The War in the Air, vol. 6

THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME

By way of retaliation for this attack, the day bombers of the head-quarters IX Brigade were given German aerodrome targets on the 25th of August. The aero- dromes chosen were at Etreux, south-east of Le Cateau, and Mont d'Origny, east of St. Quentin, which respec- tively housed Nos. i and 4 Bombengeschwader. Nos. 27 and 49 Squadrons attacked Etreux, and Nos. 98 and 107 Mont d'Origny. Nos. 32 and 43 fighter Squadrons had orders to patrol the Marcoing and St. Quentin areas while the bombing was in progress, and subsequently to escort the bombers on their homeward journeys. In addition, No. 62 Bristol Fighter Squadron was ordered to provide patrols over the two target aerodromes while the attacks were being made. The bombing of Etreux took place at 4 p.m., when 144 bombs of 25-lb. weight were dropped from heights varying between 10,000 and 13,000 feet: one of the hangars was seen to burst into flames. There was considerable air fighting of a confused kind, some of it taking place during a thunderstorm on the homeward flight, as a result of which two D.H.9's of No. 49 Squadron

MARCH TO OCTOBER

On the 30th of August the junction at Valenciennes was again attacked by No. 98 Squadron, some of whose twenty 1 1 2-lb. bombs burst in the station sidings. Twelve German Fokkers which attempted to interrupt the bombing were driven off by sixteen escorting S.E.5a's of No. i Squadron. On the same day No. 27 Squadron, prevented by heavy clouds from reaching its allotted objective at Solesmes, dropped thirteen 1 12-lb. bombs on Le Cateau from 13,000 feet without definite result. On the 29th and 30th the low- flying attacks by the single-seater fighters on ground targets in the battle area were continued, but on a reduced scale, and there were bombing attacks, by day and by night, notably on Cantin, Douai, and Pont-a-Vendin. The pilots and observers of the corps squadrons, on these two days, main- tained their work of co-operation with the advancing troops.

MARCH TO OCTOBER

also with Allied attacks elsewhere. On the 1 2th of Septem- ber, the day the preliminary movements began on the Third Army front, the First American Army, assisted by French divisions, had opened the offensive which drove the Germans, with heavy losses, from the St. Mihiel Salient. Marshal Foch had requested bombing help from the Royal Air Force to which he had allotted targets in the area Valenciennes-Le Cateau-Busigny. The French air service would, he said, attend to the sector St. Quentin- Mezieres and the neighbourhood of Conflans, and the Independent Force would temporarily divert its attention to specific objectives on the Lorraine front. The bombing was timed to begin on the night of the I2th/i3th of September, but the weather made this impossible and it was not until the next night that the bombers of the Royal Air Force head-quarters IX Brigade were able to go out. The Handley Pages of No. 207 Squadron, which flew through heavy rain, attacked Le Cateau station with one 1,650-lb. bomb, forty-eight 1 1 2-lb. and thirty 25-lb. bombs. No. 83 Squadron had to turn back from an attempt to bomb Busigny station on account of the weather, which again made operations impossible on the following night. Marshal Foch had told Sir Douglas Haig on the 12th of September that he possessed information which showed a German intention to attack Paris with large numbers of small incendiary bombs. Every available German bomb- ing aeroplane would be employed, and after Paris had been dealt with the Germans would turn their attention to London. As a result of this information General Petain had arranged to bomb the aerodromes of the German Nos. 2 and 4 Night-Bombing Squadrons, and Marshal Foch asked that the Royal Air Force should be instructed to attack Etreux aerodrome, which housed No. i Bombing Squadron, and other night bomber landing-grounds in the neighbourhood of Cambrai and St. Quentin. Major- General J. M. Salmond subsequently pointed out that the only aerodrome in the area of Cambrai-St. Quentin known to accommodate night bombers was Bazuel, east of Le Cateau, which would be attacked by the Royal Air Force in addition to Etreux. The aerodrome at St. Maur, south

BATTLES OF THE HINDENBURG LINE.

7he Second Battle of Le Cateau

CHAPTER XI. Prelude to Victory . pp. 397-436

Exhausted British divisions moved to quiet sector of French line. May 1918. They are involved in the German Aisne offensive. Why the enemy attack achieved surprise. Work of No. 52 Squadron. Tell-tale dust-clouds. Complacency and detection.

