Campaigning with Grant

8–21 May 1864

Battle of Spotsylvania Court House

Chapter V. Grant's Third Day in the Wilderness-

Chapter V. Grant's Third Day in the Wilderness- Hail TO the Chief! —A Night Alarm— A Midnight Ride— Grant Roughs it with his Troops— Out of THE Wilderness— Sheridan Ordered to Crush " Jeb'' Stuart— a Chapter op Accidents— Grant in Front of Spottsylvania— The Death of Sedgwick— Arrival op Despatches—" I shall Take no Back- ward Steps" 74

SPOTTSYLVANIA — THE DEATH OF SEDGWICK — ARRIVAL

GEANT'S THIED day in the wilderness — HAIL TO THE chief! — A NIGHT ALAEM — A MIDNIGHT RIDE — GRANT ROUGHS rr WITH HIS TROOPS — OUT OF THE WILDER- NESS— SHERIDAN ORDERED TO CRUSH "jEB^ STUART — A CHAPTER OF ACCIDENTS — GRANT IN FRONT OF SPOTTSYLVANIA — THE DEATH OF SEDGWICK — ARRIVAL OF DESPATCHES — "l SHALL TAKE NO BACKWARD STEPS ''

STEPS ''

THE next morning, May 7, General Grant was almost the first one up. He seated himself at the camp- fire at dawn, and looked thoroughly refreshed after the sound sleep he had enjoyed. In fact, a night's rest had greatly reinvigorated every one. A fog, combined with the smoke from the smoldering forest fires, rendered it difficult for those of us who were sent to make recon- naissances to see any great distance, even where there were openings in the forest. A little after 6 a. m. there was some artillery-firing from Warren's batteries, which created an impression for a little while that the enemy might be moving against him ; but he soon sent word that he had been firing at some skirmishers who had pushed down to a point near his intrenchments and dis- charged a few shots. At 6 :30 a. m. the general issued his orders to prepare for a night march of the entire army toward Spottsylvania Court-house, on the direct road to Richmond. At 8 : 30 Burnside pushed out a

GRAN1?'S THIBD DAY IN THE WILDERNESS 77

All preparations for the night march had now been completed. The wagon-trains were to move at 4 p.m., so as to get a start of the infantry, and then go into park and let the troops pass them. The cavalry had been thrown ou* in advance; the infantry began the march at 8 : 30 p. m. Warren was to proceed along the Brock road toward Spottsylvania Court-house, moving by the rear of Hancock, whose corps was to remain in its posi- tion during the night to guard against a possible attack by the enemy, and afterward to follow Warren. Sedg- wick was to move by way of Chancellorsville and Piney Branch Church. Bumside was to follow Sedgwick, and to cover the trains which moved on the roads that were farthest from the enemy.

30 November 1864

Battle of Franklin (1864)

OOBRESPONDENCE WITH QENEBAL THOMAS 333

there trace his track, but you are not quite certain where he will come out till you see his head.'* Hood had abandoned Georgia to Sherman, and was moving north with his whole force against Thomas. His army now consisted of about 45,000 men. Schofield, who, under Thomas's orders, was in advance watching Hood's movements and endeavoring to delay him, had less than 25,000 troops. On November 30 Hood closed up on Schofield and attacked him. This brought on the des- perate battle of Franklin, and the fighting continued until long after nightfall. The enemy was handsomely repulsed, with a loss of over 6000 men, while Schofield lost only 2326. This day was made still more eventful by reason of Sherman's capturing MiUen, (Georgia, at the same time that Schofield was achieving his signal victory in Tennessee. The night of the battle of Frank- lin, Thomas was reinforced at Nashville by two divisions from Missouri, and the next day by two divisions of his own troops that he had brought in from the front. The day after the battle of Franklin (December 1), General Thomas reported that he had retired to the fortifications around Nashville until he could get his cavalry equipped, which was then outnumbered by that of the enemy four to one, adding that if Hood attacked that position he would be seriously damaged, and if he mad^ no attack imtil our cavalry could be equipped, he or Schofield would move against him at once. General Grant telegraphed Thomas on December 2 : "If Hood is per- mitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will lose all the road back to Chattanooga, and possibly have to abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you, it is all well ; but if he does not, you should attack him before he fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster's employees, citi- zens, etc." Nashville was a large military depot where

THOMAS CBUSHES HOOD 349

The general had scarcely arrived at his hotel when a despatch came in from Thomas, saying : ^^ I attacked the enemy's left this morning and drove it from the river, below the city, very nearly to the Franklin Pike, dis- tance about eight miles. ..." Before the general went to bed he sent a reply to Thomas, dated midnight, as follows : " Your despatch of this evening just received. I congratulate you and the army under your command for to-day's operations, and feel a conviction that to- morrow will add more fruits to your victory." Mr. Lin- coln, on hearing the news, telegraphed Thomas : " You have made a magnificent beginning. A grand consum- mation is within your easy reach. Do not let it slip."

