Military Operations, Macedonia, vol. 1

15–24 August 1914

Battle of Cer

SERBIA’S DANGERS 9

tributary, the Drina, also a formidable barrier. Montenegro 1914. was a small but sturdy ally; no great danger threatened Avg: from Albania, and on the south none at all from Greece, if, indeed, help might not be looked for from that quarter. Her eastern frontier with Bulgaria was another matter ; and here there was grave risk that her old enemy would attack her, probably waiting until she was deeply engaged with Austria in the north. Her other disadvantages were, first, the inferiority of her equipment and communications by comparison with those of Austria, and, secondly, the fact that her capital and only considerable city lay between the right banks of Sava and Danube, was indefensible, and could be shelled by field guns from Austrian territory. In fact, the Government had to abandon the city at once and retire to NiS, the principal fortress of the country, but a small town of not more than 25,000 inhabitants. There could be no doubt of Austria’s power to overwhelm Serbia if Russia did not intervene in the latter’s favour. The news of Russia’s mobilization was therefore received with great enthusiasm by her fellow-Slavs.

SERBIA’S DANGERS 9

Compelled to leave a proportion of her troops in Macedonia to watch Bulgaria, Serbia managed to concentrate a considerable force to the north to guard against the Austrian menace ; but nearly half of it consisted of troops of the “‘ Second Ban” or Landwehr. The three principal Armies, the First (four cavalry regiments and 52 battalions), Second (one cavalry regiment and 64 battalions), and Third (about 35 battalions),! concentrated south-east, south, and south-west of Belgrade. Learning of a great concentration north of the Sava and Danube, the Serbians expected the main attack from this quarter; but they were stationed in good positions for swinging towards Danube, Sava, or Drina as required. Another so-called Army, the Army of Uzice (24 battalions), assembled at the point from which it took its name, on the NiS-Sarajevo railway, prepared to co-operate with the Montenegrins. The supreme command was nominally in the hands of the youthful Regent, Prince Alexander, actually in those of an experienced veteran, the Voivode (Marshal) Putnik.

SERBIA’S DANGERS 9

The Austrians had concentrated three Armies, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth. In accordance with the plan worked out long before by the Austrian Chief of the General Staff, General Conrad von Hoetzendorff, the Fifth and Sixth Armtes were to attack eastward across the Drina, thus simultaneously assuring the protection of Bosnia, while the Second attacked southward across the Sava and Danube. This plan and the mobilization based upon it had, however, assumed a campaign against Serbia alone— a punitive expedition, as Austria would have considered it. It collapsed at once when it became known that Russia also was about to enter the field. The Second Army was now destined for Galicia, but it was found impossible to interrupt the train movements already in progress. The Second Army was therefore ordered to complete its mobiliza- tion and remain on the Sava and Danube until the northern railway lines were clear, and meanwhile to limit itself to demonstrations. The two remaining Armies, with 140,000 rifles, were inferior in numbers to the Serbians opposed to them, who had some 180,000 rifles of the First and Second Ban. The small Montenegrin Army! would have to be contained by the garrison troops of Southern Bosnia and Hercegovina, which numbered some 40,000 men from Sarajevo to Cattaro. The new plan was to cross the Drina and advance by two valleys running east and west, that of the Jadar, a tributary of the Drina, and that of the Detinja, which had its source quite close to the Drina but flowed eastward to the Morava. The supreme command of the two Armies was confided to Feldzeugmeister Potiorek, the commander of the Szxth, an energetic officer of high reputation who knew the country well, having been Governor of Bosnia.

AUSTRIAN VICTORY ON THE DRINA 15

On the northern front trench warfare, with trench-to- trench attacks, had begun. On the 24th October the Austrian attacks in the Matva were renewed and by the end of the month the Serbians had been forced out of this salient, the Austrians holding the Sabac—Le&nica railway, which represented its chord. Potiorek was now ready to strike his main blow, having filled up his ammunition dumps along the Drina. On the 5th November he began his artillery preparation and on the following day launched his attack. Now, at last, he began to gather the fruits of his previous labours. The Sixth Army in particular made astonishing progress and forced back the opposing Serbian First Army eight miles in two days’ fighting, the Third Army on its right being compelled to conform to its retreat. The Voivode Putnik on the 10th decided to break off the action and ordered a withdrawal of the Second Army to Ub and of the Third and First to a semi-circular position eight miles north and west of the important town of Valjevo, in the valley of the upper Kolubara. Valjevo was actually his own former headquarters and a great road junction, which he determined to hold as long as possible. The Battle of the Drina was fought and won.

