Military Operations, France and Belgium 1918, vol. 3

PEEFACE

This volume covers three months, from the beginning of May to the beginning of August 1918, that is the period between the close of the two great German offensives of the 21st March-5th April and 9th-80th April against the British and the opening of the Franco-British ofiensive of the 8th August, General Ludendorff’s “ Black Day In this period there were a few interesting but minor British operations ; our forces were, in the main, reorganizing and recuperating after the strenuous fighting of the previous six weeks ; our Ally had to bear the brunt of the fighting. The German Supreme Command made three great diversion offensives against the French (who now, for the first time, had American divisions in their ranks on the active fronts) for the purpose of drawing away the Allied reserves from Flanders preparatory to delivering a final knock-out blow to the British. This result was to be achieved by an offensive, of which the code-name was “ Hagen ”, directed against the Hazebrouck — ^Ypres front, followed by the isolation of the Belgian Army and the rolling up of the British line. The preliminary German offensives against the French were, first, that of the 27th May, officially known as the Second Battle of the Aisne, but usually called the Chemin des Dames offensive ; secondly, that of the 9th June, the Battle of the Matz, designed to blunt and widen the salient in which the Germans found themselves after the unexpectedly easy success on the Aisne ; and thirdly, the Heims — Soissons offensive of the 15th July, called the Second Battle of the Marne, intended to secure a good defensive line behind that river, so as to enable aU possible reserves to be diverted to “ Hagen ”. Then, in the midst of this last attack of the German Armies on the Western Front, came Foch’s counter-stroke of the 18th July, led by General Mangin’s siuprise attack near Soissons. It was carried out by French and American troops against

CHAPTER II

Aisne. The Allied Situation Before the Battle 30

CHAPTER V

The Battle of the Aisne (continued). The Germans on the

ORDERS OF BATTLE

C. French Forces Engaged in the Battle of the Aisne .

PEEFACE

This volume covers three months, from the beginning of May to the beginning of August 1918, that is the period between the close of the two great German offensives of the 21st March-5th April and 9th-80th April against the British and the opening of the Franco-British ofiensive of the 8th August, General Ludendorff’s “ Black Day In this period there were a few interesting but minor British operations ; our forces were, in the main, reorganizing and recuperating after the strenuous fighting of the previous six weeks ; our Ally had to bear the brunt of the fighting. The German Supreme Command made three great diversion offensives against the French (who now, for the first time, had American divisions in their ranks on the active fronts) for the purpose of drawing away the Allied reserves from Flanders preparatory to delivering a final knock-out blow to the British. This result was to be achieved by an offensive, of which the code-name was “ Hagen ”, directed against the Hazebrouck — ^Ypres front, followed by the isolation of the Belgian Army and the rolling up of the British line. The preliminary German offensives against the French were, first, that of the 27th May, officially known as the Second Battle of the Aisne, but usually called the Chemin des Dames offensive ; secondly, that of the 9th June, the Battle of the Matz, designed to blunt and widen the salient in which the Germans found themselves after the unexpectedly easy success on the Aisne ; and thirdly, the Heims — Soissons offensive of the 15th July, called the Second Battle of the Marne, intended to secure a good defensive line behind that river, so as to enable aU possible reserves to be diverted to “ Hagen ”. Then, in the midst of this last attack of the German Armies on the Western Front, came Foch’s counter-stroke of the 18th July, led by General Mangin’s siuprise attack near Soissons. It was carried out by French and American troops against

