Military Operations, France and Belgium 1917, vol. 1

BALANCE OF PROFIT AND LOSS 3

Russia had thrown into the scales, as her contribution, her greatest exploit of the whole War, the offensive of General Brusilov, commanding the Group of Armies of the South-West. Launched on the 4th June, this attack had resulted in an advance of twenty to fifty miles on a front of some two hundred, overflowed Bukovina, and finally reached the foot of the Carpathians, having brought in a haul of 450,000 prisoners and 400 guns. Unfortunately, the offensive at Baranovichi of the Group of Armies further north, under General Evert, launched late and half-heartedly against the Germans, had been by comparison a failure. The blow to the Austro-Hungarian Armies was, none the less, shattering, and German reserves had been drawn in to build up a new front.

BALANCE OF PROFIT AND LOSS 3

In Italy, again, the enemy had struck first, but his offensive in the Trentino, begun on the 14th May, had achieved only a partial success, further limited, after troops had been recalled to check the advance of Brusilov, by the Italian counter-offensive in June. The Austrian attack 1 See « 1916 « Vol. I., p. 7.

THE PROSPECTS OF 1917

There is no doubt that in the course of the summer the situation of the Central Powers had become precarious. The comparative failure of the Trentino offensive, the shock of Brusilov’s blow, had shaken not only the Austro- Hungarian Armies, but the fabric of the Dual Monarchy itself. The fighting power of the Germans had at first been little weakened — though it was before summer was out, and the withdrawal of early 1917 was to be, however one takes it, an admission that they could not stand up to this terrible milling at close quarters when the next campaigning season came round. Yet if against any opponents but British and French they were still almost irresistible, they were tied down on every front. A division here, an army corps there, rushed on to a stricken field could still trans- form its fortunes, or at worst bring the assailant quickly to a halt. Such reinforcements were, however, becoming harder and harder to find. When the prospect of Rumania’s intervention obtruded itself, it was grave enough to chill the most confident heart. HacJ Rumania struck six weeks earlier and based her stroke upon a better strategical plan, 1 See “ 1916 ” Vol. I., pp. 254-8.

THE RUSSIAN THEATRE

On the whole, it could not be said that prospects of assistance from the exterior European theatres of war were as rosy as in 1916. Actually there was no success gained in the least comparable to the “ Brusilov Offensive ”, and none even equal to the Sixth Battle of the Isonzo or the Battle of Monastir.

PREFACE

Although the duration of the Battles of Arras 1917 was much shorter than that of the Battles of the Somme, or of the Battles of Ypres 1917 which were to follow, they were important and encouraging operations. The capture of Vimy Ridge, in particular, was not only a fine feat of arms, but also proved of considerable value in the following year. Including the fight round Bullecourt, 33 British and 87 German divisions took part in the battles during the period covered by the volume. The operations achieved a greater measure of initial success than in any previous

PREFACE

Arras are not as vivid in general now as I found those of Loos and the first days of the Battles of the Somme, and Captain Falls found those of the Battles of Gaza and of Megiddo, when the Branch was engaged upon them some ten years ago. Yet there are still some men who seem to have every incident and almost every fold in the ground engraved upon their memories.

BALANCE OF PROFIT AND LOSS 3

advantage was also on its side. The Battles of the Somme had resulted in enormous loss to attackers as well as to defenders, but it was the defenders who had suffered the greater strain and moral damage.

BALANCE OF PROFIT AND LOSS 3

In the first place, Germany had anticipated the Allied offensive in France and modified the French part in it by the attack at Yerdun. But in that tremendous battle, which raged from the 21st February until the opening of the Battles of the Somme, and continued on a minor scale until the end of August, the French defence had had the better of it. Even of the relatively small amount of ground lost, some of the most valuable had been recovered by the French counter-offensive on the 24th October. And, though the defence of Yerdun had drawn upon French troops which were to have taken part in the attack astride the Somme, it had not prevented the French Armies from playing a considerable part in the battle.

