Military Operations, France and Belgium 1916, vol. 2

PREFACE

in reference to the Russian campaign in 1916. The medical reports repeatedly give considerably higher figures than the Army returns. Accord- ing to the former, the figures on page 566 of Volume X., taken from the Army returns, required to be raised : to about 225,000 (instead of 140,000) for the total losses from January to August, of which 140,000 (instead of 85,000) were due to the Brusilov offensive. These enormous (gewaltig) differences have so far not been capable of explanation ; they are partly due to the incompleteness of the Army returns. 44 The figures of the 44 medical report are regarded as the more accurate.”

THE GERMAN SIDE

Verdun to the Somme. The Brusilov offensive had by no means spent itself, for the Russians were continuing their attacks between the Carpathians and the Dniester, and were about to strike again along the river Stochod. 4 4 The Austro-Hungarian troops had lost 44 all confidence in themselves and needed support everywhere ” ; 1 Conrad was loth to withdraw divisions from the Italian front, for he feared, with reason, that the Italians would soon take the offensive on the Isonzo. They did so on the 6th August.

FOURTH ARMY IN AUGUST

4 Brusilov’s left, still making headway against the Austrian Seventh Army , was now approaching the southern passes of the Carpathians. Farther north, the Russian advance was threatening the communications of Bothmer’s Southern Army in Galicia.

THE RELIEF OF THE FRENCH

Prospects were not unfavourable, although the opera- tions of 1916 could hardly be said to have gone according to plan. At Verdun in February the Germans seized the initiative in an endeavour to shatter the resistance of France, but they succeeded merely in diminishing the French contribution to the Allied offensive on the Somme. Italian attacks upon the Isonzo front in March had little result beyond provoking strong Austrian reactions. In May the Austrian thrust from South Tirol, which came almost as a surprise to the Italian High Command, antici- pated the resumption of Italian operations upon the Isonzo. Three weeks later the balance was more than restored by the launching of the Brusilov offensive : the Russian Armies, attacking on a front of nearly two hundred miles, overran Volhynia and Bukovina and reached the Car- pathian passes.3 Thus relieved from Austrian pressure, the Italians launched a counter-offensive which recovered about half the ground lost in the Trentino ; early in August they passed again to the attack upon the Isonzo and

PREFACE

This volume concludes the account of the Battles of the Somme, 1916, begun in its predecessor, u 1916 ” Volume I. The preliminaries of that great Franco-British offensive, and the plans and preparations culminating in the events of the 1st July, when the great assault was launched, have been described in the earlier volume. There, also, will be found three explanatory chapters dealing with the ex- pansion and reorganization of the British Expeditionary Force between August 1914 and July 1916, and with the building-up in France of the great establishments required for the maintenance of an Army which numbered, including the units on the lines of communication, one and a half million men. A fourth chapter described the administrative system and what may be called the domestic conditions of the battle, which must be borne in mind throughout its course.

PREFACE

In the following pages the course of the Somme offensive is traced from the conclusion of the first day’s fighting to the dying down of the struggle in November. Chapters are devoted to a brief account of the Chantilly Conference which, in that month, outlined the future strategic plans of the Allies ; to a summary of events upon the remainder of the British front, where active trench warfare was maintained throughout the Somme offensive ; and to a

PREFACE

There being no open flank on the Western Front, Sir Douglas Haig’s plan for the Somme offensive, as originally conceived and approved by the War Committee of the Cabinet, was to break through the German defences and, having thus made an internal flank, to roll them up north- wards from flank and rear. In view of the tactics adopted in 1916, with the resources then available, this proved an impossible task.2 The British artillery, admittedly in- sufficient for the purpose, and possessing an even less density per mile of front than that of the French, certainly played great havoc with the enemy’s positions, which were much more than mere fieldworks after the labour bestowed on them for the better part of two years. The British gunners inflicted very heavy losses upon his troops, and at times extended them to the utmost limit of endurance ; but they could never count upon overcoming the machine- gun defence, while their efforts — without gas shell — to neutralize the enemy batteries were only partially suc- cessful. They were rarely able to silence temporarily even half of those in action. Under these conditions the impetus

PREFACE

On the 15th September the great attack in which tanks were used for the first time failed to force a way through the German defences and so permit the waiting cavalry to come into action ; although the British employed all their available means they could do no more than secure a portion of their immediate objectives. Before the end of the month other local successes were won ; Lesboeufs and Gueudecourt were captured in the Battle of Morval, when, after Combles fell, the French were at last able to lend close assistance on the right by advancing due northward instead of north- eastward. On the other flank Thiepval was taken, but the struggle persisted on the heights south of the Ancre, which had become the battle ground of the Canadians. It was then too late in the year to embark upon any extensive plan for the advance eastward beyond the river which the Commander-in-Chief had kept in view. The Germans had been driven from the uplands between the Peronne — Bapaume road and the river Ancre ; it was therefore on the lower ground lying beyond, in the autumn rain and mud and fog, that the British continued the battle of attrition. Indeed, it had become a battle of attrition such as General Joffre had expected and desired from the moment when, as a result of the German attacks at Verdun, it grew manifest that the British must play the principal role in the Somme offensive. At length, after the German salient astride the Ancre had been reduced and the strong Beau- mont Hamel position captured in the Battle of the Ancre, the operations came to an end. The last attack, on the 18th November, was made in the first snowstorm of winter.

CHAPTER V

Next day General Plumer, who was much occupied with preliminary preparations for an offensive against the Messines ridge, informed General Monro that the only locality he considered suitable was his extreme right, and suggested a joint operation at this point should the occasion arise. General Monro agreed in so far that on the 8th July he ordered Lieut.-General Sir R. C. B. Haking,2 commanding the XI. Corps, to put forward a scheme for an attack by one of his own divisions and one from the Second Army. The Sketch B. XI. Corps was holding the front from south-west of Cambrin (south of the La Bassee canal) to E.S.E. of Laventie, the

RESERVE ARMY PLAN

On the 7th September the Commander-in-Chief in- structed the Second Army to start an aggressive policy of raids and bombardments about the middle of the month. So far as his resources permitted, General Plumer was also to press on with his preparations for the capture of Mount Sorrel and of the Messines — Wytschaete ridge.

FOURTH ARMY ARTILLERY 293

At a rough computation, there was one field gun (or howitzer) to every 10 yards of front, and one heavy gun (or howitzer) to every 29 yards. The figures on 1st July were respectively 21 and 57 ; at the Battle of Messines,

HAIG’S WINTER PLANS

The monthly conference of Army commanders, which Nov. had been suspended during the battles of the Somme, was resumed on the 18th November when the Commander-in- Chief had returned from Paris. Sir Douglas Haig laid down the general policy for the winter : if attacked, the British Armies would hold their ground and not allow their future plans to be upset ; if an Ally were attacked a British attack would be launched in its turn, and, in any case, methodical pressure would be maintained u in order to “ prevent the recovery of the enemy ” ; preparations would continue for a general combined offensive in the spring, and all was to be in readiness by the 1st February 1917. More specifically, he said, the Fourth and Fifth Armies would continue offensive operations to a limited extent, “ as far as resources and weather permitted ”, and the Second Army might be called upon to attack the Spanbroekmolen spur, west of the Messines — Wytschaete ridge.

CH CO

Italy : Seventh Battle of the Isonzo ends.

OCTOBER 1916

Italy : Eighth Battle of the Isonzo begins.

OCTOBER 1916

Italy: Ninth Battle of the Isonzo begins.

NOVEMBER 1916

WthV ' Italy’. Ninth Battle of the Isonzo ends . ^ Germany and Austria proclaim