Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine, vol. 2

TURKISH REINFORCEMENTS IN PALESTINE,

The seven divisions which it was originally designed to put under the command of Yildervim, in addition to the troops already in Palestine and Mesopotamia, were the 19th and 20th from Galicia, the 24th and 42ud from the Dardanelles, the 48th from the Caucasus, the 50th from Macedonia, and the 59th from Adana in the Gulf of Iskanderun. Of these the 19th and 24th were the only ones to arrive before the opening of the Third Battle of Gaza (see Chapter II). The 20th Division arrived in time to take part in the Jerusalem operations, and the 48th soon afterwards. The 42nd does not appear to have reached Syria till the summer of 1918. The other two, the 50th and 59th, were broken up, probably at Aleppo, and the troops divided between the Palestine and Mesopotamia fronts.

THE PLAN OF ATTACK.

On the Turkish side also there was activity, though mainly with defence in view. The positions along the Gaza —Beersheba road, mere skeletons at the time of the Second Battle of Gaza, were immeasurably strengthened, though owing to the shortage of barbed wire in the country and the difficulties of transporting it from Europe there was little for the left of the line. The railway branch from Et Tine, of which mention was made in the first volume, was completed to Beit Hanun, 44 miles north-east of Gaza, to supply the right flank, and a short spur taken off from Deir Sneid, a little higher up, to Huj, to supply the centre.

THE PLAN OF ATTACK — 29

The plans mentioned above had been approved by a telegram to Cyprus from G.H.Q. on the 6th October, and it is to be presumed that the work had not made sufficient progress by the 17th to give the appearance of a new base from the air. There is no evidence that the rumours which were intended to be carried to the Turks by their agents reached them, at any rate before the Third Battle of Gaza.

A SUCCESSFUL RUSE 31

After the capture of Gaza an order was found, signed by Colonel Ali Fuad Bey, commanding the Turkish XX Corps, stating that he had rewarded the N.C.O. in charge of the patrol which had obtained such valuable information, and warning his own officers against carrying papers when they were on reconnaissance. But before that happened the effect of the ruse was seen. Work on trenches immediately decreased on the enemy’s left and was greatly increased on

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE BATTLES OF MEGIDDO (continued).

SITUATION OF BEERSHEBA 33

_ break-through would be a slow and costly operation, and 1917. even that the risk of complete failure was not small. Had Oct. _ all gone well, the corridor opened for the pursuit would have been most uncomfortably narrow and exposed to artillery fire, being limited by the gardens of Gaza and the long ridge east of the town. Finally, the advance up the coast _ would have been conducted with an unbroken enemy retiring on the high ground to the south-east instead of the _ beaten troops whose threats the British were able virtually to disregard. Even if we take into account our present | _ knowledge, we shall have to admit that there were accidents in the pursuit by the mounted troops from Tell esh Sheria which could hardly have been anticipated, quite apart from the water shortage. There is no real analogy between the offensive of September 1918 and that of October 1917, because in the Battles of Megiddo the British were able to | pin down the whole Turkish front while they broke the right flank ; whereas if they had attempted to break the right flank at Gaza they would not have been in a position to pin down the Turkish forces on the whole Gaza—Beersheba line. The military student may, however, find a problem or war game of great interest in working out an imaginary attack in | accordance with the scheme of the “‘ Gaza School.”’

PALESTINE AND SYRIA.

Har-Megeddon = The Mountain of Megiddo.

PLACE-NAMES

= The mountain of Megiddo.