Napoleon, a History of the Art of War, vol. 1

WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 1792.

THE early years of the French Revolution are interesting from a historical rather than a military standpoint. Louis XIV. and Louis XV. had created an enormous debt. The peasants were downtrodden, but the middle classes had increased in intelligence. Free-thinking writers had filled the minds of all with ideas of independence, and to this the American Revolution added fuel. To raise money, Louis XVI. called together the States General in 1789. The Third Estate exerted its numerical power over the Nobles and Clergy, and formed a National Assembly. This body began to demolish the monarchy, and the king finally became the prisoner of the people. The Royalists emigrated, and urged outside nations to intervene. This the Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia did in 1791, and the invasion of France in 1792 led up to a Reign of Terror. The people rose to defend its frontiers, and fended off attack on northern France. Another allied army expected to move through Cham- pagne to Paris, but the advance was slow and ill-conducted. Having crossed the Argonnes, the allies under Brunswick were defeated in an artillery battle at Valmy by Dumouriez and Kellermann. This success raised the courage of the French and enabled Dumouriez to beat the allies at Jemapnes in Belgium, and Montesquieu to conquer part of Savoy. After these victories the enthusi- astic French soldier felt that he could face all Europe.

VALMY STELMENEHOULD

Failing to secure this, it was his purpose to follow them, should they march on the capital; or perchance turn against the allied line of operations, and threaten theirs as they were now threatening his own. Although the first stage of the close manceuvring had been quite in favor of the allies, this latter was the manifest strategic operation for the French, for all that would be left for Dumouriez and Kellermann to do, if the allies marched on Paris, was to seek to deter them by a movement via Metz on their communications, however ques- tionable this might prove with a bold opponent, who had an- other line of retreat to Flanders. But the allies feared to advance on the French capital, with an army on their rear, and finally, reduced to some forty-five thousand men by de- tails and shrinkage, Brunswick advanced towards Ste. Méné- hould, purposing to take possession of all the Argonnes passes, and then to seize the Chalons road in the rear of the French army, when, as he imagined, he would have it at his mercy. Such, indeed, might have been the result, had his boldness only equaled the position chance had yielded him. The so-called battle of Valmy, which should rather be called the cannonade of Valmy, for there was no infantry fighting, decided the campaign and the fate of the new Republic; but the French victory was due rather to utter lack of energy on the part of the allies than to the exceptional bearing of the raw levies of Gaul. On the 20th of September, 1792, at day- break, the allies broke up, and soon reached the Chalons post- road at Cabaret La Lune. Here they were surprised by an occasional cannon-ball which fell into their column and indi- cated the enemy in their front; but the fog prevented their gauging the value of his position. The shots came from the guns of Kellermann, whose scouts had reported the allied ad- vance, and who held a position near Valmy ; while Dumouriez, on his right rear, stretched out as far as the Aisne at Chaude

POSITION OF THE FORCES. 71

Battle of Valmy.

T4 WEAKNESS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

In this Valmy campaign there is nothing new. The old hidebound system of cordons and divided forces was apparent at every turn. But it serves to show how low, since Freder- ick’s day, the art of war had fallen.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

Battle of Jemappes : - : ° :

A FAULTY METHOD. 65

In accordance with their plan the French, early in the year, crossed into the Netherlands in a number of small columns, in the Lille-Valenciennes-Givet country. Near Jemappes one of the centre columns was thrown back by the Austrians ; another fell back before it reached the enemy; the right (Lafayette’s) and the left columns, though successful, then deemed it essential also to retire; for the cordon theory de- manded that the advancing heads of column should keep on a level, and as the centre had retreated, so must the columns on the right and left. Both the central French columns had much outnumbered the enemy, but discipline was so lax that there had been no attempt at real fighting. One of the com- manders, Dillon, was shot by his men for suspected treason ; and Rochambeau was later replaced by Luckner. Quiet

A SHORT-LIVED TRIUMPH. 75

This fortress lies in the marshy confluence of the Hayne and Trouille. In its south front lies a chain of moderate hills, between which and the rivers, like outlying works, stand the villages of Jemappes, Cuesmes and Bertaimont, while

