The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 1914-1918

19–25 September 1918

Battle of Megiddo (1918)

ALLENBY'S GREAT SCHEME

The attack was ordered to begin at dawn on the morning of September 19th. Bulfin with the XXI Corps was to advance on the eight-mile front between the railway and the sea, and at the same time to occupy the foct-hills south-east of Jiljulieh. Having cleared a gap for the cavalry, the infantry divisions were to swing to the right on the line Hableh-Tul Keram, and then, continuing north-east, to strike for the Attara-Samaria area north-west of Nablus. This advance would, while rolling up the Eighth Turkish Army on Sharon, and forcing it along the Nablus-Jenin road towards the cavalry on the Esdraelcn plain, at the same time menace the communications of the Seventh Army along the railway and road to Jenin, and leave only the roads to Beisan and to the Jordan at Jisr ed Damieh open for its escape. As soon as tne gap was driven through the trenches on the plain, and the infantry had won the crossings over the Nahr Falik, Chauvel with his three mounted divisions was to ride rapidly north, swing north-east, and traverse the passes in the ridges which linked the heights of Samaria with Mount Carmel. Then, emerging on the Esdraelon plain at Abu Shushe and Megiddo (the ancient Armageddon), Chauvel was to seize the railway junction at El Afule and the Turkish headquarters at Nazareth, and at the same time to advance in force down the valley of Jezreel to the Jordan at Beisan. That movement would close all escape to the two Turkish armies except by the bridge at Damieh and a few fords.

MAI

By nightfall Barrow's leading brigade was close to the entrance to the Wady Arah, which leads to the Mus Mus Pass, and one regiment was pushed forward for some miles. In either of these long, narrow, and winding passes small enemy forces might have held up the cavalry for many hours — per- haps long enough to have enabled the Turks to re-form on the Esdraelon plain and cover their retreat with a strong rear- guard. But from the time Macandrew and Barrow cleared the trenches until they reached Esdraelon they saw nothing of the enemy. Allenby's information was correct. The Turks, confident as to their front line and desperately short of troops, had no reserves between Afule and the firing line. A Turkish officer, who was ridden down by Barrow's advance- guard just before dark, supplied the valuable information that an enemy infantry force, with machine-guns, was already under orders to march from El Afule and block the_ pass at Mus Mus. Barrow — accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. Foster,4 a brilliant young Australian who was his chief staff officer — at once moved forward, and urged the leading brigade to press down through the pass in the dark. Followed by the whole division, it debouched in the early morning on the Esdraelon plain at Megiddo,5 and about the same time the 5th Division gained the plain at Abu Shushe. As the van- guard rode out of the Mus Mus defile on to the level country at dawn, they came upon a battalion of Turkish infantry with machine-guns, the force which had marched in the night from El Afule. The Turks were in the act of deploying from column, when the British leader of the 2nd Lancers galloped down upon them. The Indians crashed through their lines with the lance, wheeled, and repeated the charge. In a few minutes they had killed forty-six and rounded up 470 prisoners. Barrow then marched on El Afule. Meanwhile

MAI

5 Whin, in recognition of his splendid services, General Allcnby was raised to the peerage, he took Megiddo as his title, a compliment which was appreciated by all those who rode with Chauvel upon this grand enterprise.

MAI

Corps commanders, even of cavalry, are seldom in the saddle during operations. While his two leading divisions were riding fast up the Esdraelon plain with detachments thrown out on either side to watch towards Haifa and Samaria, Chauvel with Desert Corps Advanced-Headquarters was following close behind by motor-car. The dramatic overthrow of the enemy was emphasised by the great fleet of fifty or sixty cars which on the morning of the 19th trailed across enemy territory. Halting that night at Liktera, Chauvel pushed on early on the 20th, and established fighting head- quarters at Megiddo. The pace was too strong for the use of wire communications. To supplement the wireless, Chauvel had organised a special force of light horse and yeomanry liaison officers, under Lieutenant-Colonel E. M. Williams6 of the Australian forces, to act as gallopers between the divisions and Corps Headquarters. But so swift was the progress that, before the first day had closed, these officers had ridden their horses to a standstill, and their service was limited. By the use of wireless and airmen, however, Chauvel was able to keep in intimate touch with his advanced troops. With El Afule and Nazareth in hand, and with good news of the progress of the infantry, he ordered Barrow to move at once on Beisan. The road was clear down the valley of Jezreel, and Beisan was gained and the north-western road from Samaria blocked late in the afternoon, by which time the 4th Division had covered eighty miles in thirty-four hours without off-saddling. Chauvel's great purpose had been achieved.