Military Operations, France and Belgium 1915, vol. 2

CHAPTER I

The conversations on the subject between French and British General Headquarters had been resumed after the battle of Neuve Chapelle.^ General Joffre on the 24th March had enquired whether the British would be prepared to co-operate in an offensive for which the French would be ready in five or six weeks’ time, and on the 1st April Sir John French had replied that he hoped to be in a position to do so about the end of the month. On the 6th April, some two weeks before the Germans began the Second Battle of Ypres, General Joffre sent to Sir John French through General Foch the details of his plan for a combined offensive towards the plain of Douai and Aubers ridge.® This offensive was but a step in one of the three operations against the enemy commtmications proposed in the general French plan already described,* operations which for lack

JOFFRE’S PLAN

The attack of the British First Army, north of the La Bass6e canal, was to be delivered after the main attack, on the same day as that of the IX. Corps last mentioned. Its object was to extend still further the breach in the German defences and prevent the despatch of German reinforcements from the north of the canal to the plain of Douai. The British attack was to be directed, as already discussed between French G.Q.G. and British G.H.Q. prior to the battle of Neuve Chapelle, towards Aubers ridge and La Bassee.2 A group of French heavy artillery, placed in position south of the canal between Annequin and Ver- melles, was to support the right of the British attack as well as the left of the French IX. Corps.

FRENCH’S ORDERS 5

But Sir John French said that he desired to begin these two April, attacks on the same day as the main attack of the French Tenth Army, after a preliminary bombardment of much the same duration as that at the battle of Neuve Chapelle.

AUBERS RIDGE

4. on the capacity of the British artillery to break down the German front position and demoralize the defence, so as to prepare the way for the assaulting troops. The pre- liminary bombardment was to last forty minutes, of which the final ten minutes was to be intense. Each battery was allotted definite tasks according to a special artillery time table, similar to that for the battle of Neuve Chapelle, pre- pared by the commanders of the H.A.R. (Heavy Artillery Reserve) Groups and of the divisional artillery concerned.

PREFACE

This volume, the fourth of the series, concludes the narra- tive of the war year 1915 on the Western Front, begun in the previous one. Its special interest is that it describes the first employment of Territorial and New Army divisions as complete formations in a great offensive, and the first British employment of gas. It contains the accounts of the Battles of Aubers Ridge and Festubert ; the expansion of the British Expeditionary Force, including the formation of the Third Army ; the minor actions during the summer ; the development of the Allied plans ; the Battle of Loos ; and the retirement of Field-Marshal Sir John French from the command of the British Expeditionary Force.

PREFACE

was no more, and the New Armies were not yet ready to take its place, having neither sufficient training nor adequate armament. Both Sir John French and Sir Douglas Raig, who commanded the First Army which was to make the attack, protested against engaging battle at Loos in Sept- ember, but, for political reasons, were overruled.

PREFACE

Two paragraphs extracted from reports compiled im- mediately after the battle of Loos reveal, perhaps better than anything that can be written now, the troubles of the Army in 1915. The first is : —

PREFACE

The pm-pose of military history is to discover what actually happened, in order that there may be material for study, and that lessons for future guidance may be deduced. Many legends have arisen as to the causes of the failure at the battle of Loos of certain new divisions, which had only been a few weeks in France, and after perfunctory train- ing in England had no period of initiation at the front. Their movements and the special difficulties with which