Napoleon, a History of the Art of War, vol. 4

20–21 May 1813

Battle of Bautzen

TO SCOUR THE COUNTRY. 55

At 114. m., May 19, Ney wrote Berthier from Hoyerswerda that he had interrogated the officer bringing him a letter from Lauriston, “and that what he has told me has confirmed me that the intention of the emperor was that I should move on Drehsa.” The Lauriston letter states that “it is the emper- or’s desire that Ney’s, Lauriston’s and Reynier’s corps, Vic- tor’s and Sébastiani’s, should manceuvre to debouch by Drehsa, which is between the two Sprees. This Drehsa is written Brosa on the map of the Institute of Weimar.” It seems that there is another Brosa close to Gotamelde and out of Ney’s intended line ; but there is no evidence that this misled Ney. An hour later Ney wrote Berthier: “I will manoeuvre to-morrow, the 20th, towards the position of Drehsa, but I believe it to be very important to have my movement sus- tained, so that if the enemy has decided to await battle on the heights of Bautzen, I might be in measure to contain him, in case he marched on me by way of Bautzen.”

FOOTHILLS: OF

(oo FOOTHILLS: OF LUSATIAN “ite ae Battle of Bautzen, May 20.

VOL. IV.

“ This day,” says the Bulletin, “which one might call, if isolated, the battle of Bautzen, was only the prelude of the battle of Wurschen. The enemy, however, commenced to understand the possibility of being forced out of his position. His hopes were no longer the same, and from this moment he must have had presage of his defeat. Already all his dispo- sitions were changed. ‘The destiny of the battle was no longer to be de- cided behind his intrenchments. His immense works and three hundred redoubts became useless. The right of his position, which was opposite the 4th Corps, became his centre, and he was obliged to throw his right, which formed a considerable part of his army, to oppose Ney, in a place which he had not studied and which he believed outside his position.”

THE CIPHER OF THE DAY. 79

By decree of June 4, a monument was ordered erected on Mont Cenis with this inscription: “The Emperor Napoleon, on the field of battle of Wurschen, has ordered the erection of this monument, as a witness of his great gratitude towards his people of France and Italy, and to transmit to the most distant posterity the remembrance of this celebrated epoch, where in three months twelve hundred thousand men ran to arms to assure the integrity of the empire and of its allies.”

21 June 1813

Battle of Vitoria

WELLINGTON INVADES FRANCE. 1813 TO 1814.

use in his Spanish scheme. | THE battle of Vittoria in June, 18138, had settled the fate of the Spanish monarchy, but Wellington did not relax his efforts. Although the capture of Pancorbo had opened the Royal road, the allies could no longer rely on so distant a base as Portugal, and it was essential to reduce San Sebastian so as to utilize that port. Siege was accordingly laid to it, while Pampeluna was merely blockaded. Having little confidence in the stability of the Continental allies, Wellington, hoped to capture San Sebastian before the armistice in Germany should

NYENVLNON

end, lest a peace should be made with the emperor which would enable the French to turn in force against the English. So soon as Napoleon heard of the defeat at Vittoria, he sent Soult back from Germany to the Peninsula, to reorganize the army and prevent Wellington from invading France, and the marshal was rapid enough to reach the border on July 12, and to assume the command of what was left of the three French armies, which he reorganized as the Army of Spain. Bereft of his throne, Joseph retired to Paris.

SAN SEBASTIAN BLOCKADED. 285

The siege of San Sebastian was not easy. The town had fallen from importance until the days of Vittoria, when Rey, escorting a convoy to the frontier, seized it June 28, and held it with a garrison. It was soon blockaded by Graham with ten thousand English, and the lines of San Marcial, where the Royal road crosses the Bidassoa, were held by eight thousand Spaniards. Situated as it is on an almost inaccessible penin- sula, at the neck of which was the hill of St. Bartolomeo, which the French fortified, it had natural advantages, but there had not been time to properly repair the works. Well- ington had approved a certain plan for the siege, but this does not seem to have been followed by Graham, who was in charge. On August 17 San Bartolomeo was stormed and cap- tured, and batteries were erected against the defenses of the place. On August 19 the siege-train arrived; on August 24 the breaches made were assaulted, but the assault failed from bad management. Wellington visited the operations, but on account of the manceuvre of Soult, felt obliged to go back to Pampeluna.

HILL CUT OFF. 301

After the battle of Vittoria, Suchet was forced to abandon

26–27 August 1813

Battle of Dresden

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

Grenadier, Imperial Guard __.. Battle of Dresden, August 26 Russian Grenadier

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

Wurzburg Rifleman Battle of Dresden, August 27 Frederick William ITI. Napoleon after Bellange Saxe-Coburg Rifleman

THEORY AND PRACTICE. 143

This confusion led up to Napoleon’s fighting a defensive battle at Dresden without special grand-tactics ; and while here he first held himself behind intrenchments, he did not enact a negative part. He had long foreseen that he might have to defend Dresden; to Maret he had written that “ his plan might be altered by the operations of the enemy,” mean- ing an attempt to seize Dresden out of hand; and when he learned that the allies were actually approaching Dresden, although, as he wrote Macdonald, August 24, he could be in Prague in three days, he preferred the more prudent method of debouching through the Saxon capital. The troops hurried along, and via Bautzen the van reached Stolpen early August 25, the Guard and Latour-Maubourg not far behind; Mar- mont and Victor were still a day’s march back. Vandamme was in Neustadt and Stolpen.