CAPTURE OF JEMAPPES. TT

CAPTURE OF JEMAPPES. TT

TOKENS OF REWARD. 39

Balloons and Telegraphs. There were two inventions made in this period which added somewhat of interest to military matters, those of balloons and telegraphic signaling. So soon as balloons were conceived by Montgolfier in 1782, the idea of their utility in field operations was mooted. Aero- static Institutes were started in Paris to prepare air-ships which could be availed of to observe the enemy, and these captive balloons were actually employed in the early Revolu- tionary wars. Companies of aeronauts were created, and each army was accompanied by two balloons and a proper service. At first the officers who ascended used the naval signals; but they later employed telegraphic instruments, then just discovered. Teams of thirty and forty horses were attached to these captive balloons to move them from place to place; but as all other efforts to make them dirigible were fruitless, they proved to be of questionable utility. At the battle of Fleurus in 1794, the captain of aeronauts, Coutelle by name, remained above the Austrian lines for nine hours, and telegraphed the movements of the enemy to the French army. It was not this, however, that won the battle, but it had its effect in raising the spirits of the French and in annoy- ing the Austrians. A balloon and full equipment accom- panied Bonaparte to Egypt; but we do not learn of its having been used, and after this the service declined. Telegraphic or semaphonic signaling had been well known to the ancients. In modern times, the first use in war of the new electric art was at this period. Especially at the siege of Mainz, a Frenchman named Chappé constructed a simple means of military telegraphy ; and later a number of men of science improved the system.

THE WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

Tue Reign of Terror and the finances were at their worst, yet, dragooned by fear, the people of France proposed to raise a million and a quarter men. The Coalition, subsidized by England, raised a million men. Pichegru com- manded the French on the northern frontier, along which several costly battles were lost and won. Jourdan made several crossings of the Sambre, in June captured Charleroi, and somewhat later fought the battle of Fleurus. This was really lost, but the allies retired. Pichegru again advanced, and the allies re- tired into winter quarters, while Pichegru overran Holland. All these opera- tions were weak and ill-considered, but the French had shown much energy, and the Coalition armies, which were to enter France and march on Paris, could gain no real foothold within the frontier. On the Rhine the French were again defeated at Kaiserslautern, but on the whole, under Moreau, they held their own. In the Alps Kellermann, and on the Riviera Massena, did good work. The campaign of 1794 was a failure for the Coalition. In 1795 only Austria and the German empire remained in the field. ‘The French had more than six hundred thousand men all told, two thirds campaigning against the Coalition. In September Jourdan crossed the Rhine at Diisseldorf, and Pichegru crossed and took Heidelberg. Pichegru turned traitor, and the allies recaptured Mainz. In 1795 Kellermann did no more than to hold his position in the Alps, but Scherer, aided by Massena, won the battle of Loano in November, and drove the enemy back across the mountains. If during the first years of the Revolu- tionary wars France was able to defend her frontiers, in 1794 and 1795 she ad- vanced into the enemy’s territory, and showed energy and ability far beyond those of the allies. The year 1794 saw the Vendean struggle largely quieted.

FORCHIE

Battle of Fleurus.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS. 113

The French loss is given as six thousand men. The allies quoted their own losses as sixteen hundred, and the French claimed the allied loss to be thirteen thousand. It is probable that the allied casualties exceeded five thousand. The battle of Fleurus was followed by a fresh advance of Pichegru’s army during the summer, by the retreat of the allies behind the Meuse, and the occupation of Belgium and West Flanders by the French. Brussels was entered July 10. The persist- ency of the Republican leaders had been as admirable as their military methods were lacking.

AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1796.

BoNnAPARTE had lost Peschiera and Lonato, but had driven Quosdanovich back to Gavardo. Wurmser proposed to cross the Mincio and join his lieuten- ant. Bonaparte lay between the two. Wurmser wasslow. Had he operated rapidly, the Army of Italy would have been crushed between superior bodies. On August 3 Quosdanovich advanced towards Lonato, which had been re- taken, and from here Massena drove him back, while Augereau by handsome fighting checked Wurmser’s van at Castiglione. On August 4 the French left advanced again on Quosdanovich, but found that he had retired up the lake. This enabled Massena to join in the battle of next day at Castiglione. Having rid himself of the Austrian right, Bonaparte now outnumbered the Austrian left near Castiglione. Augereau remained in place, Massena came up from Lonato, and Serurier’s corps from Mantua; and the Brescia troops came along as reserve. Wurmser prepared to fight a defensive battle, and at the proper moment to turn Bonaparte’s left. On his side Bonaparte proposed to turn Wurmser’s left and cut him off from the Mincio. The French preparations were the better, and the attack was sharp. Augereau quickly broke through the Austrian line, and Wurmser was wise to retire and save his bridges. For six days the French had been marching and fighting, but they were enthused by their splendid success. The siege of Mantua was renewed. Wurmser began a fresh advance at the end of August down the Adige by way of Bassano. Bona- parte kept on with the siege of Mantua, held the lower Adige with small forces, and early in September marched up river, capturing Roveredo and Trent, and thus getting on the rear of the column in the Brenta valley. Holding the Austrians on the upper Adige, he followed Wurmser down the Brenta, beat him at Bassano, threw part of his forces back on the Piave, and followed the rest towards Mantua. A race ensued towards the fortress ; the faster French almost trapped the enemy, but Wurmser eluded Bonaparte’s van. In asharp fight on August 16 the Austrians were defeated and hemmed up in Mantua. The place was again shut in. Wurmser’s army had been practically destroyed. The French marching has been rarely equaled. Bonaparte had again proved that speed was one of the great factors in war.

