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10 May 1796 · French Revolutionary Wars · Napoleonic

Battle of Lodi

On 10 May 1796 Bonaparte's army forced the wooden bridge over the Adda at Lodi against an Austrian rearguard of about 9,500 men. Most of the Austrians escaped, but the assault helped make the legend of the young general.

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Map of the battle of Lodi.
Map of the battle of Lodi. Даня Губен · CC BY-SA 4.0

Background

By the spring of 1796 the French Directory was running a campaign in northern Italy under a new commander. When Bonaparte took over the Army of Italy in March it had a nominal strength of 63,000 men, but only 37,600 men and 60 field guns were available for immediate action. In April he beat the Austrians at Montenotte (12 April) and Millesimo (13 April), then the Sardinians at Mondovì (21 April), and the armistice of Cherasco on 28 April took Piedmont-Sardinia out of the war.

The Habsburg field army under Beaulieu, reassembled near Acqui after the fighting at Dego, had about 32,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry and 148 guns on paper, though its usable strength may have been as low as 25,000. Bonaparte pursued it into Lombardy, then part of the Habsburg monarchy, and won at Fombio on or about 7 to 9 May. The Austrians fell back across the Adda, the broad river that guards the approaches to Milan. Lodi, with a long wooden bridge over the river, was where their rearguard had to cross. On 10 May the French advance guard caught that rearguard there. The fight was minor beside Marengo or Austerlitz, but it was fought in a single afternoon at a single bridge, and that made it an easy story to tell.

The armies

The French on the day numbered about 15,500 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 30 guns, according to the figures English Wikipedia takes from Digby Smith. Bonaparte commanded in person, with Masséna's division as the main body. Claude Dallemagne led the advance guard of about 3,000 elite infantry, and the cavalry came under Beaumont and Ordener. Berthier and Lannes were also present and appear in the accounts of the crossing.

Beaulieu was not on the field. The Austrian commander at Lodi was Feldmarschall-Leutnant Sebottendorf, whose division was 6,577 strong in the article's account, with two further detachments, Nicoletti's at Corte Palasio and eight Neapolitan squadrons at Fontana, nearby but not at the bridge. Vukassovich's rearguard, including two battalions of Carlstädter Grenz infantry, was driven in towards the town in the morning. Rosselmini's covering force, one battalion of Nádasdy Infantry and two squadrons of Mészáros Uhlans, then held Lodi itself. Sebottendorf drew up nine battalions in two lines on the far bank, with 14 guns. His men were tired after a forced march.

The obstacle was the bridge: about 200 yards of wooden roadway on piles.

The battle

Morning: the rearguards (about 9 am). The French advance guard overtook Vukassovich's rearguard and drove it towards Lodi. Rosselmini's covering force relieved it near the town. Lodi's own defences were weak and lightly held, and the French entered the town and moved on towards the bridge.

Sebottendorf's decision. Sebottendorf judged it unwise to withdraw in daylight and chose to hold the crossing until nightfall, and his men were exhausted. The Austrians tried to destroy the bridge, but French guns fired along its length and stopped them.

The Austrian line. Behind the first line of nine battalions stood a second line of Terzi, Belgiojoso and Thurn infantry and the Archduke Joseph Hussars. The bridge was the only way across for the attackers, about 200 yards long, so any column on it was exposed along its whole length to the guns on the far bank.

Afternoon: the cannonade. The French advance guard was too weak to force the bridge unaided, so Bonaparte waited for reinforcements. When the heavy artillery came up it opened a sustained fire across the river at the nine battalions and 14 guns on the far bank. This is the period in which CDB90 (engagement LODI, 18:30 to 20:00) begins its record; the longer afternoon of waiting and bombardment lies outside its timings.

