Battle of Bautzen

Background

Napoleon came back from Russia at the end of 1812 with almost nothing left of the Grande Armée, and spent the winter raising a new one. On 28 February 1813 Frederick William III of Prussia signed the Convention of Kalisch and joined the Tsar. By spring the Russians under Wittgenstein and the Prussians under Blücher were in Saxony. Napoleon struck back at Lützen on 2 May and won, but he had too little cavalry to finish them off, and the Allies fell back over the Elbe.

The two allies wanted different things. The Prussians wanted to cover Berlin. The Russians would not give up their road home through Bautzen, Görlitz and Breslau, and the Tsar overruled any move north. Both sides agreed that they must stand and fight west of the Oder, or Austria and the German princes would take Lützen as decisive. On 12 May orders went out to take up a position beyond Bautzen, and the Russian chief engineer went ahead to fortify it. Barclay de Tolly brought another 13,500 men, freed by the surrender of Thorn.

Napoleon reoccupied Dresden. He won back the King of Saxony, whose troops in Torgau joined the French. By 11 May he had 119,000 men at Dresden, and Ney had 84,000 at Torgau, aimed at first towards Berlin. Once he was sure the Allies would fight at Bautzen, Napoleon turned Ney south against their right flank. The plan, prepared in unusual detail, was to pin them from the west and roll them up from the north against the Bohemian mountains. Austria was still neutral, and still arming.

The armies

The Allied army had about 96,000 men and 622 guns. It held a double position. Miloradovich held the line of the Spree around Bautzen as an advanced guard. The main line ran along the marshy valley of the Blösaer Wasser, from the wooded hills of the Drohmberg on the left, through redoubts at Baschütz and Litten, to the Kreckwitz heights, which jutted out like a bastion on the right. French engineers later destroyed 78 redoubts, batteries and epaulements on it. Gorchakov's Russians held the centre, Blücher's Prussians and Kleist the Kreckwitz heights, and Barclay the open ground to the north. Wittgenstein commanded, but the Tsar was the real authority, and the King of Prussia was also on the field. The Prussians fought with the spirit of men defending their homes.

Napoleon had about 200,000 men and 543 guns. Under his own hand were Oudinot's XII, Macdonald's XI, Marmont's VI and Bertrand's IV Corps, with Soult directing Bertrand, the Guard and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry. From the north came Ney with his own III Corps, Lauriston's V and Reynier's VII. They included Württembergers, Italians, Bavarians and Saxons. Many of the infantry were raw conscripts, and the cavalry was weak in numbers and poor in quality. The orders that reached Ney were muddled, and they left him unsure what was expected of him.

The battle

CDB90 records the battle as a single engagement, number 136 (BAUTZEN), from 15:00 on 20 May to 17:00 on 21 May. Times below come mostly from Petre.

19 May: Königswartha. Believing Lauriston was isolated, Wittgenstein sent Barclay and Yorck, about 24,000 men, across the Spree to strike him. Barclay surprised Peyri's Italian division of Bertrand's corps at Königswartha and cost it 2,860 men. Yorck ran into Lauriston near Weissig and fought until late at night. Both were back in the main position by the afternoon of the 20th, about 2,000 men the poorer.

20 May, noon to evening: the Spree. Napoleon attacked the river line to fix the Allies and give Ney time to arrive. About 13:00 Oudinot crossed at Singwitz, on the right, and pushed towards the Drohmberg. Macdonald took the bridge above Bautzen and threw two more. Marmont bombarded the far bank with sixty guns from Oehna, and at about 15:00 he forded into the north-western suburb with Compans' division. The Russians abandoned the town, and Miloradovich fell back to the main line. Oudinot's advance convinced the Tsar that Napoleon meant to turn the Allied left and cut them off from Austria, and he sent reserves against Oudinot. On the left, Soult reached the Spree at the Gottlobsberg with heavy loss, and Bonnet's division drove Kleist from Burk. That night Ney's divisions were round Sdier and Särchen, north of the field.

21 May, dawn to 11:00: Ney arrives. Oudinot attacked at daybreak, but Miloradovich, with about 20,000 men against 15,000, drove him back onto the Drohmberg. Ney crossed at Klix between 04:00 and 05:00. Barclay, with only some 5,000 on the Gleina heights, fell back on Preititz and then to Baruth to guard the line of retreat. By 10:00 Ney stood on the windmill height at Gleina with 23,000 infantry. Napoleon's pencilled order told him to be at Preititz at 11:00. Jomini, his chief of staff, urged him on, but Ney waited for the hour. Napoleon lay down among the Guard at 09:00 and slept until 11:00.

