Napoleon and the grand army in Russia

7 September 1812 (26 August Old Style)

Battle of Borodino

CHAPTER VI. 109

The failure of this expedition, which he had until now represented as unseasonable, and which he now characterises as perhaps the most useful for Europe, was not to be ascribed to a stormy day, or to a sudden attack of fever. Whatever was within the power of man has been attempted and accomplished. The battle of Moskwa has had all the success that could be expected. The failure of this European enterprise is no more to be attri- buted to the state of ill-health of the chief of the French army, than to the skill of the Russian gene- rals ; a premature cold was the only cause of it.

C H A PTE R IX. 161

liim that Spain which he has found out at the other extremity of Europe ; but nothing of all this was the case. Here, as in every page of his work, there is exaggeration, confusion, and supposition. It was only after the battle of the Moskwa, and during our retreat, that a few peasants, excited by the allurement of plunder, murdered some of our wounded who had remained in their power. He (Napoleon) was daunted, he hesitated, he

CHAPTER VII.

laid down from the reports of certain individuals, as to what might have been done at the battle of the Moskwa. He sends Davoust back to his post, murmuring against such an excess of prudence. Amongst the variety of reasons that might be given in justification of the Emperor's refusal, why does the author mention his age, which had render- ed him less enterprising. Was Napoleon an old man at forty three years of age ? The fact is that even to this day, knowing as we do all the forces which the Russians brought to that field of battle, no one can affirm what might have happened, if $> the movement proposed by Davoust had been carried into execution. With a view to its suc- cess, it ought to have been carried into effect dur- ing the night. Now, the inconveniences attendant upon such marches in a wooded and unknown country, almost without a guide, are well known. When it was question of much easier manoeuvres, the consequences of which were of less importance, we see what occurred to the corps of Junot, both before and after the battle of Smolensko. It is, moreover, very probable, that the enemy, owing to his immense number of light troops, would have been soon apprised of the movement; this would have occasioned counter measures on his part, or made him fall back, and the battle we so eagerly desired would have been again put off.

CHAPTER X. 211

Considering our distance from France, the im- perial guard was like a fortified town, under shel- ter of which the army might at all times have ral- lied. Mr. de Segur, who wrote after the events had occurred, should have reflected, that if the guard had been brought into action at the battle of the Moskwa, the French army, of which it con- stantly formed the nucleus, and supported the courage during the retreat, would have had every difficulty to recross the Niemen.