Battle of Fleurus (1794)

Background

In the spring of 1794 the War of the First Coalition turned on the Austrian Netherlands. Prince Josias of Saxe-Coburg's Allied armies held a front from the coast to the Meuse, and the French struck at both ends of it. In the west, Pichegru's left wing of the Army of the North beat the Allies around Courtrai and laid siege to Ypres. In the east, French columns tried again and again to cross the Sambre and take Charleroi, the fortress that opened the way into Brabant. Attempts at Grandreng, Erquelinnes and Gosselies all failed.

In May Jourdan brought the bulk of the Army of the Moselle north to join the Army of the Ardennes and the right wing of the Army of the North, about 96,000 men in all. This was the force soon named the Army of Sambre-et-Meuse. It crossed on 12 June and invested Charleroi, was thrown back in fog at Lambusart on 16 June, and on 18 June crossed again: the fifth passage of the Sambre in two months. Hatry reopened the siege of a garrison of about 2,800 men under Colonel Reynac.

Saint-Just, the Convention's representative on mission, watched every move. He had an artillery captain shot when a battery was not ready on time, and ordered Jourdan to send 30,000 men to Pichegru, which Jourdan refused to do without a written order.

Ypres fell on 18 June. Too late to save it, Coburg turned on Jourdan instead, leaving the Duke of York to guard the Scheldt. Rocket signals meant to tell Charleroi that help was coming were fired too far off to be seen. On 25 June Reynac offered terms. Saint-Just refused the letter, saying he wanted not paper but the place, and the garrison surrendered at discretion. Coburg attacked the next morning without knowing it.

The armies

Jourdan had about 75,000 men on the field once the Charleroi garrison and his Lambusart losses were deducted. They held a semicircle round Charleroi with both ends on the Sambre, dug in this time with redoubts and entrenchments. From the east: Marceau's and Mayer's divisions of the Army of the Ardennes by Baulet and Velaine; Lefebvre in front of Campinaire, with outposts in Fleurus; Championnet by Heppignies and Wagnée; Morlot before Gosselies. Kléber's wing (Duhesme and Montaigu) held the Piéton and the ground towards Trazegnies, with Daurier's brigade of about 6,000 sent over from Maubeuge on the far left. Hatry's division, freed from the siege, and Dubois' cavalry stood in reserve at Ransart. Marceau's battalions were the weakest troops in the line.

Coburg brought about 52,000, perhaps 14,000 of them cavalry, with some 111 guns. They advanced in five columns. From west to east: the Prince of Orange with Dutch and Austrian troops (24 battalions, 32 squadrons) against the French left and the Sambre bridges; Quosdanovich against Gosselies; Kaunitz against Heppignies; and Archduke Charles and Beaulieu, under Charles's direction, against Fleurus and the French right. Coburg kept no reserve.

The French also had the observation balloon L'Entreprenant, a hydrogen balloon on a tether, run by Captain Coutelle's company of aérostiers. It flew from the hill of the Jumet windmill, near Jourdan's headquarters, with General Morlot aloft to observe.

The battle

The approach (01:30–05:30). Orange set out at 01:30 and Archduke Charles's columns at 02:00 from Point-du-Jour. Phipps has the battle opening at 3 a.m.; fighting at Fleurus itself began between 05:30 and 06:00, and Kaunitz moved on Heppignies when he heard the guns. The fighting went on under a blazing sun.

The western flank (05:00–15:00). Montaigu's division, drawn up in front of Courcelles, was driven back through the Monceau woods to the Sambre at Marchienne-au-Pont, some of it over the river. Frederick of Orange-Nassau's sub-column was stopped at l'Espinette between 09:00 and 10:00 by Daurier's brigade. Kléber held the line of the Piéton with Duhesme's division, Colonel Bernadotte in the centre by Roux. Duhesme counter-attacked Waldeck's column late in the morning; at about 14:00 Kléber crossed the Piéton, Bernadotte's men charging guns firing case. Daurier and Poncet's brigade drove Frederick back to Anderlues by 15:00.

The eastern flank breaks (09:00–10:30). Beaulieu struck Marceau at Baulet and Velaine and drove him into the wood of Gopiaux. By 10:30 the line had broken, and Marceau's men fled back over the Sambre, leaving him with only his staff. Lefebvre's chief of staff, Colonel Soult, found him seeking death to wipe out the disgrace, and told him to go and rally his soldiers instead. Lefebvre, now open on his right, pulled his outposts back from Fleurus to Campinaire; Championnet gave up Saint-Fiacre; Charles took Fleurus at about 10:00.