25 September – 16 October 1915

Battle of Loos

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SERBIA.

attack was this time to be carried out from Syrmia and the Banat, across the Sava and Danube. Despite the difficulty of crossing these great rivers, an attack from this quarter was far preferable to one from the west because of the superiority in communications of Hungary to Bosnia and the easier nature of the country into which the force would advance. For that decision it needed not to recall the hapless Potiorek’s words to his successor: ‘‘ Wenn Sie “ Serbien nochmals anzugreifen haben, tun Sie es nur bei ‘“‘ Belgrad.””! When the Austrians declared that they could not find all the troops required, Falkenhayn did not hesitate to draw upon his scanty reserves to the extent of another German corps of three divisions, which he attached to the Austrian Army. At the last moment he was given a severe fright by the Allies’ Champagne—Loos offensive, but it did not cause him to alter his plans.

REVIEW OF THE EXPEDITION 83

made impossible the Champagne—Loos offensive. (If it be argued that that would have been all to the credit of Salonika, it can only be retorted that the offensive seemed promising; that, in Champagne at least, it scared the German command ; and that it represented the first serious attempt by the Allies to end the deadlock on the Western Front.) The object of advancing these arguments is merely to ensure that the reader does not condemn the venture out of hand. In fine, early co-ordinated and determined action by the Allies might, at the least, have frightened Bulgaria out of her engagements, brought Greece into the field, and further limited the extent of the Serbian disaster. Failure was due above all to the clash of policies, Britain hankering after a renewed attempt to force the Dardanelles or a landing in the Gulf of Iskanderun, while France had decided that Salonika was the goal.

THE FORMATION OF THE ENTRENCHED CAMP.

The 28th Division (Major-General C. J. Briggs) was the first to start, but was held up in Egypt owing to the discussion regarding a landing in the Gulf of Iskanderun. It began its entrainment on the 21st October, and its first troops reached Alexandria on the 29th. On the 22nd November, by which time the division was complete in Egypt but for two artillery brigades which sailed direct from Marseilles, divisional headquarters embarked for Salonika. Here disembarkation was slow, partly owing to the congestion of the quays, partly to its being discontinued for two days (the 8th and 9th December) at the moment when the Government were disposed to evacuate Salonika altogether. The period in Egypt had been of great value to Major-General Briggs for training and reorganizing the division after its losses at Loos.

THE DIVISIONS FROM FRANCE 87

The 22nd and 26th were divisions of the New Armies, having both been formed in September 1914 and sent to France a year later. Neither had yet taken part in a battle, but both were composed of good, well-trained young troops. The 27th and 28th were Regular divisions. Both had been heavily engaged at “ Second Ypres,’’ in which the 28th was almost destroyed ; and the 28th had just taken part in the Battle of Loos. These two divisions were still, however, far above the average in quality; and in the force as a whole the general standard of discipline, training, and military experience was higher than that of the divisions successively landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The 10th Division was in a very different condition to the other four and required steady training, rest when that should become possible, and above all time to throw off the effects of its recent experiences and to absorb its large drafts. On its return to the neighbourhood of Salonika, Br.-General J. R. Longley, formerly commanding the 82nd Brigade, 27th Division, was appointed to the command, Br.-General Nicol resuming that of the 30th Brigade;? Br.-General King- King, who was sick, was replaced by Lieut.-Colonel E. M. Morris in command of the 3lst Brigade; many senior officers, including all those of the artillery, were gradually replaced, and the staff was almost entirely changed.

4 June – 20 September 1916

Brusilov Offensive

BREAK-THROUGH OF GORLICE 23

which—despite the Brusilov offensive of the following June —it may fairly be said they never fully recovered.

THE PROSPECT OF RUMANIAN INTERVENTION.

Rumania had not yet made up her mind; she was merely awaiting a sign. At the beginning of June it came in the form of one of the most astonishing and spectacular episodes of the whole world war. On the 4th June the Russians launched on their southern front, from the great eastward buckle of the Styr in Volhynia to the Rumanian frontier, the “‘ Brusilov Offensive.’’ Here there was only one German Army, the Southern, with three Austro-Hungarian Armies to the north of it and one to the south. The attack was made after a short but heavy artillery preparation and met with astonishing success on the two flanks. On the right at Lutsk a gap 30 miles broad was created in the first onrush. On the left, under the eyes of Rumania, an even