PREFACE

Many important events occurred in the period now dealt with : the inauguration of unrestricted U-Boat war- fare (1st February) ; the beginning of the Russian revolu- tion (12th March) ; and the entry of the United States of America into the War (6th April). In the military opera- tions, the retirement to the Siegfried-Stellung , called by us the Hindenburg Line (14th March-5 th April), was carried out by the Germans, and the Battles of Arras and the Second Battle of the Aisne (Nivelle Offensive) were fought. Serious unrest in the French Armies followed the latter ; General Petain succeeded General Nivelle in command, and again the Allied plans were revised.

PREFACE

The Battles of Arras 1917 are best known by the capture of Vimy Ridge, which happened in the first stage. They actually included several phases : 9th to 14th April, the First Battle of the Scarpe and the Battle of Yimy Ridge ; 23rd— 24th April, the Second Battle of the Scarpe ; 28th- 29th April, the Battle of Arleux ; 3rd— 4th May, the Third Battle of the Scarpe, with the capture of Fresnoy ; 3rd— 17th May, the very desperate Battle of Bullecourt, fought after a first unsuccessful attack on the 11th April ; and the fighting lasted until after the turn of the month.

PREFACE

Although the duration of the Battles of Arras 1917 was much shorter than that of the Battles of the Somme, or of the Battles of Ypres 1917 which were to follow, they were important and encouraging operations. The capture of Vimy Ridge, in particular, was not only a fine feat of arms, but also proved of considerable value in the following year. Including the fight round Bullecourt, 33 British and 87 German divisions took part in the battles during the period covered by the volume. The operations achieved a greater measure of initial success than in any previous

PREFACE

The German regimental histories have proved even more valuable than usual. By means of a careful examination of all published histories of regiments, artillery as well as infantry, which took part in the Battles of Arras 1917, Captain G. C. Wynne has not only been able to trace the course of events in more detail than they are given in the official monograph, but has also unearthed and pieced together the German methods of defence, in principle and practice. Only a fraction of his material has found a place here, but it might well prove of value to students.2

PREFACE

Many important events occurred in the period now dealt with : the inauguration of unrestricted U-Boat war- fare (1st February) ; the beginning of the Russian revolu- tion (12th March) ; and the entry of the United States of America into the War (6th April). In the military opera- tions, the retirement to the Siegfried-Stellung , called by us the Hindenburg Line (14th March-5 th April), was carried out by the Germans, and the Battles of Arras and the Second Battle of the Aisne (Nivelle Offensive) were fought. Serious unrest in the French Armies followed the latter ; General Petain succeeded General Nivelle in command, and again the Allied plans were revised.

PREFACE

As the French Official History of the period had already appeared, there was no great need to ask for the ever-ready assistance of the Service Historique ; but the typescript was sent there, and many useful and helpful suggestions were kindly made by its successive chiefs. General Blin and Colonel Bonnassieux. The German Official History also covers the period, but the German Historical Section, now the Kriegsgeschicktliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres , has been as helpful as ever. Gratitude is particularly due to Herr Direktor Foerster for the extremely interesting German information on Map 11, of the French Aisne offensive, which, from the strategic point of view at least, shows the dispositions for the defensive battle in perfection.1 66 Mein Kriegstagebuch ”, by Crown Prince Ruppreeht of Bavaria, has been so useful that it deserves especial mention.

SKETCHES

B. Second Battle of the Aisne

MAPS

and 3rd Battle of Champagne.

