Battle of Spicheren

Background

France declared war in July 1870 before its armies were ready to invade Germany. German forces crossed the frontier on 4 August; the Third Army took Wissembourg, and on 6 August beat the French at Wörth. In the centre, Napoleon III had ordered General Lebœuf to besiege Saarbrücken. The Germans evacuated the city and the French occupied it without crossing the Saar, since the chief intendant had warned that supplies could not reach the far bank.

Moltke's plan was to hold Bazaine's army near the Saar until the Second Army attacked it from the front, the First Army hit its left flank and the Third Army closed on its rear. About 134,000 men of the Second Army, under Prince Friedrich Karl, were to do the main work. About 60,000 men of the First Army under Steinmetz, in I, VII and VIII Corps, were the flank force.

Steinmetz, against Moltke's orders not to cross the Saar, led the First Army south on the evening of 5 August towards Spicheren. This cut Friedrich Karl off from his forward cavalry. Frossard's II Corps had occupied Saarbrücken and then abandoned the heights beyond the town for what he called a 'position magnifique' on the plateau between Spicheren and Forbach. The battle that followed was not planned by either side; it grew as each commander sent units towards the sound of the guns.

The armies

Frossard's II Corps had about 27,000 to 29,000 men and 90 guns, in three divisions: Laveaucoupet's 3rd, Vergé's 1st and Bataille's in reserve. Laveaucoupet held the right and centre along the heights, with two companies entrenched on the Rotherberg; Vergé held Stiring and the Forbach valley on the left; Bataille was around Spicheren. CDB90 codes the ground as rugged and heavily wooded, and Howard (via s1) credits the chassepot rifle, together with poor planning, for the high German losses. Bazaine's 3rd Corps of about 40,000 stood within a few hours' march and did not intervene.

Steinmetz's First Army had about 60,000 men and the leading elements were Georg von Kameke's 14th Division of VII Corps, with François's 27th Brigade (the 74th and 39th Regiments) and Woyna's 28th Brigade. As the day went on they were joined by units from VII and VIII Corps and, from about 15:00, by Alvensleben's III Corps of the Second Army, whose arrival put Prince Friedrich Karl in overall command. German strength is given as 37,000 in some tallies, as units arrived in sequence rather than as one force. Michael Howard (via s1) blames the French defeat mainly on the incompetence and lack of initiative of its commanders.

The battle

Morning: Kameke takes the heights (to about 12:00). Kameke's 14th Division found the Saarbrücken bridges intact and seized the heights beyond the town, which Frossard had given up. Kameke believed the French were retreating and ordered an all-out attack. Shortly before noon François's 27th Brigade was ordered to clear the Rotherberg. Frossard initially thought the attackers were skirmishers and did not call for reinforcements, and poor communication with Bazaine's headquarters delayed what reserves there were.

Afternoon: the Rotherberg (13:00–16:30). Just after 13:00 the 74th Regiment advanced; its flank battalions were halted in the Stiring valley and in front of Stiring-Wendel and the rest sheltered at the foot of the cliffs. By about 13:00 troops from both German armies had reached the base of the heights. Three Prussian batteries on the Galgenberg stopped French counterattacks. By 14:30 François's brigade was spread over about three miles and barely holding. Woyna's 28th Brigade crossed the Saar, but confused orders split the 77th Regiment and Woyna did not realise until 16:30 that he had lost half his brigade. At about 15:30 Kameke attacked the Rotherberg frontally with every unit he had, François leading. François was killed, hit by five bullets. A hussar squadron was thrown in but could not climb the cliffs. French counterattacks by Laveaucoupet's 40th Regiment and Vergé's 2nd Brigade drove the Prussians back. About 16:30 more German batteries were hauled up the slope and fired on Spicheren village.

Evening: reinforcements and the French counterattack (17:00–19:00). Prussian reinforcements from Zastrow's VII Corps, including the 13th Division, came down the Rossel valley. Constantin von Alvensleben arrived with the leading elements of III Corps and took effective control of the fighting. After 17:00 Bataille's division attacked with 15 battalions near Stiring and Spicheren and pushed the Prussians back almost to Saarbrücken, and about 18:00 the French drove back the Prussian right, which seemed about to collapse. Frossard then halted his attack. He feared he would be outflanked by Adolf von Glümer's fresh division, reported at Forbach, and about 19:00 told headquarters he would retreat. The fighting in Forbach and Stiring was house-to-house.

Night: the plateau falls (dusk to 21:00). Alvensleben sent six battalions against Laveaucoupet's flank from the Stiring valley; the first wave broke under artillery and chassepot fire and the second stalled. At dusk his infantry, more than 5,000 strong, overran the French rearguard and took the Rotherberg after dark. About 21:00 the Prussians held the whole plateau and fired a 101-gun salute. Their infantry was exhausted, so they did not pursue, and Frossard escaped under cover of 58 guns, towards Sarreguemines.

Aftermath

German losses were 4,871, with 843 dead, 3,656 wounded and 372 captured. French losses were about 4,078, among them 2,096 prisoners. Frossard withdrew towards the Moselle and planned to fall back on Verdun; on the way a division from Bazaine reinforced him. The exhausted German infantry had not pursued, so the French escaped, though a French memoir by Louis Bouchard (1894) describes the retreat as turning into 'a run for your lives' once the troops left the town. Steinmetz attacked again at Borny-Colombey. The French withdrew to the defences of Metz.

s1 calls the battle the second of three critical French defeats. Howard blames the French defeat mainly on the commanders' incompetence and lack of initiative; the high German losses he attributes to poor planning and the chassepot. Steinmetz had disobeyed Moltke's plan, and his advance cut Friedrich Karl off from his forward cavalry.

There are German and French memorials on the Rotherberg and in the cemeteries of Spicheren and Saarbrücken. A trail named for General François passes them. Groups from both countries still re-enact the battle.

Wargaming it

Spicheren is a meeting engagement that grows through the day, so reinforcement timing is the game. At battalion scale it fits one table around the Rotherberg; at brigade scale a larger table can include Forbach, Stiring-Wendel and Saarbrücken. The French begin well placed on the heights but passive, and the Germans arrive in a steady trickle.

Key terrain: the Rotherberg cliffs, which cut a frontal attack into piecemeal assaults, and the Stiring and Forbach valleys on the French left. The interest lies in command. Frossard never asks for help early, Bazaine's corps sits idle, and each German commander sends units forward without orders. Give the French a rule that reserves need a message to Bazaine and arrive after a delay; give the Germans a random arrival schedule for III Corps and VII Corps.

What-ifs: Bazaine's 3rd Corps joins in the afternoon; Frossard counterattacks at 18:00 with all of Bataille's division and the Prussian right collapses; Glümer's flank march (the fear of which ended the French attack) never materialises. Casualty figures differ, so treat the 4,000 or so French figure as including prisoners.

Maps and pictures