novel
War & peace
Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910), 1915
Named on the page for Battle of Borodino.
machine-read Machine-read (OCR) from a scanned book at the Internet Archive: expect misread words and names. The scan itself is at the library.
draft Matched to the battle automatically; not yet reviewed.
Passages that name the battle; the whole book is at Internet Archive.
7 September 1812 (26 August Old Style)
Battle of Borodino
CHAPTER I
THE fight at Schevardino had taken place on the 5th September ; on the 6th not a gun was fired on either side; the 7th was the fearful day of Borodino. Why and how were these battles fought? We ask in amazement, for no great advantage could result either to the Russians or the French. For the Russians they were a step further towards the loss of Moscow, which was the catastrophe they most dreaded; and for the French a step nearer to the loss of their army, which no doubt filled them with equal apprehension. However, though both these consequences were self-evident, Napoleon offered battle and Koutouzow accepted the challenge. If any really good reasons had ruled _ the strategy of the rival commanders, neither ought to have fought then and there; for Napoleon ran the risk of losing a _ quarter of his men at 2000 versts inside the frontier—the straight || road to ruin, and Koutouzow, while exposing his army to the ‘|| same danger, would lay Moscow open. Before the fight at Borodino the proportion of Russians to ii French in the respective armies was as 5 to 6; after it as 1 to 2; if] OF AS 100,000 to 120,000 before, and as 50,000 to 100,000 after; i2nd yet Koutouzow, an intelligent and experienced veteran, Wmade up his mind to the struggle, in which Napoleon, an #2cknowledged military genius, sacrificed a quarter of his men. fUhough some writers have tried to prove that he believed he Mmpshould close the campaign by taking Moscow as he had taken mV ienna, it would be easy to demonstrate the contrary. Contem- fiporary historians tell us that as soon as he had reached Smolensk pe was anxious to find an opportunity of stopping; for while, on mapone hand, he was fully aware of the danger of extending his line gover too wide an extent of country, on the other he foresaw that Il A
CHAPTER I
The real course of events was as follows: The Russian right rested on the river Kolotcha, which crossed the high road at an acute angle; its left flank lay towards Schevardino, and its right by the village of Novoié: the centre facing Borodino at the meeting of the Kolotcha and the Voina. Any one studying the battle of Borodino and forgetting the circumstances under g Which it was fought will perceive that the sole object of this
CHAPTER I
late in the day, the first and the most important half of the § battle of Borodino was actually lost on the 5th, and the inevit- §
CHAPTER I
Thus the battle of Borodino was fought in a way quite unlike the descriptions given of it, which were written merely to cover the faults of the Russiau generals; and this imaginary picture in fact only dimmed the glory of the army and the nation. It was not fought on a spot carefully selected and strengthened, nor with a small numerical difference: it was forced upon them on an exposed plain, after the recoubt had been taken, against forces twice as great as their own; and under conditicns which
Public domain. Text from Internet Archive.