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG’S INSTRUCTIONS

and Vimy, any portion of the line subsequently taken over from the French being held defensively. For General Sir Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, on the right, it was stated that the objective at the outset of operations would probably be the comparatively close one of Rocquigny, Bapaume and the Bois Loupart. For General Sir Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army, only the direction of the attack, Achiet le Grand, was indicated. General Sir Edmund Allenby’s Third Army was instructed to prepare an attack between Ficheux (4j miles south of Arras) and the Scarpe, handing over its front north of that river to the* First Army of General Sir Henry Horne, which was to prepare for the capture of Vimy Ridge. One of the secondary attacks for which provision was to be made was against the Spanbroekmolen spur of the Messines Ridge, on the Second Army front. This operation would have to await its turn, but it was the Commander-in-Chief’s intention to supply General Sir Herbert Plumer with resources for the completion of his preparations as soon as those for the main attack were finished. Meanwhile, the Second Army was to be ready to launch, at a month’s notice in the spring or summer, a more important offensive with the object of recapturing the Messines — Wytschaete Ridge itself. This, it may be remarked, was a preliminary step necessary to the clearance of the Belgian coast. The front between Vimy and the Lys would probably be purely defensive, but General Horne was to consider the possibility of capturing Aubers Ridge, north of the La Bass6e Canal, if required to do so.

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG’S PLANS 127

the formation of a pocket instead of in a break-through, the Second Army was to continue its preparations for the capture of the Messines Ridge. He touched upon the dis- posal of the divisions and heavy batteries made available by the shortening of the Fifth Army’s line and its changed role, but did not give a definite decision on that point. It is to be noted, however, that he had no intention of re- inforcing the Second Army beyond the addition of the one division — the 19th — already allotted to it, before the 15th April and then only for offensive purposes. The only question regarding these surplus divisions and batteries was in what proportion they should be allotted to the Third and First Armies or remain in reserve to the Fifth Army to assist the Arras attack.

THE BATTLES OF ARRAS 1917 : THE LAST STAGES,

It was not in his power to launch this offensive at once ; nor was there in his view any need to do so. The capture of the Messines Ridge was essential to the main operations, which were to take place east and north of Ypres, and it could be carried out separately. In front of the ridge, too, preparations were already well advanced. On the 7th May Sir Douglas Haig informed the Army commanders at a meeting held at Doullens that he hoped to capture the Messines Ridge that day month.

THE BATTLES OF ARRAS 1917 : THE LAST STAGES,

The campaign would thus have two phases : first, the capture of the Messines Ridge, and secondly, the “ northern operations ”, to be begun some weeks later. It was the Commander-in-Chief’s intention to transfer to the north in the first instance only enough troops for the Messines operation. Three divisions, the 11th, 24th, and 4th Australian — the equivalent of those relieved by the French when they took over the front to the Omignon — would be required. Half the heavy artillery at the disposal of the Fifth Army would be moved gradually,

PREFACE

as they achieved in the later part of the year against the Russians in the “ Kerenski Offensive ” and at Riga, and against the Italians at Caporetto, they were able to find no more than six extra divisions — so short of men were they — which were shifted from one theatre to another. Not only were the Germans on the defensive ; they also withdrew a considerable distance in the north of France. It was at first represented that this was a strategic retirement in order to avoid decisive battle until unrestricted U-Boat ’ warfare had become effective ; but the publication in 1938 of Volume XI. of the German Official Account has disposed of this reason. The credit for bringing it about must go to the French and British troops who out-fought the Germans in the long struggles at Verdun and on the Somme.

THE PROSPECTS OF 1917

had, however, upset the plans of the Italian High Command, and retarded its contribution to the general scheme. This took the form of successive thrusts in August, September, October and November — Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Battles of the Isonzo — against the Carso plateau, possession of which would have opened the road to Trieste. Only in the first battle were there any appreciable gains, at Gorizia ; but the enemy had been hard pressed.

