official history
Military Operations, Gallipoli, vol. 1
C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929
Named on the pages for Battle of Mons, Battle of Neuve Chapelle, Landing at Cape Helles (Gallipoli).
machine-read Machine-read (OCR) from a scanned book at the Internet Archive: expect misread words and names. The scan itself is at the library.
draft Matched to the battles automatically; not yet reviewed.
Passages that name the battles; the whole book is at Internet Archive.
23 August 1914
Battle of Mons
THE INITIATION OF THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN
THREE days before the opening of the Battle of Mons, when Aug. every soldier’s eyes were fixed on the Western front, and 1914. every sailor's on the horizon of the North Sea, two telegrams were received at the Foreign Office, which, read in conjunction with a third on the 27th August, thus early in the war attracted the attention of ministers to the Dardanelles.
FINAL PREPARATIONS AT MUDROS 143
The long distance separating the peninsula from the British overseas base in Egypt was to place an inevitable strain on the administrative services and departments and particularly on the medical service in their plans for the care of the wounded. Owing to the impracticability of opening large hospitals at Mudros till a better water supply could be secured, it was decided early in April that all casualties must at first be evacu- ated to Egypt or Malta." For this purpose four general hospitals were established at Cairo and Alexandria, with room for 4,500 patients, and accommodation for at least 3,000 more cases was arranged in Malta. Though these numbers did not seem excessive, it is curious to notice that no exception was taken at that time to the inadequate allotment of only two hospital ships to the Expeditionary Force for the voyage between these widely separated hospitals and the Dardanelles.2 It would appear that in the early stages of the preparations no attempt was made to predict the number of casualties likely to be suffered in the landing. After the return of G.H.Q. to Mudros, however, this subject was carefully examined, and though no figure could be more than guesswork, the losses incurred at the battle of Mons were taken as a basis of calculation. In that action the two divisions of the II. Corps had a total loss of 1,500 killed, wounded, and missing, or roughly 7:5 per cent of the 20,000 infantry engaged. In order to be on the safe side, it was deter- mined to increase the Mons figures, and to anticipate that, in the fighting for the beaches, the three divisions to be first engaged would sustain a loss of 3,000, or то per cent of their infantry, in wounded alone, exclusive of missing and killed.
10–13 March 1915
Battle of Neuve Chapelle
INITIATION OF DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 87
Ata War Council meeting on the roth March (the first day of the battle of Neuve Chapelle) Lord Kitchener announced that he would now despatch the 29th Division to the Mediterranean. He stated that the Allied force available for operations against Constantinople was approximately 130,000 ! men, against which the Turks could possibly muster 180,000. The Russian admiral’s orders were to attack the Bosporus as soon as the British fleet reached the Marmara, but the troops were not to be landed till the Turkish fleet had been sunk and the two Allied fleets had joined hands.
25–26 April 1915
Landing at Cape Helles (Gallipoli)
ILLUSTRATIONS
V Beach from the River Clyde, 8 A.M. 25th Apal Turkish Wire Entanglement at Cape Helles
THE DEFENCES OF THE DARDANELLES
The total length of the passage of the Dardanelles from its mouth at Cape Helles to the Sea of Marmara is about forty- one statute miles. For the whole of this distance the narrow waterway is dominated by the frowning heights of the Gallipoli peninsula, and by lesser eminences on the Asiatic shore. At the beginning of the war only the mouth of the Straits, and the four miles’ course from the northern point of Kephez Bay to the Narrows at Chanak, had been prepared for defence.
INITIATION OF DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 83
the whole of his force would be wanted at the outset. The hidden guns and howitzers were certain to be protected by heavily entrenched infantry, and the sea defences were said to be strongly fortified on the land side. He and Carden agreed that if military aid were wanted, the best plan would be to make a feint at Bulair, and to land a strong force at Cape Helles to take the forts in reverse. Не deprecated a landing on the Asiatic shore, as the country looked big and difficult; but it would be necessary to do this if the Asiatic guns could not be dominated from the European side. No local information about Constantinople feeling could be obtained, but he thought that the arrival of an Allied fleet at the capital might lead to the collapse of opposition.
INITIATION OF DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN 87
The Director of Military Operations (General Callwell) then came in, and with the aid of a wall-map, gave Hamilton a rough outline of what he believed to be the Greek plan for capturing the Gallipoli peninsula. Callwell explained that the Greeks had meant to employ about 150,000 men,! but Lord Kitchener interposed that half that number would now suffice, as the Turks were busy elsewhere. He hoped, indeed, that it would be unnecessary to use Hamilton's troops in the Dar- danelles at all. But if they did have to land, they must see the enterprise through at all costs. He further added that the Turkish garrison of the peninsula was estimated at 40,000 men, and that the Kilid Bahr plateau was probably well protected. South of Kilid Bahr, to the point at Cape Helles, he believed that the peninsula was open to a landing on very easy terms. The fire of the fleet from both sides would make the flat and open country south of Achi Baba untenable by the enemy.
Public domain. Text from Internet Archive.