Napoleon as a General, vol. 2

7–8 February 1807 (26–27 January Old Style)

Battle of Eylau

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It seems almost as if the Emperor's gifts as a leader had taken that direction which he mentioned as characteristic of Massena : " He was resolute, brave, intrepid, full of ambition and self-interest ; his most prominent feature was obstinacy ... he conceived his plans for an attack in a very indifferent manner . . . but with the first sound of the cannon, in the midst of bullets and dangers, his mind became clear and strong. If he was beaten, he began again, just as if he had been victorious." ^ This want of definition in the plan of attack is evident here, as pre- viously it might have been noticed at Heilsburg. But the first sound of the cannon, the beginning of the battle, imm.ediately awakened the whole energy of the general struggling for victory. That obstinacy, which, though beaten, yet does not submit to play the part of the vanquished. For Napoleon, though defeated at Asparn, displayed it, even as he had already displayed it after the indecisive battle of Eylau. We know of Massena, that he was in the highest degree addicted to sexual indulgence and to luxury, and we can imagine that his military talents were obscured by these, until the first cannon shot set him free. May not indeed a similar process have now taken place in the Emperor ? He also was now the slave of sensual pleasures, and if not of the greed for pecuniary riches, yet of the greed for boundless power. Thus we may well believe that for him, too, imminent danger, and the excitement of battle itself, were needed to rouse him to a full exercise of his magnificent military talents. Indeed his retinue noticed that he was less eager than usual in his preparations for battle, and said : " The Emperor has for a long time been tired of war, as much so as our young conscripts; he only continues waging

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Strategically speaking, he could have stopped at Smolensk ; he would then, if he stationed his forces so as to be ready for a rapid concentration, and covered his wings by keeping the lines of the Dwina and Dnieper strongly occupied, have been in a similar position to that of 1805 in Moravia before the battle of Austerlitz, or of 1807 in Poland before the battle of Eylau ; he could, as he did then, have awaited the enemy's approach, marched quickly against them and fought the decisive battle. But in that case he would have failed, in the eyes of Europe, in his enterprise ; as a general he would thereby have acknowledged that he had not been able to reach the goal desired by the statesman, for he could never have thus compelled Russia to submit to hiswill ; but such a con- fession would be sure to have had an incalculable indirect effect upon conquered Europe. And more than this, in a mere military sense such a course of action might have brought about his ruin, for the Russians would have had time to utilize all the resources of their large countr}-. to bring up the inexhaustible masses of their human material, to equip and organize them, and since in that case the resumption of the struggle would have lain in

5–6 July 1809

Battle of Wagram

WAGRAM.

WAGRAM.

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At midnight the Emperor, who received most con- tradictory reports from the cavalry in advance as to the enemy, sent Massena forward to examine the situation of affairs, and the latter reported that the enemy's army was standing ready on the Russbach. The Archduke had actually formed the plan of allowing the French army to cross, and then giving battle, and he was during the night occupied with placing his corps in position along the line Strebersdorf — Gerasdorf — Deutsch-Wagram. With the break of day the Emperor mounted his horse; accompanied by Berthier, Massena and Lannes, he wished to ride forward to the edge of the heights near Asparn, but was prevented by the Austrian cavalry scouting close up to the Danube.

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He now intended to cross the arm bounding the eastern front of the Lobau, in order to turn the enemy completely by this movement, and then wheel to the left and attack their left flank. The Austrians, who had fallen back to the line Deutsch-Wagram — Markgrafneusiedl, now held the front from Asparn to Essling with one corps and were throwing up fortifications there. For the execution of his plan the Emperor had to secure two things ; first, the possibility of issuing from the Lobau with a broad front, entailing the construction of numerous bridges, and secondly, the full command of the Lobau and from it of the plain of Gross- Enzersdorf, in order to have his masses ready there for debouching. For this latter purpose numerous infantry positions were established on the island, and 113 guns placed in position on it, of which 80 were to command the plain of Gross-Enzersdorf and prevent any preparations of the enemy there, 18 were to be kept in reserve and 15 were to defend the northern front. A few days later 12 more guns were added to the above 80.

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in the neighbourhood of Kaiser-Ebersdorf and Vienna. Thus there would be engaged at Wagram 202,000 men.