THE ITALIAN THEATRE

The Italians even professed to have evidence that Germany was contemplating an invasion by way of Switzer- land. General Nivelle accordingly sent officers to Italy to discuss the question of support in case of need. Then followed the Rome Conference, beginning on the 4th January 1917, at which Mr. Lloyd George’s plan of lending British heavy artillery to the Italians for an offensive against Trieste was shelved.1 On the 1st February General Nivelle himself arrived at Udine for a two days’ visit to the Isonzo front. He examined with General Cadorna the possibility of a German invasion through Switzerland, which he did not by any means wholly discount. He suggested, however, that climatic conditions would protect the Italian left until the month of May ; meanwhile he trusted that the Italians would launch an attack on the Isonzo to coincide with the Franco-British offensives in France. General Cadorna was doubtful whether he could be ready by the 1st April.2 Eventually his offensive, the Tenth Battle of the Isonzo, was launched on the 12th May, after the Allied spring offensives in France were virtually over. It resulted in considerable local successes both on the shore of the Gulf of Trieste and north of Gorizia.

THE RUSSIAN THEATRE

On the whole, it could not be said that prospects of assistance from the exterior European theatres of war were as rosy as in 1916. Actually there was no success gained in the least comparable to the “ Brusilov Offensive ”, and none even equal to the Sixth Battle of the Isonzo or the Battle of Monastir.

THE GERMAN ASSAULT

At 3.80 a.m. on the 15th April there was a short bom- bardment of Hermies and the battery positions behind it on the front of the 1st Australian Brigade (Br.-General W. B. Lesslie). At 4.5 a.m. the 3rd Battalion’s sentry post facing the canal “ Spoil Heap ”, which was to become famous in the Battle of Cambrai, saw a large number of Germans approaching. Lewis -gun and rapid rifle fire was at once opened, and the enemy promptly retreated. A few moments later all the posts of this, the left, company, were attacked. The enemy very inadvisedly fired rockets from the Spoil Heap, which brightly lit up his own troops. These were mown down or driven back in disorder, and the

CAPTURE OF OUTLYING FARMS 529

At 4.20 a.m. on the 21st April the 25th Brigade (Br.- General C. Coffin) of the 8th Division attacked Gonnelieu, while the 119th and 120th Brigades of the 40th advanced their front within striking distance of Villers Plouich and Beaucamp. The two divisions were moving along the spurs, on either side of the Couillet valley, which were destined to become famous in the Battle of Cambrai at the end of the year, under the names of Welsh Ridge and Highland Ridge.

SUCCESSES OF XV. CORPS

was to have been captured by the 20th Division subse- quently ; but now, in order to assist the 40th, Major- General T. G. Matheson ordered the operation to be carried out at 11 p.m. that night. After an artillery preparation, the 12/K.R.R.C. attacked the farm, one company forcing its way in through a gateway, and speedily captured it, with 14 prisoners and a machine gun. Next norning the 11/King’s Own of the 120th Brigade retook Beaucamp with- out difficulty. The Bilhem spur proved an excellent observation post, and was to be invaluable as such both before and during the Battle of Cambrai.

SUCCESSES OF XV. CORPS

A calm fell upon the right wing of the British Armies which was scarcely to be disturbed until the Battle of Cambrai, and south of that battlefield not until the German offensive of March 1918.

PREFACE

Although the duration of the Battles of Arras 1917 was much shorter than that of the Battles of the Somme, or of the Battles of Ypres 1917 which were to follow, they were important and encouraging operations. The capture of Vimy Ridge, in particular, was not only a fine feat of arms, but also proved of considerable value in the following year. Including the fight round Bullecourt, 33 British and 87 German divisions took part in the battles during the period covered by the volume. The operations achieved a greater measure of initial success than in any previous

THE FLEMISH COAST

For various technical reasons which belong to the his- tory of the Flanders Offensive of 1917 Sir Douglas Haig put aside the first two schemes. He was the more inclined to do so because the third, the large-scale operation, would form part of a project which he had kept in view ever since he became Commander-in-Chief : an advance towards the Dutch frontier from the Ypres Salient, aiming at not merely the capture of Ostend but the clearance of the whole Belgian coast.