PRELUDE TO VICTORY

The Battle of the Aisne^ igi8

PRELUDE TO VICTORY

an attack on the immediate right of the German armies engaged in the Aisne battle, and that the objective would be Compiegne. Late on the 7th of June a telegram from General Foch informed British General Head-quarters that there were strong signs of an attack impending on the Montdidier-Noyon front, where German pilots were active over the French lines. The Generalissimo asked that the greatest possible concentration of British fighting and bombing air strength, additional to the units already attached to the French, should be directed towards the area Nesle-Roye. The time when these air units might intervene most effectively would be communicated later. The British reply, on the 9th of June, stated that the air units with the British Fourth Army had been increased to a total of eight fighter squadrons, three day bomber squadrons, and four night bomber squadrons, and that orders had been given that the maximum possible of this air strength was to be employed, when required, in the direction indicated.

PRELUDE TO VICTORY

The French also made a secret air concentration. On the 5th of August General Debeney, commanding the French First Army, requested the support of the Air Division, which had been taking part in the Champagne offensive and counter-offensive. General Petain agreed, and the Air Division moved on the 7th : it disposed of a total of 432 fighters and 195 day bombers. In addition, the fighting group with the French First Army, temporarily re- inforced, comprised 180 fighters. Fifty- two night bombers were also placed at the disposal of the French First Army, so that, together with the 245 two-seater reconnaissance, &c., aeroplanes, there were 1,104 French aircraft available on the front of attack of the French First Army.

CHAPTER VII. The Italian Front . pp. 273-292

Reduction of the British force, March 1918. Signs of an impending enemy offensive. The Austrian attack, 15th June. Across the Piave. British aeroplanes concentrated to help the Italians. Bombing the Piave bridges. The Austrian advance checked. The Piave in spate. Bridges washed away. Italian counter-attacks. The Austrians with- draw. Bombing the retreating troops. An Austrian account of the bombing of the bridges.

THE ITALIAN FRONT

The calamity which overtook the ItaHan army on the Caporetto front was sudden. Directed hy the German general staff, the Austro-German offensive which was launched against the Italians on the morning of the 24th of October 191 7 had for aim the crippling of the Italian army by means of one shattering battle, secretly prepared in all its details. On the flanks of the attack the Italians resisted, but at Caporetto the line broke, and the two Italian corps guarding the sector melted away, with the result that a wide gap was opened for a rapid exploitation of the enemy success. For a fortnight Italy was threatened with a major disaster, but Otto von Below, the German general in com- mand of the offensive, had insufficient reserves to exact the maximum advantage from the victory he had won, and, on the loth of November, the Italian retreat ended along the line of the river Piave.

THE ITALIAN FRONT

By this time the general situation had become clearer, and it was agreed that the British should take over from the Italians the Montello sector of the Piave, with the French on their left. The 41st Division went into the line on the 2nd of December from east of Nervesa to a point opposite Fontigo, and the 23rd Division relieved the Italians two days later from Fontigo to east of Vidor. No. 34 Squadron was accordingly transferred from Grossa to an aerodrome at Istrana, west of Treviso, on the 3rd of December.

THE ITALIAN FRONT

*were serviceable. The Italian squadron on the aerodrome *had not been so fortunate, for although only one bomb 'had fallen amongst them, it had set a hangar on fire and 'destroyed two machines. We treated the raid lightly and 'thought no more of it. An amusing sequel lay in store for 'us. After lunch I and another officer set out to walk to 'corps head-quarters at Fanzolo for tea. It was about six 'kilometres away. As we climbed into a field over a hedge 'near C. Gritti Rizzi, we were astounded to see a small 'Austrian machine there, with the pilot apparently dead 'in his cockpit. On approaching it we heard snores, and 'found that the pilot was merely asleep. His machine-gun 'was loaded so we pointed it at him and awakened him. We 'talked to him in Italian, but finding that he talked perfect 'English, carried on our conversation in our own tongue. 'He soon realized his position and became quite affable. 'All that he remembered was that he had had a very good 'Christmas dinner at his squadron, and had put ten officers 'to bed at about 7 that morning. He himself had just got 'into bed when an order had come from Army head-quarters 'at Vittorio that every serviceable aeroplane in the army 'was to be loaded up with bombs immediately and proceed 'to bomb the aerodromes across the Piave by way of 'reprisal. The machine he had taken had not been filled up 'with petrol, and after forty minutes he had been forced to 'land. He had sent his mechanic to steal some petrol, 'hoping still to escape. We took him to corps head-quarters 'where we learned that five other machines had landed 'south of the Piave and several of the pilots were "not 'quite sober".' ^