Battle of Spotsylvania Court House

Background

Grant had come east in March 1864 as general-in-chief with a simple aim: Lee's army, not Richmond, was the objective. In the Wilderness on 5–7 May his army had fought Lee to a bloody standstill. Union commanders before him would have recrossed the Rappahannock. Grant instead ordered Meade to march around Lee's right flank to Spotsylvania Court House, about ten miles to the south-east, an important crossroads on the way to Richmond. Holding it would put the Union army between Lee and his capital and force him to fight on ground Grant preferred.

The march began at about 20:00 on 7 May, Warren's V Corps leading down the Brock Road and Hancock's II Corps following, while Sedgwick's VI Corps and Burnside's IX Corps took the longer route by Chancellorsville. The roads were dusty, the woods still burning, and wagons and ambulances jammed the way. Meade reached Todd's Tavern after midnight and found Sheridan's cavalry asleep there instead of clearing the road ahead.

Lee guessed where Grant was going. Richard Anderson, who had taken over Longstreet's First Corps only the day before, set off at about 22:00 by a track that Lee's artillery chief Pendleton had cut through the woods, and bivouacked near Block House Bridge on the Po at about sunrise. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry spent the night strengthening log barricades across the Brock Road. The race for the crossroads would be won by about 100 yards.

The armies

Grant's force numbered about 100,000 at the start; Eicher and Kennedy put those engaged at about 110,000, and heavy artillery regiments from the Washington defences joined during the battle. It comprised Hancock's II, Warren's V and Sedgwick's VI Corps of Meade's Army of the Potomac, Burnside's IX Corps, still reporting to Grant, and Sheridan's Cavalry Corps. Command was still divided, Grant deciding and Meade commanding, and it showed: Meade and Sheridan quarrelled on 8 May, and Sheridan took some 10,000 cavalry away on a raid for the rest of the battle. The heavy artillery regiments, scorned by veterans as "bandbox soldiers", were each about the size of a Confederate brigade.

Lee had about 52,000 men in four corps: Anderson's First, Ewell's Second, the Third under Early while A. P. Hill was ill, and Stuart's cavalry. He was outnumbered about two to one and had lost Longstreet in the Wilderness.

The decisive weapon was the spade. Overnight on 8–9 May the Confederates built more than four miles of earthworks from the Po past Laurel Hill and around a bulge, the Mule Shoe, held by Ewell, with trenches, felled trees, traverses and head logs. Grant's problem for two weeks was how to break such works. Emory Upton's answer was a dense column that charged without stopping to fire or load.

The battle

CDB90 treats the battle as a single engagement, number 203 (SPOTSYLVANIA), from 8 to 19 May. Times are approximate and sources differ.

8 May: Laurel Hill. At first light Merritt's cavalry failed to clear Fitzhugh Lee's barricades, and at about 07:00 Meade sent Warren's infantry through. Robinson's division pushed the cavalry back past the Alsop farm to a low ridge beyond the Spindle clearing that the Federals called Laurel Hill. Warren thought only cavalry held it. Anderson's leading brigades, Henagan's and Humphreys's, with Haskell's guns, reached the ridge with the Federals about 100 yards away. Warren's divisions went in piecemeal and were thrown back; by noon he was entrenching. Wilson's cavalry briefly held the courthouse village that morning but withdrew. Sedgwick came up in the afternoon, and a combined attack at about 19:00 failed.

9 May. At about 09:00 Sedgwick, inspecting his line near the Brock Road and chiding men who ducked, said the sharpshooters "couldn't hit an elephant at this distance", and was shot dead under the left eye. Wright took over VI Corps. Burnside approached along the Fredericksburg Road from the east and entrenched; Hancock crossed the Po to turn Lee's left but halted for the night, and Lee moved two of Early's divisions against him.

10 May. Heth struck Hancock's rear division, Barlow's, at about 14:00, and it escaped back over the Po. Warren attacked Laurel Hill again at about 16:00 and failed. Mott, never told that the general assault had been postponed, attacked the tip of the Mule Shoe alone at 17:00 and was repulsed. Just after 18:00 Upton led about 5,000 men of twelve picked regiments in four lines against the western face of the salient, broke into Doles's Georgian brigade and took about 1,000 prisoners, but with no support he was driven out within minutes. Grant promoted him brigadier general.

