages he gained at the onset to better account Lord Wellington himself admitted subsequently^ in con- versation at his own table*^ that he committed a &ult in extending his right too much to P090 Velho ; and that if the French had profited by it, as they could have done, there might have been bad consequences; but that they let him recover himself and change hia front before their faces. The British position was, in fact, too much spread out for their numbers, and was strengthened by giving up the groimd on the right, and concentrating with the right flank thrown back on the Turones, as the army stood when the fighting ceased. The light division throughout the day performed a dis- tinguished part. They had first to cover the passage of the seventh division over the Turones, and then to retire across a plain at least three miles in extent, in presence

BOBEBT GRAUFUBD. 251

of a body of five thousand of the enemy's cavalry, sup- ported by the entire infantry of tjbe eighth corps. They moved slowly and deliberately in squares, whUe Mont- brun with his horsemen crowded round their flanks, and appeared to be gathering in a mass for a concentrated charge. But they, threatened without attempting to execute ; and the dangerous crisis of the battle passed over innocuously. Craufurd cleared the plain, with very little loss, presenting such a close and determined front wherever the enemy pressed too eagerly, that they held back, and suffered the retiring divisions of the British army to take up their new ground in regular order. If Massena, as was expected, had renewed the attack on the following day, there seems little reason to doubt that the result would have been decisively against him. But he drew off his army without any further effort, leaving Almeida, which he sought to relieve, to its fate, and resigned the command of the army of Portugal to Marmont, who was destined to sustain a more signal overthrow in the following year. Let all who read of the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro bear in mind that Massena outnumbered the English army by more than two to one, and that he had an overpowering pre- ponderance in cavalry. During the remainder of 1811, General Craufurd and the light division were actively employed in various field movements ; but . no other general action took place under the immediate command of Lord Wellington. The renewed siege of Badajos was abandoned after the battle of Albuera, in conse- quence of the junction of Soult and Marmont, whose