BRUSILOV’S OFFENSIVE 135

Rumania was convinced that here was an atieanitaneoas occasion such as might never recur. In this she was right, and it had been well if she had seized it at once. Yet she did not realize the true significance of the Russian victory : that it was in part due to the half-heartedness, if not the treachery, of some of the corps belonging to the subject races of the Austrian Empire, and so might well be nullified once sounder troops had been brought to the scene of action. That no other Russian offensive coincided with that of Brusilov, that the later attacks at Baranovici and further north were repulsed by the Germans with almost contemptuous ease even while they were denuding their front to check Brusilov, did not appear ominous to her. Prisoners reported by the hundred thousand, her frontier with the Bukovina covered, the prospect that Russian troops would now be able to cross the Carpathians side by side with her own and pour down into Hungary: that, naturally, was the picture which most appealed to her. On the 4th July, after the Somme offensive had also been launched and the Italian counter-attacks in the Trentino had made their weight felt, the Rumanian Prime Minister informed the French Minister at Bucharest that he was ready to sign a military convention on certain conditions, one of which was that Rumania should be protected against Bulgaria either by Russian troops or by an offensive from Salonika.

31 October – 7 November 1917

Third Battle of Gaza

THE SERES ROAD 281

the War Office by the Ministry of Shipping as to the strain imposed by the number of forage-ships required by Salonika. (The Ministry’s remedy was delightfully simple: it was, to sell the mules.) A second cause was the situation in Egypt. When the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was campaigning in Sinai it had little use for mules or draught horses. At the beginning of 1917 it reached the frontier of Palestine, with a country ahead of it on which wheels could play their part. Moreover, Egypt was, if one may put it so, coming into fashion, whilst Macedonia was going out. Mr. Lloyd George’s Government were more or less in agreement with the General Staff in its hostility to the Macedonian venture, and the Prime Minister himself was becoming hopeful of winning a success against the Turks in Palestine. The First Battle of Gaza, in particular, caused the Government to entertain expectations of the capture of Jerusalem. It resulted that the shipment of mules, and to a lesser extent of horses, from Egypt to Salonika, which had taken place in the summer of 1916, was followed a few months later by a shipment in the opposite direction. Doubtless great numbers of the very animals which had come from Alexandria were now shipped back there. As some of them had done service on the Gallipoli Peninsula, they were becoming experienced travellers and campaigners ; and if, like the mule of Prince Eugene, they had not profited thereby, it must be owned that they had so far seen less that was profitable than that immortal beast.

THE SERES ROAD 281

The reductions were completed by the 25th March 1917. Shortly afterwards, on the 4th April—in the period between the First and Second Battles of Gaza, it is worth while to note—the War Office telegraphed that it had been decided, “‘ owing to the necessity of meeting urgent requirements of “Egypt in transport animals and personnel, and having “regard to the military situation on the Salonika front, to “transfer 5,000 draught animals and 500 Army Service “Corps personnel ... to Egypt.’’ General Milne was informed two days later that the animals were all to be mules.

POSTPONEMENTS WEST OF VARDAR 301

Meanwhile another conference between British, French, and Italian political and military representatives had taken place on the 19th April, m a railway carriage at Saint-Jean de Maurienne, on the French side of the Mont Cenis tunnel. In view of the offensives in France, which had already begun at Arras, of the second attack on Gaza, which was actually launched that day, of the offensive in Mesopotamia, where Baghdad had been occupied, of the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, and perhaps especially of the fact that Turkish troops were moving eastward, the British Government were eager enough now for an offensive to be launched in Macedonia. They afterwards went so far as to despatch a message to the French Government, regretting that General Sarrail had postponed the attack, and urging that he should carry it out as soon as he could. Nevertheless, the British Prime Minister looked upon this operation as the last chance which could be given the Armée d’Orient. At

POSTPONEMENTS WEST OF VARDAR — 301

Meanwhile another conference between British, French, and Italian political and military representatives had taken place on the 19th April, in a railway carriage at Saint-Jean de Maurienne, on the French side of the Mont Cenis tunnel. In view of the offensives in France, which had already begun at Arras, of the second attack on Gaza, which was actually launched that day, of the offensive in Mesopotamia, where Baghdad had been occupied, of the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, and perhaps especially of the fact that Turkish troops were moving eastward, the British Government were eager enough now for an offensive to be launched in Macedonia. They afterwards went so far as to despatch a message to the French Government, regretting that General Sarrail had postponed the attack, and urging that he should carry it out as soon ashe could. Nevertheless, the British Prime Minister looked upon this operation as the last chance which could be given the Armée d’Orient. At