Lefebvre at Lambusart (10:30–16:00). Soult put three battalions, a dragoon regiment and twelve guns saved from Marceau's wreck at right angles to the line between Lambusart and the woods. Lefebvre's men held their fire until the Austrians were close, then volleyed, and cavalry charged out through gaps in the line. Charles's columns were thrown back three times. Beaulieu got into Lambusart; the French fired the barns and held the houses next to their works. The ripe corn caught fire, ammunition wagons exploded, and the men shouted that there would be no retreat that day.

Crisis in the centre (11:00–16:00). Kaunitz attacked in earnest at about 11:00. Jourdan drew Morlot back on Gosselies, and Championnet's counter-attack at 14:00 failed. At about 15:30 a false report that Lefebvre was in retreat started Championnet evacuating the Heppignies redoubt. A rider then brought word that Lefebvre still held. Jourdan turned the division round and threw in Dubois' cavalry; at about 16:00 Championnet's bayonet charge, backed by Hatry's men, broke Kaunitz's column.

Coburg breaks off (15:00–19:00). At about 15:00, with news that Charleroi had fallen, Coburg ordered a general withdrawal. Lefebvre led the 80th into Lambusart while the troops en potence fell on its flank, joined by some of Hatry's men and the rallied part of Marceau's division. Beaulieu's cavalry was routed but his infantry got away. Orange began to withdraw at about 17:00. By 18:00 the Allies had left the field; Phipps has the fighting last until 19:00. Coburg, who had beaten both French flanks, was gone.

Aftermath

Losses were moderate for a fifteen-hour fight. Dupuis put Coburg's at 2,286 men, a mortar and a standard, not counting the 2,800 men of Charleroi, and the French at about the same; later writers give about 5,000 on each side. The French were too exhausted and short of ammunition to pursue. Coburg fell back to Braine-l'Alleud and Waterloo.

The battle was tactically indecisive and strategically decisive. Fortescue notes it was broken off before either side had gained a decisive advantage, and asks whether Thugut's policy or Coburg's judgement decided it; Vienna soon resolved to give up the Low Countries. The French entered Brussels on 10 July and Antwerp on 27 July; Coburg crossed the Meuse and reached Maastricht by 24 July. By January 1795 the Dutch Republic had fallen. In Paris the victory weakened the case that the Terror was needed to save France, and Saint-Just went to the guillotine with Robespierre a month later.

Phipps judges it no brilliant feat of arms: Jourdan barely held an entrenched position, but kept his head while both wings gave way. The balloon is argued over still. It is often called the first use of aircraft in battle and credited with part of the victory. Soult and Championnet thought it useless. Jourdan said it only astonished the enemy, and he kept Morlot's pencilled note reporting the right wing successful when it had in fact been driven over the Sambre. Twenty-one years later Ligny was fought on much the same ground.

Wargaming it

Fleurus is a big, open, grand-tactical battle: five Allied columns converging on a French semicircle that is entrenched but brittle. It suits brigade or division-level rules on a large table, or a campaign-day game with each column as a player command. The ground is rolling farmland with woods, villages and the Sambre at both ends of the French line.

Key terrain is the Campinaire–Lambusart position, the Heppignies redoubt, the Piéton crossings and the Sambre bridges at Marchienne-au-Pont. The French player must hold the centre while both wings may collapse; Marceau's division should be fragile, Lefebvre's very hard to break. Burning corn, exploding caissons and running short of ammunition make good random events.

The interest lies in command and information. Coburg has no reserve and little grip once his columns are engaged; French messages can be false, as the report that made Championnet abandon Heppignies was. A balloon rule can give the French better sight of the field but slow, unreliable reports.

The what-ifs are strong. What if Charleroi had held a day longer, tying Hatry to the trenches? What if Coburg had kept a reserve, or pressed on after 15:00 instead of breaking off? What if Jourdan had obeyed Saint-Just and sent 30,000 men north? Victory conditions might turn on Charleroi and the bridges rather than on casualties.

Maps and pictures

Paintings and prints

Paintings and prints of the battle, from the time and the century after, by year: free-to-use pictures from the battle's category on Wikimedia Commons. Each opens its file page there, with the full caption and source.