JUNOT’S BRAVERY. 275

The battle of Lonato was thus a series of isolated marches and combats. The main reserve body under Massena, in fighting towards the east, had recaptured Lonato. The body under Guyeux, Despinoy and Dallemagne had started as a whole towards the north, but had been cut in two, and then, after operating on the Austrian flank, had been forced to withdraw. Ocskay had marched south, past Guyeux’s right, on Lonato, and on retiring after his defeat, had been caught between Massena and Guyeux, and captured. Augereau was holding head to Liptay by superb fighting near Castiglione. This to-and-fro almost hap-hazard battle-manceuvring had, however, resulted in cutting Quosdanovich from his chief, and

BIRBISI

Battle of Castiglione.

MASSENA SUSTAINED. 283

By many authors, all the combats from July 29 to August 5 are included in the title, Battle of Castiglione.

ARCOLE. OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1796.

BonAPARTE foresaw that he would again have to fight for Mantua, and his position was far from sound. Still by every means, political and military, he strove to better his position. The Austrians were largely reinforced from the successful armies on the Danube, and Alvinzi in October was sent to relieve Mantua. As usual, the Austrians divided their army, proposing to move from Trent and from Bassano on Verona, and there join hands. To meet this double threat Bonaparte left Vaubois to hold the upper Adige while he attacked Alvinzi; but Davidovich drove back Vaubois, and Alvinzi held his own against Bonaparte on the Brenta. Thus both French columns early in November fell back, and Bonaparte saw that if he lost Verona he must retire behind the Mincio. He had never yet been in such danger. At Caldiero, November 11, Bonaparte attacked Alvinzi, but, unable to make any impression on the supe- rior Austrians, retired to Verona. Had Alvinzi, Davidovich and Wurmser now advanced promptly on Bonaparte, the French would have been in ill case. Some new plan must be devised, or Bonaparte could not hold himself. Leav- ing a small force in Verona, he marched down the Adige, crossed at Ronco, and attempted to turn Alvinzi’s left and reach his rear. But the French were stopped at Arcole by the marshy ground, over which they could only advance along causeways, and here for three days was fought a bloody battle. On each evening the French retired to the west bank of the river. The Army of Italy was saved by Davidovich’s slowness, who during all this time did not attack Vaubois, and finally on the 17th Alvinzi weakened, and the battle of Arcole was won. This enabled Bonaparte to drive Davidovich back up the Adige, which he could now do with superior numbers. Wurmser made an ill-timed sortie from Mantua, which in nowise aided Alvinzi.

ST. STEFFANO

Battle of Arcole.

THE BATTLE ENDED. 371

Arcole did the like ; and the entire Austrian force, which for three days had so pluckily held the bridge against the re- peated French attacks, withdrew along the road to Cologna, leaving Arcole to the French. The combined attack along both banks of the Alpone had succeeded, and the battle of Arcole was won. Massena meanwhile, having driven the enemy out of Porcile, left a half-brigade there, and was with- drawn to Arcole to strengthen the main column. There being no good ground for defense along the Alpone flats, Alvinzi retired by way of San Bonifacio and Villanova. The troops which had stood at Verona on the 15th and 16th without un- dertaking any operation, and had then retired to Caldiero, summarily withdrew. A slight French attack on San Boni- facio was repulsed, and this ended the battle. The troops of both armies, utterly exhausted, slept on their arms.