11:00 to 15:00: Preititz. Ney sent Souham's division alone into Preititz. Blücher sent Röder's brigade with help from Kleist, and they threw Souham back towards Gleina by about 13:00. Napoleon woke and sent Marmont across the Blösaer Wasser, with Barrois' Young Guard division in the gap. Bertrand had his bridge under the Kiefernberg only at 13:00. At about 14:30 Franquemont's Württembergers stormed the Koppatschberg. Delmas retook Preititz around 14:00. Then Ney, instead of marching south on the spire of Hochkirch as Jomini urged, turned his 32,000 men west against the Kreckwitz heights.

After 15:00: the escape. Attacked from three sides, Blücher abandoned the heights soon after 15:00. Müffling warned him that he had a quarter of an hour before the gap closed. The Prussians fell back in perfect order to Purschwitz. Ney's and Bertrand's men met on the empty plateau and took an hour to sort themselves out. Only now did the Tsar see the danger on his right. At 16:00 the Allies ordered a retreat in three columns, covered by Barclay on the north and Eugen of Württemberg on the Löbau road. Latour-Maubourg's cavalry could do nothing against the Russian horse, and a violent rainstorm at about 18:00 ended any pursuit.

Aftermath

The Allies lost somewhere between 10,850 and 20,000 men, but very few prisoners and no guns except a few disabled pieces. The French lost 20,000–25,000. Petre reports Napoleon's reaction as he rode over the field: 'What! after such a slaughter, no trophies? These people will leave me no claws!'

The Allies retreated through Görlitz into Silesia. At Reichenbach on 22 May a cannonball killed General Kirgener and mortally wounded Duroc, the Grand Marshal of the Palace and Napoleon's closest friend. On 26 May at Haynau, Blücher's cavalry caught Maison's division in the open, and it lost over 1,000 men and five guns. Wittgenstein was blamed for the defeat, and Barclay replaced him. A truce began on 2 June, and on 4 June the two sides signed the Armistice of Pläswitz (also called Poischwitz), later extended to 10 August. Napoleon wanted the time to rebuild his cavalry, and he feared Austria. Jomini, followed by most later writers, called the armistice the greatest mistake of his career, because it gave the Allies time to bring Austria in.

The argument over Bautzen is about blame. Petre writes that all critics put the failure mainly on Ney, but he shares it with Napoleon. The orders were unclear, the 11:00 rendezvous was too rigid, and the Emperor never explained his plan. 'Drehsa' may even have meant the village behind the Allied centre, not the one near Brösa.

Wargaming it

Bautzen is a big, two-day corps battle, best played at brigade or division level, with roughly one game turn per hour. A 15mm or 6mm grand-tactical game can handle 300,000 men and over 1,100 guns. The map is the challenge. The Spree gorge at Bautzen, the fordable river below it, the carp ponds and causeways in the north, the marshy Blösaer Wasser, the redoubts and the Kreckwitz heights all need clear rules. So does the Hochkirch spire, the landmark Jomini wanted Ney to march on.

The second day is the better game. The French player must hold the Allies with a frontal attack that is meant to look serious, while Ney arrives from the north. The Allied player must decide, without knowing, which flank is the real threat. Hidden movement, or an umpire, makes this work. A rule that ties the Tsar's reserves to whatever is happening on the Allied left recreates the historical blunder. Ney's orders can be handled the same way: a fixed hour at Preititz, and a roll to see whether he turns for the heights or keeps marching south.

The what-ifs are rich. Ney marches straight for Hochkirch at 10:00. Victor's 25,000 arrive on time. Bertrand bridges the Spree overnight. The Allies slip away on the night of the 20th, as Petre says they should have. The French player's weak cavalry should make any pursuit hard.

The 19 May raid on Königswartha makes a fast, small encounter game.

Maps and pictures

Paintings and prints

Paintings and prints of the battle, from the time and the century after, by year: free-to-use pictures from the battle's category on Wikimedia Commons. Each opens its file page there, with the full caption and source.