DRESDEN IN DANGER. 145

damme could have held Dresden a day or two. To move to Dresden and fight there was only a tactical operation, that through Konigstein with the main army was a beautiful strategic manceuvre. Thus, the alleged danger to the city persuaded Napoleon merely to threaten his enemy’s rear with Vandamme’s corps, and to fight his battle at Dresden. This was not a masterful proceeding. Napoleon himself left Stolpen, and reached Dresden August 26, at 9.a.m. While purposing to undertake the larger manceuvre, he had written St. Cyr how to conduct the defense so as to hold on several days; but now Vandamme was ordered to assemble all his forces in the Lilienstein camp, and personally to cross to Konigstein and reconnoitre in its front. Although Napoleon learned of Oudinot’s defeat, whatever he may have thought, he laid no great stress upon it, keeping up his habit. of en- couraging his subordinates ; and having got a first and erro- neous report from the Katzbach, he wrote Maret : —

8 January 1815

Battle of New Orleans

VALUE OF LINE AGAINST COLUMN. 621

There had occurred, in January of this year, the remarkable battle of New Orleans, which tends to illustrate what has here- tofore been said about the relative value of line and column. To defend the city, after a preliminary manceuvre, General

RIDERS OF MANY LANDS.

Colonel Dodge’s claim to know something about horses is amply and pleasantly maintained in nearly fourscore delightfully written chapters. — New Orleans Times-Democrat.

16 June 1815

Battle of Ligny

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

Battle of Ligny ; : ; ; eae ee

RESULTS OF THE DAY UNFAVORABLE. 447

more confirmed in his judgment; he does not appear to have gone or sent towards Voué or Mesnil; and yet nearly all Schwartzenberg’s available forces were assembling in his front. This careless reconnoitring is almost incredible. It was the forerunner of that succeeding the battle of Ligny. By eight o’clock guns were opened from Nozay, where Pahlen was moving across the Barbuisse brook; the French fell back to Moulin Neuf, and Rajevski came up and occupied

STRATEGIC OPENING AS IN 1796. DBS

It was the position of the allied armies that led Napoleon to undertake the same form of strategic opening to which he had resorted in his first campaign in 1796, to wit, one line of operations, one mass, an assembly at a safe distance, the rup- ture of the enemy’s centre, and the hurling of his mass upon each part separately, so that each might be thrown back along its own line of communications. Of such a divergent retreat there was apparently small doubt: the allied commanders had not only different bases, but different interests to subserve ; once separated, why should they hold together? In 1794 the Austrians, operating in this country on the same lines and beaten at the battle of Fleurus, retired towards the Rhine, separating from York, who commanded the Anglo-Dutch.

NOT. ONLY STRATEGICAL BUT TACTICAL. 6555

at Nivelles at ten o’clock with a large body, as the English leader assumed that he would be able to do. Even if Well- ington had told Blucher that he could not aid him, it is not certain that the Prussian marshal would have moved to the rear instead of fighting at Ligny, for Blucher’s position in front of the chaussée was taken, not only that he might reach out his right to the Anglo-Dutch, but partly that Bulow might promptly come up from Liége to his aid. Yet this latter was not a vital point, for the many available roads would enable Biilow to march towards any place at which his chief might choose to concentrate. Blucher’s action tends to prove his view of the understanding ; and although Welling- ton’s divisions in the event did not come up in season to aid the Prussian army to maintain itself, yet to do this was strategic common sense, and mistaken as he was as to what he could perform, Wellington expected and strove to accom- plish this end. The helpful intention of both leaders is ac- knowledged in more than one way.

16 June 1815

Battle of Quatre Bras

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

Battle of Quatre Bras

AVI

Battle of Quatre Bras.

FAILURE TO RECONNOITRE NORTHWARD. 598

dawned: Napoleon still loitered in Fleurus, while his army was bivouacked on the battlefield. He was really worked out. The effort of June 16 would have been nothing to him in earlier years, but now it had not only robbed him of his own activity, but of the power of pushing his lieutenants. No re- port on the battle of Quatre Bras had been received; and Flahault, who had remained with Ney during the 16th, did not get back to headquarters until early morning of June 17. As Ney had not heard the details of the battle of Ligny, after Flahault’s arrival Soult wrote him the facts, and added that it would consume the day to finish the business of the 16th, distribute ammunition, and collect stragglers and detach- ments. This was not Napoleonic alertness. It falls far behind 1809 or even 1814.

PRAISE TC THE PRUSSIANS. 601

ing of the 17th, Ney is said to have waited several hours with the impression that a short delay might induce Wellington to stand at Quatre Bras, and enable him to advance on his posi- tion in front, while Napoleon came on and took the English in flank, —the pendant of the mancuvre he himself had failed in the day before. This was neither the spirit of the old Ney, nor the tenor of his orders. He might have guessed that the British would not seek to hold the right of the Quatre Bras- Sombreffe line when the Prussians had been driven out of the left of it, although in excuse for this lapse it may be said that he was not early informed of the victory of Ligny. Moreover, Ney erred in not keeping the emperor posted as to his own doings, — and this apparently out of lack of his old frank helpfulness. Wellington had early concluded to retire towards Brussels, basing his action on the same facts as those known or accessible to Ney, and had fallen back at 10 a.m. With Blucher retiring towards Wavre, he knew that not only could he not fight at Quatre Bras with success, but that wherever in the rear he might stand, the Prussian army could debouch upon the flank of the French when they should attack him. Early in the day there came an officer from Blucher, and by him Wellington returned word that he would stand at Mont St. Jean for battle, if Blucher would send a corps to help him. This news reached Blucher about noon, but as he did not know exactly where Thielemann and Bulow then were, and his ammunition had not yet been secured, he could not until later give the assurance asked. Ney did not penetrate Wellington’s design, and until the arrival of Napoleon, nothing of moment was done. Though the English had been for three hours in the delicate position of withdrawing by daylight from the field of battle, Ney had not discovered the fact or taken any action to interfere with them. South of Quatre Bras there is a roll in the ground