POLITICAL AND MORAL FACTORS

operations unless the Ypres offensive were entirely success- ful. On the other hand, General Joffre, though he assigned the distant objective of Roulers — Thourout to this offensive, looked upon it mainly as a method of containing the German reserves, and suggested that even if it was success- ful only to a small degree the landing should still be attempted. In the second place, the French proposition was for the landing of five divisions, whereas G.H.Q. gravely doubted whether a disembarkation on that scale was within the bounds of possibility.

POLITICAL AND MORAL FACTORS

This scheme, now definitely included in the plan of operations for 1 the coming year, was the origin of the Flanders Offensive of 1917. It emanated in the first place from the British Admiralty, whose object was to protect communications in the Channel from attacks by submarines and, in lesser degree, destroyers, based on Ostend and Zeebrugge. It was taken up by the British War Office and G.H.Q. in France, first, because they desired to assist the Admiralty in a matter so vital to the British forces in France and Belgium, and, secondly, because they desired, for military reasons, to drive the enemy from the Belgian coast. It was given the approval and backing of General Joffre because he had a vision broad enough to enable him to realize the force of the British contentions, though the question did not directly affect his own Armies.

PREFACE

Many important events occurred in the period now dealt with : the inauguration of unrestricted U-Boat war- fare (1st February) ; the beginning of the Russian revolu- tion (12th March) ; and the entry of the United States of America into the War (6th April). In the military opera- tions, the retirement to the Siegfried-Stellung , called by us the Hindenburg Line (14th March-5 th April), was carried out by the Germans, and the Battles of Arras and the Second Battle of the Aisne (Nivelle Offensive) were fought. Serious unrest in the French Armies followed the latter ; General Petain succeeded General Nivelle in command, and again the Allied plans were revised.

PREFACE

As the French Official History of the period had already appeared, there was no great need to ask for the ever-ready assistance of the Service Historique ; but the typescript was sent there, and many useful and helpful suggestions were kindly made by its successive chiefs. General Blin and Colonel Bonnassieux. The German Official History also covers the period, but the German Historical Section, now the Kriegsgeschicktliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres , has been as helpful as ever. Gratitude is particularly due to Herr Direktor Foerster for the extremely interesting German information on Map 11, of the French Aisne offensive, which, from the strategic point of view at least, shows the dispositions for the defensive battle in perfection.1 66 Mein Kriegstagebuch ”, by Crown Prince Ruppreeht of Bavaria, has been so useful that it deserves especial mention.

SKETCHES

B. Second Battle of the Aisne

XXXVI

16th. Second Battle of the Aisne 16th. Arrival of Lenin in Russia.

PREFACE

Many important events occurred in the period now dealt with : the inauguration of unrestricted U-Boat war- fare (1st February) ; the beginning of the Russian revolu- tion (12th March) ; and the entry of the United States of America into the War (6th April). In the military opera- tions, the retirement to the Siegfried-Stellung , called by us the Hindenburg Line (14th March-5 th April), was carried out by the Germans, and the Battles of Arras and the Second Battle of the Aisne (Nivelle Offensive) were fought. Serious unrest in the French Armies followed the latter ; General Petain succeeded General Nivelle in command, and again the Allied plans were revised.

PREFACE

As the French Official History of the period had already appeared, there was no great need to ask for the ever-ready assistance of the Service Historique ; but the typescript was sent there, and many useful and helpful suggestions were kindly made by its successive chiefs. General Blin and Colonel Bonnassieux. The German Official History also covers the period, but the German Historical Section, now the Kriegsgeschicktliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres , has been as helpful as ever. Gratitude is particularly due to Herr Direktor Foerster for the extremely interesting German information on Map 11, of the French Aisne offensive, which, from the strategic point of view at least, shows the dispositions for the defensive battle in perfection.1 66 Mein Kriegstagebuch ”, by Crown Prince Ruppreeht of Bavaria, has been so useful that it deserves especial mention.

SKETCHES

B. Second Battle of the Aisne

XXXVI

16th. Second Battle of the Aisne 16th. Arrival of Lenin in Russia.