11–12 May: the Mule Shoe. Grant planned Upton's tactics on a corps scale and told Washington "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." Lee, believing Grant was about to withdraw, pulled the artillery out of the salient. Hancock's corps, 15,000–20,000 strong, massed in the rain at the Brown house. Johnson asked for his guns back, but the order reached them only at 03:30. At 04:35 Hancock's mass struck the tip of the Mule Shoe out of the mist, overran Johnson's division and took about 3,000 prisoners, including Johnson and Steuart, and about 20 guns. Then it lost all order. Gordon counter-attacked with Johnston's, Hoffman's and part of Evans's brigades, and when Lee rode forward the men cried "Lee to the rear!"

12–13 May: the Bloody Angle. Wright's VI Corps attacked the western leg from about 06:00, Russell's division joining at about 09:30. Ramseur's, Perrin's, Harris's and McGowan's brigades fought back from the far side of the same log parapet. For some twenty hours, in pouring rain and mud, men fought, much of it hand to hand, across the same parapet; an oak behind the works was felled by bullets. Warren's attacks at Laurel Hill and Burnside's on the east face achieved nothing. At about 04:00 on 13 May, Lee's men withdrew to a new line across the base of the salient.

14–19 May. Grant shifted east through the mud, taking Myers Hill on 14 May. At about 04:00 on 18 May Hancock assaulted the new line across the Harrison field; abatis and massed artillery broke the attack. On 19 May Ewell probed north with Rodes's and Gordon's divisions and at about 17:00 met Tyler's heavy artillerymen at the Harris farm; reinforced by Birney's division, they held until firing died away at about 21:00. On the night of 20–21 May Hancock marched for Milford Station, and Lee left for the North Anna.

Aftermath

Union losses were about 18,400, Confederate about 9,000–13,400, the higher modern counts including the 3,000 men of Johnson's division captured on 12 May. With the Wilderness, Grant had lost about 36,000 men in two weeks, and some 20,000 more were due to go home as enlistments ran out. Lee lost perhaps 23 per cent of his army, Grant about 18 per cent, and Lee's losses of veteran soldiers and commanders could not be replaced. Union Generals Sedgwick, Rice and Stevenson and Confederate Generals Daniel and Perrin were killed or mortally wounded. Far to the south, Sheridan's raid brought Stuart to battle at Yellow Tavern on 11 May, where he was mortally wounded, but it left Grant without his cavalry's eyes at Spotsylvania. Forty-three Medals of Honor were awarded for the battle.

Both sides claimed victory. Lee held his ground; Grant kept his grip and moved on to the North Anna, Cold Harbor and Petersburg. Encyclopedia Virginia calls it a tactical draw but a strategic success for Grant. Gordon Rhea criticises both commanders: Grant never seems to have considered what to do after Hancock broke through, and Lee's removal of the guns from the salient nearly destroyed his army. The Bloody Angle is often called the most intense fighting of the war. Part of the field lies in Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park.

Wargaming it

Spotsylvania is a campaign of attacks on prepared works, so it gives several distinct games rather than one. Laurel Hill on 8 May is a meeting engagement and a race: Warren's divisions arriving one by one against cavalry who must hold until Anderson's brigades come up, with the arrival times the whole game. Upton's attack on 10 May is a good regimental game about columns, timing and support. The Mule Shoe on 12 May works at brigade level, with turns of 30 minutes, from Hancock's assault to Lee's new line. Harris Farm on 19 May suits green but large heavy artillery regiments against veteran Confederates.

Rules need to handle earthworks well: head logs, traverses and abatis should make a frontal attack by line near-hopeless, while a dense column that does not stop to fire has a chance of breaking in but is then hard to control or support. Rain and mist on 12 May should limit visibility and slow movement.

The decisions are good. The Confederate player must decide whether to pull the guns out of the salient, and how soon to start a fall-back line. The Union player must decide how to exploit a breakthrough nobody planned for, and when to commit Wright and Burnside. What-ifs include Anderson arriving minutes later on 8 May, Burnside pressing into the gap on 10 May, the guns staying in the Mule Shoe, and Sheridan's cavalry staying with the army.

Maps and pictures