About 6 pm: the bridge and the ford. Beaumont's cavalry was sent to find a ford upstream. At the same time the 2nd battalion of carabiniers came out of the town and onto the bridge. Part-way across, the Austrian artillery fired a salvo into the column, which wavered. Masséna, Berthier, Lannes, Cervoni and Dallemagne are said to have gone to the front, rallied it and led it forward. Some carabiniers climbed down among the pilings and waded the river, firing as they went. One eyewitness account, from the grenadier François Vigo-Roussillon, is among the sources for the episode.

Collapse and withdrawal. Fearing encirclement, and already demoralised by the bombardment, the Austrians broke and retreated towards Crema in the gathering darkness. Some units fought rearguard actions that slowed the French pursuit, and Oberst Count Attems of the Terzi Regiment was killed covering the withdrawal. Some authorities describe a second French attack, but English Wikipedia marks this as disputed and uncited.

The legend. The nickname 'le petit caporal' is said to have come from Bonaparte personally directing guns at Lodi. The article notes that no contemporary evidence supports the story.

Aftermath

The French took the bridge and the Austrian rearguard lost about 2,000 men, by the figures I could find, but the bulk of Beaulieu's army escaped. The article's own verdict is that Lodi was not a decisive engagement. Its immediate result was that the way to Milan lay open, and the French entered the city five days later.

The lasting importance of the battle is reputational. The article cites Dwyer's 2004 essay on Napoleon as hero and saviour for the view that Lodi fed the myth that Bonaparte was a man of destiny. The story of the general in the front rank at the bridge, and the soldiers' nickname for him, belong to that myth, and the nickname has no contemporary evidence behind it.

The figures for the day are thin and partly uncertain. The French loss, given as 'at least 350', is a minimum, and the Austrian total of about 2,035 combines killed and wounded with prisoners. CDB90 gives higher figures for both sides, 900 and 1,850.

Wargaming it

Lodi is the classic small game built around one obstacle. At 1:10 or 1:20 figure scale the whole action is a few French battalions and batteries on the near bank against nine Austrian battalions and 14 guns behind a river. A table about two metres long, with the 200-yard bridge as the centre of the board, is enough.

The interesting decisions belong to the attacker. Bonaparte can wait for the heavy artillery, spend the cavalry on a ford upstream, or throw the carabiniers at the bridge and hope their momentum survives the salvo. The Austrian player decides how long to hold and whether to demolish the bridge; in this account the French guns raked the bridge when the Austrians tried. Time is the Austrian currency: Sebottendorf has to hold until dusk as Sebottendorf in the account chose to do, and a victory condition based on how many of Beaulieu's units clear the field by nightfall suits the real result better than a straight kill count.

A morale test for the column part-way across the bridge, with a bonus if senior officers lead it, reproduces the moment that mattered. The usual what-if is the ford: if Beaumont's cavalry had arrived sooner or later, the bridge fight might have been shorter, or the Austrians might have lost more men. No source I saw says.

Maps and pictures

The Battle of Lodi, 10 May 1796, by Louis-François Lejeune (1804).
The Battle of Lodi, 10 May 1796, by Louis-François Lejeune (1804). Louis-François, Baron Lejeune · Public domain
The French crossing the bridge at Lodi.
The French crossing the bridge at Lodi. Carle Vernet / Johannes Allart · CC BY-SA 4.0
André Masséna, who led a division at Lodi.
André Masséna, who led a division at Lodi. Edme-Adolphe Fontaine / After Antoine-Jean Gros · Public domain

Sources

  1. s1Battle of Lodi (English Wikipedia)
  2. s2Smith, Digby, The Napoleonic Wars Data Book, Greenhill, 1998 (p. 113), seen only as cited in s1
  3. s3Chandler, David, The Campaigns of Napoleon, Macmillan, 1966 (pp. 78-86, 84), seen only as cited in s1
  4. s4Boycott-Brown, Martin, The Road to Rivoli, Cassell, 2001 (pp. 310-315), seen only as cited in s1
  5. s5Dwyer, Philip, 'Napoleon Bonaparte as Hero and Saviour', French History 18(4), 2004, seen only as cited in s1
  6. s6Montenotte campaign (English Wikipedia)