15–16 December 1864

Battle of Nashville

CONFEBENCE AT THOMAS'S HEADQUABTEBS 3

General Grant had started, the day before the inci- dent I have described, from Bridgeport, a place thirty miles below Chattanooga, where the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad crosses the Tennessee River, and had ridden by way of Walden's Ridge, the only route left open by which communication could be had with the beleaguered town. We had been advised that he was on his way, but hardly expected that he would reach Chattanooga that night, considering the state of the weather, the wretched condition of the roads, or rather bridle-paths, over the mountain, and the severe injury to his leg which had been caused by a fall of his horse several weeks before, and from which he was still suffering. When he arrived he had to be lifted from his saddle, and was evidently experiencing much pain, as his horse had slipped in coming down the mountain, and had further injured the lame leg ; but the general showed less signs of fatigue than might have been sup- posed after his hard ride of two days under such trying circtmistances.

GBANT'S PIBST MEETING WTTH LINCOLN 19

The next day, the 10th, he paid a visit by rail to the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, near Brandy Station, in Virginia, about seventy miles from Washing- ton. He returned the day after, and started the same night for Nashville, to meet Sherman and turn over to him the command of the Military Division of the Missis- sippi. While in Washington General Grant had been so much an object of curiosity, and had been so continu- ally surrounded by admiring crowds when he appeared in the streets, and even in his hotel, that it had become very irksome to him. With his simplicity and total lack of personal vanity, he did not seem able to understand why he should attract so much attention. The Presi- dent had given him a cordial invitation to dine that evening at the White House, but he begged to be excused for the reason that he would lose a whole day, which he could not afford at that critical period. " Besides,'' he added, " I have become very tired of this show business.''

THOMAS CEUSHES HOOD 351

General Grant's predictions that Hood would turn north, and not follow Sherman when the latter cut loose from Atlanta, and that Thomas's army would crush Hood's as soon as it was led against it, were completely fulfilled. There has been so much discussion in regard to the actions of General Grant and General Thomas during the two weeks preceding the battle of Nashville that a synopsis of the coiTespondence between them has been given in order that the reader may form his own conclusions. General Grant has been charged with be- ing inimical to Thomas, allowing himself to become un- duly irritated over the delay of the latter, and ordering an ill-advised advance of the army, against Thomas's expressed judgment. The general-in-chief had had a larger experience with Confederate armies than any one else, and felt that the urgent orders he gave were neces- sary ; and as he was held responsible by the government and by the country for the operations of all the armies, and the success of the cooperative movements which he had planned, he certainly exercised a perfectly proper authority in giving the orders he issued. When General Thomas did not obey the instructions repeatedly sent him, the general-in-chief did not treat the case as one of insubordination or defiance, and act hastily or arbitrarily in taking steps immediately to enforce his orders, but exercised a patience which he would not have done under other circumstances or toward any other army com-

THOMAS CEUSHES HOOD 351

mander. He felt while sending his urgent despatches for an advance of the army that he was doing Thomas a posi- tive service ; for he knew better than any one else could know that as soon as Thomas launched his army against Hood's forces he would win triumphantly, and demon- strate to the country what was already known to his fellow-officers — that the "Rock of Chickamauga" was worthy of being placed in the front rank of the great commanders of the war. It was because he felt entire confidence in Thomas's ability to whip Hood that he urged Thomas to strike, and not because he doubted him. When General Grant made his report of the operations, he stated, in referring to General Thomas, substantially what he had said in conversation at head- quarters after the victory of Nashville : " His final defeat of Hood was so complete that it would be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officei^s judgment On the other hand, there were those who criticized Gen- eral Thomas severely for disobedience of orders of his superior officer, and manifesting a spirit of insubordi- nation at a critical crisis of the war. Such insinuations, when all the circumstances are taken into consideration, would attribute to General Thomas traits of character which were certainly foreign to his nature. He be- lieved that he was right, and that he was acting for the best interests of the service, and evidently felt so thor- oughly convinced of this that he was willing to run the risk of assuming all responsibility, and to submit to being displaced from his command, rather than yield his judgment. There is very little doubt that if any other two general officers in the service had been placed in the same trying circumstances there would have been an open rupture* but both being men of patience as well as firmness, their correspondence was conducted without acrimony, the services of both were utilized for