The War in the Air, vol. 3

AND TRAINING 1914-16

In June 1916, before the Somme battle opened, Major- General Trenchard, looking ahead to the spring of 191 7, had asked that the number of squadrons in France should be increased to fifty-six. His demands contemplated equal

AND TRAINING 1914-16

numbers of fighting and artillery (or corps) squadrons. But in September 1916 he was quick to read the lessons of the Somme battle and he intimated to the War Office that ultimately the number of fighting squadrons with each army must be increased from four (as asked for in the June programme) to eight. This would mean twice as many fighting as artillery squadrons. On the 16th of November 19 16 this became a definite proposal on the application of Sir Douglas Haig for twenty fighting squad- rons, extra to those asked for in the June programme. The application was intended to be a form of guidance for the future, so that the War Office could initiate the necessary production without delay.

A.D.M.A.)

On the 24th of October 191 6, the day following this Report, a leading article appeared in The Times which expressed, fairly and clearly, the general public feeling on the same subject. 'Those who are best qualified to judge 'of the working of the Board,' said The Times , 'are unani- 'mous that there has as yet been no real solution of the 'ancient rivalry between its naval and its military repre- sentatives. . . . We need to fix our eyes, not on the un- 'questioned superiority of our airmen in these closing 'months of the great battle on the Somme, but on the 'situation as it may stand in the spring of next year. 'Undoubtedly the main defect in our organization is the 'weakness of the Air Board. Its powers were dependent 'from the outset on the readiness of its individual members 'under an independent chairman, to work together for 'common ends. It was never invested with such authority 'as was instantly assumed, for instance, by the Ministry of 'Munitions ; and it was for that reason — not, as our critics 'supposed, from any ridiculous notion of directing air 'strategy from Whitehall — that we pressed for the creation 'of a Minister of the Air. . . . We should like to see Lord 'Curzon, who should know his subject by this time, insist 'at once upon fuller powers and abandon all his other 'work in order to exercise them. . . .'

A.D.M.A.)

Next day, the 16th, the Commander-in-Chief made his application for twenty extra fighting squadrons and, on receipt of this, the Director of Air Organization (Brigadier- General W. S. Brancker), in a comprehensive minute, reviewed the full implications of this demand. The com- pletion of the existing programme still required 10,200 men, he said, and the additional twenty squadrons, together with an essential expansion of reserve squadrons, would require a further 13,560 men. The existing ap- proved programme was for eighty-six service squadrons, for all theatres of war, and for sixty reserve squadrons. This estimate of sixty reserve squadrons to create and maintain eighty-six service squadrons had proved too low. Under very favourable conditions, it had only just been possible to replace the wastage in pilots during the Somme battle. It had to be expected that casualties would become proportionately heavier as air fighting increased, and for the same reason it was essential that a higher future standard should be exacted from pupils before qualification, with a consequent slowing down of the output of trained pilots. The Director of Air Organization, therefore, asked that sanction should be obtained at once for thirty-five addi- tional trainingsquadrons as well as for the twenty extra fight- ing squadrons. Sir David Henderson pressed the matter to a decision, and at an Army Council meeting on the 1 2th of December 191 6 the expansion of the Royal Flying Corps to 106 service squadrons and 95 reserve squadrons was formally approved. The latter number was increased, at the beginning of January 19 17, by two squadrons specially sanctioned for the training of night-flying pilots for home and overseas.

PREFACE

This third volume tells of the part played by aircraft in the destruction of the Konigsberg, and in the campaigns against German East Africa and German South-West Africa ; gives an account of the air attacks on Great Britain, 1914-16; reviews the problems of supply, administration, recruitment, and training, 19 14-16; and outlines the air developments and operations on the Western Front in the winter of 191 6- 17, and during the battle of Arras, 191 7.

CHAPTER VI. The Battles of Arras, 1917 pp. 332-79

Features of the further fighting at Arras. First organized co-opera- tion of fighting aircraft with attacking infantry. Two Flights go 'over the top', nth May. The operation repeated, 20th May.

LIST OF MAPS IN VOLUME

5. Battle of Arras, Disposition of Royal Flying

THE WESTERN FRONT IN THE WINTER OF

Coincident with the Arras offensive, there was to be an attack between the Oise and the Somme by the French northern group of armies and, a fortnight later, the main French offensive was to be launched on the Aisne.