CHAPTER II

Aisne. The Allied Situation Before the Battle 30

CHAPTER V

The Battle of the Aisne (continued). The Germans on the

ORDERS OF BATTLE

C. French Forces Engaged in the Battle of the Aisne .

PEEFACE

This volume covers three months, from the beginning of May to the beginning of August 1918, that is the period between the close of the two great German offensives of the 21st March-5th April and 9th-80th April against the British and the opening of the Franco-British ofiensive of the 8th August, General Ludendorff’s “ Black Day In this period there were a few interesting but minor British operations ; our forces were, in the main, reorganizing and recuperating after the strenuous fighting of the previous six weeks ; our Ally had to bear the brunt of the fighting. The German Supreme Command made three great diversion offensives against the French (who now, for the first time, had American divisions in their ranks on the active fronts) for the purpose of drawing away the Allied reserves from Flanders preparatory to delivering a final knock-out blow to the British. This result was to be achieved by an offensive, of which the code-name was “ Hagen ”, directed against the Hazebrouck — ^Ypres front, followed by the isolation of the Belgian Army and the rolling up of the British line. The preliminary German offensives against the French were, first, that of the 27th May, officially known as the Second Battle of the Aisne, but usually called the Chemin des Dames offensive ; secondly, that of the 9th June, the Battle of the Matz, designed to blunt and widen the salient in which the Germans found themselves after the unexpectedly easy success on the Aisne ; and thirdly, the Heims — Soissons offensive of the 15th July, called the Second Battle of the Marne, intended to secure a good defensive line behind that river, so as to enable aU possible reserves to be diverted to “ Hagen ”. Then, in the midst of this last attack of the German Armies on the Western Front, came Foch’s counter-stroke of the 18th July, led by General Mangin’s siuprise attack near Soissons. It was carried out by French and American troops against

CHAPTER II

Aisne. The Allied Situation Before the Battle 30

CHAPTER V

The Battle of the Aisne (continued). The Germans on the

ORDERS OF BATTLE

C. French Forces Engaged in the Battle of the Aisne .

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

® On 6th June the American 2nd Division (stationed since 2nd June in the front line in the Chateau Thierry area so as to block the Meaux road to Paris) captured Bouresches and occupied the southern portion of Belleau Wood. On the 5th, the American 3rd Division went into the line a little farther west.

SOISSONS. JUNE

In the first half of July there were still more minor operations. The Fourth Army, in search of identifications, carried out numerous small raids ; the Fifth had fighting on the Montagne de Bligny in the old British sector ; the Sixth, in a German attack captured over two hundred prisoners, advanced its line slightly at several places, whilst the American 2nd Division (Major-General O. Bxmdy) seized Vaux, taking 250 prisoners ; the Tenth Army was particularly active, making eight attacks and taking over fourteen hundred prisoners ; the Third Army made two good advances,

I U.S. I

Bouresches *. ^

SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE

Bouresches

THE MATZ

“ The near future, therefore, remained full of anxieties which were not lessened by the opening of the Austrian offensive along the Piave on the 15th June.

AFTER THE MATZ

By a verbal message. General Foch asked that the British XXII. Corps might accept direct orders to occupy a Second Position from General Debeney, commanding the French First Army next to the British. To this Sir Douglas Haig demurred, because, as he said, the corps would then cease to be in General Reserve : it must take orders from General Foch, but from no one else. General Debeney, nevertheless, issued instructions for the 37th Division of the XXII. Corps to occupy a position close to the front in local reserve in case of attack. On Sir Douglas Haig protesting on the 16th by letter to General Foch, he received a telegram in reply from General Petain, that the 37th Division would be released on the 19th. It may be added that on the 24th June, General Fayolle, convinced that “ Paris was to be the objective of the German Army ”, asked that the three northern divisions in General Debeney ’s Army might be relieved by the British ; but this request was refused by General Foch. At a conference on the 18th, General Foch explained to Sir Douglas Haig that he was anxious about the reserves and had to keep strong forces to cover Paris. The methods of meeting German attacks were discussed, and he handed to the British Commander- in»Chief a copy of a long memorandum on the subject. ^ He also expressed his satisfaction with the fighting powers of the American troops which had been in action, as also with the situation on the Piave and on the Asiago plateau, where the Austrian advance was beginning to slacken.

INFLUENZA

Every day of respite was to the advantage of the Allies. They were further cheered by the final collapse of the Austrian offensive along the Piave on the 24th, to which the French XII. Corps and the British troops under General Lord Cavan (7th, 28rd and 48th Divisions) had contributed ; ^ also by the report of a speech made on the

MINOR AFFAIRS

poned.^ He did not, however, abandon hope of a general offensive, and, after pressing General Pershing at a con- ference on the 23rd to speed up the American programme so as to have eighty divisions ready by April 1919, he wrote on the 27th to General Petain and Sir Douglas Haig inviting them to accustom their subordinates to the idea of resuming the offensive : he hoped that within two months he would have some thirty divisions ready (12 American, 10 French and 7 or 8 British). He also wrote to General Diaz urging him to exploit his recent victory on the Piave and informing him of the possibility of a powerful Allied general offensive in September : if, how- ever, 1918 did not afford the desired opportunity, all the Allies must be ready for a decisive effort in 1919, when, with American help, they should possess the necessary numerical superiority.