THE BATTLE ENDED. 371

From the battlefield of Arcole, Bonaparte wrote General Clarke: ‘‘ Your nephew, Elliot, has been killed on the battle- field. ‘This young man had become familiar with arms. He has several times marched at the head of column. He would have been one day an estimable officer. He died with glory and in the face of the enemy. He did not suffer an instant. Where is the reasonable man who would not envy such a death ? ”’

POSITION OF JOUBERT. 387

As it happened, Joubert had, about 10 Pp. M. of the 13th, begun to leave his Rivoli position, intending to retire to Cas- telnuovo, lest the Austrians, coming on in great numbers and from several directions, should surround and overwhelm his one division. Luckily, his chief’s orders reached him in sea- son for him to turn back and reoccupy a position on the pla- teau just in front of Rivoli, leaning on Campana and Monte Castello, with van in Zoane. Had the Austrians anticipated him, the battle of Rivoli might not have been a French victory. Bonaparte’s message also informed him that his chief was on the way with reinforcements. He prepared for a hard fight to carry out his orders.

JOUBERT MOVES FORWARD. 389

nized that here, on the heights of Rivoli, was the one place to meet him; for here only could he keep the several Austrian columns, now far apart, from joining hands. The infantry, marching alone, he would receive with salvos of artillery ; and the cavalry would not be able to deploy on the zigzag roads for any big manceuvre. Lusignan and Wukassovich were for some hours practically harmless.

JOUBERT MOVES FORWARD. 389

Battle of Rivoli.

THE PLATEAU FREED. 395

Alvinzi had twenty-six thousand men in line at the battle of Rivoli; Bonaparte about four thousand less. The loss in killed and wounded does not appear to be determined; but the Austrians lost more heavily than the French. Especially in prisoners were their casualties serious. Quosdanovich retired in part by way of Rivalta, and in part by Dolce; Wukassovich, unable to assist his comrades, fell back up

BATTLE OF SHEBREISSE. 483

Cairo, having taken eight days to march the eighty miles from Shubra-Khet. The sight of the Pyramids of Gizeh encouraged the troops, and Bonaparte, in an allocution to the army pre- vious to the ensuing battle, used the memorable phrase: “ Sol- diers ! you have come to these countries to snatch them from barbarism, to carry civilization into the Orient, and save these beautiful lands from the yoke of England. From these mon- uments forty centuries are watching you ! ”

BATTLE OF SHEBREISSE. 483

The Mamelukes had drawn up for a further defense of their capital at Embabeh, a small suburb of Cairo, on the opposite or left bank of the Nile. Soon the French came in view of the enemy on the plain between the stony hills of Gizeh and the river Nile. As the army advanced, the minarets of Cairo, backed by the brown range of the Mokattam hills, were seen on the left, with the ruins of Memphis in their front, and on the right the everlasting Pyramids. In the Gallic mind this wonderful view bred untold enthusiasm, which augured well for the coming conflict. Murad Bey had collected ten thou- sand Mamelukes on the plain, each served by three or four footmen; and having armed twenty thousand fellahin, had placed them behind earthworks at Embabeh. There had joined him several thousand janissaries and spahis, or sol- diers of the Pasha. His right rested on the Embabeh in- trenchments, which, though defended by forty guns, were of small value, being simply a wall and ditch. Here stood the fellahin and the janissaries, while the little walled town of Gizeh up river was defended by three thousand Arab auxil- iaries. Murad’s entire reliance was on his left wing, consist- ing of his Mamelukes, who had vowed to drive the dogs of Christians from the land.

FORMATION IN ECHELON. 485

GIZ ay Battle of the Pyramids.

FORMATION IN ECHELON. 485

Meanwhile the main body opposite Reynier struck the square of this division, and in striving to avoid its fire, came within the zone of Dugua’s musketry. Here the Mamelukes lost their head, and as bravely as they charged, so rapidly did they flee, leaving behind them thousands of corpses. Part of the line wheeled towards the Pyramids, another turned towards Embabeh. The sight of the defeat of their comrades demor- alized the militia in this town, and Bon and Vial were ordered forward to take it. The squares advanced, the three front ranks, or proper divisions, ployed into column, and under Rampon and Marmont rushed towards the village. The Mamelukes left in Embabeh, and in part those who had fled thither, sallied out and attacked the French column ; but this halted and formed square, and drove back the assault. <A part of the French column took advantage of a deep ditch, along which they could file, to turn the town, whose defenders were melting away. The fleeing Arabs partly reached the plain, where the French right wing drove them towards the river, and those who remained in Embabeh, after a bare two hundred shots from the guns, were driven into the Nile by the French assaulting parties. As the Egyptians are mostly good swimmers, many were able to save themselves.