The Marne miracle;illustrating the principles of war

5–12 September 1914

First Battle of the Marne

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Sketch No. 4 — Battle of the Ourcq-Marne, and Battle

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This study does not pretend to be a final analysis of the Battle of the Marne, nor of the preliminary movements leading up to that battle. From the meagre amount of information that is available, the author has been able to check the movements to his own satisfaction as they were probably made. The accompanying sketches also were prepared by the author, and bear only the names of places men¬ tioned in the text. Any conclusions drawn are based upon the best available data. Since the Battle of the Marne, a great many German writers have been making contributions; and inasmuch as they all seem to agree upon the salient points, it seems but just to give full credit to their versions.

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Marshal J off re stated that toward the end of August, 1914, the Allies had on the Western Front 83 infantry and 12 cavalry divisions opposed to a German force of 85 infantry and 10 cavalry divi¬ sions. Reginald Kann, in the Revue de Paris of July 15, 1919, counting only active and reserve divisions, estimates the strength of the German con¬ centration in the west at 70 divisions, and this estimate agrees with the number of enemy units shown on the French official maps for August and September, 1914. It is certain that the Allies were at least equal in strength, and it is altogether proba¬ ble that the Allied armies had a considerable supe¬ riority in numbers over the Germans throughout the first Marne campaign.

G. H. Q.

ever with the armies up to the Battle of the Marne. In isolated cases officers were sent from GHQ as bearers of long recopied directions, which were often anticipated by events and also with instructions to give orders in the name of the Chief of Staff based upon their own personal estimate of the situation. Instances of this will be pointed out later.