20–21 May 1813

Battle of Bautzen

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fortune, if at last such oft-repeated errors were fully appreciated and turned to the best advantage by his opponents, to the utter ruin of his army. If the destruc- tion of his army had ensued on the first day the Emperor showed a want of energ)% we might call it a case of sheer ill-luck, but if we recall Ratisbon, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Borodino, Maloyaroslavets, and note moreover Bautzen, Dresden, Duben, and more instances than can be fully enumerated here, we shall have to acknowledge that Leipzig and Belle-Alliance were not only in a historical, but also in a military sense, a just retribution.

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Napoleon's admonition, " We must act cautiously and not endanger inferior troops, nor be foolish enough, as some are, to think that to be a man is to be a soldier. Troops such as you have " (the words are addressed to Clarke in i8og in connection with the Walcheren ex- pedition) " are just the kind which need most entrench- ments, earthworks, and artillery. . . . The more inferior the quality of a body of troops the more artillery it requires. There are some army corps with which I should require onl}' one-third of the artillery which I need for other corps." ' For this reason the Emperor tried to create everywhere the belief that he was well provided with this arm, and indeed took care to be well equipped in this respect, so that on the resumption of hostilities after the truce he again had 1300 guns at his disposal. After Liitzen and Bautzen we hear him say, " It is the artillery of my Guard which generally decides my battles, for, as I have it always at hand I can bring it to bear, wherever it becomes necessary." ° And after the end of the campaign he wrote, " Great battles are won by artillery." ^

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The Prusso-Russian army had, after the evacuation of the line of the Elbe, fallen back behind the Spree ; and had taken up a position on its right bank near Bautzen, where they decided to await attack. The Emperor had at first been very much in doubt as to the enemy's movements. He was inclined to think the Russians would retreat to Breslau, and the Prussians, on the other hand, to Berlin. Not until the night of the 13th did he receive definite news that the enemy had not separated, but had fallen back to

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Bautzen. He was of opinion, however, that they would make no stand there, but continue the retreat to Breslau. But on the morning of the 17th he was in- formed that the AlHes were ready for battle at Bautzen ; and early on the i8th he sent orders to Ney to come up there, in order to fall on the enemy's right flank during the attack which he meditated. As the point on the battle-field which he was to aim at, he designated Dresha, in the rear of the Allies. Ney had already had his attention drawn to the fact that the enemy seemed to be preparing for battle at Bautzen, and consequently in his advance towards Berlin on the 17th he had made a slight change of direction, Lauriston marching from Dobrilugk to Seuftenberg, Ney's own corps from Luckau to Kalau, and Reynier from Dahme to Luckau. On the igth the above-mentioned orders from the Emperor reached the marshal at Hoyerswerda, whilst Lauriston arrived at Weissig and Reynier at Kalau. The remainder of his army the Emperor assembled behind Bautzen, on the left bank of the Spree.

16–19 October 1813

Battle of Leipzig

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Had Kutusov been a Suvarov, he would not have let his day's work come to an end at Bykova, but would have used his best efforts to immediately follow the cavalry, which he had in the morning at 5 o'clock sent forward to Viasma. He would then have reached this place in the afternoon and attacked Ne}- ; a performance in no way more extraordinary than that of Vandamme, Lannes and St. Sulpice on the 22nd April, 1809, the march from Landshut to Eckmuhl, and the subsequent victorious engagement. I emphasize this fact here, because it serves to show how a final and complete downfall is always the outcome of a long series of disasters, and not the result of any combination of fatal circumstances on one unlucky day. He who takes into consideration only the day of Leipzig or that of Belle-Alliance, might be led to suppose that the Emperor of course did commit errors and therefore rightly succumbed, but that after all it was unlucky for him to have had to deal, just on the days when he made such mistakes, with able and skilful opponents, who profited by them and brought about his utter downfall. The question has two sides for the military student. True, good luck is certainly a factor, but we know that it favours the bold, and this should tend to make a general form bis resolutions rapidly. We must also remember that she gives her hand permanently only to him who grasps it firmly. The carelessness of the Emperor, sitting quietly in his study at Slavkova, was not punished here as it deserved to be. If we see in the future again and again how the Emperor's energy and resolution were no longer equal to the require- ments of the moment, we must no longer ascribe it to ' C. X. To Berthier.

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We are not in a position to explain or account for this sudden determination in the Emperor's mind. It was undoubtedly a mistake in generalship ; not one of those which here and there are committed in a weak moment by the most able generals, and which only prove that even the most able cannot escape having their weak moments ; but it was, at the most decisive juncture, a complete departure from those great principles which had laid the foundation of his successes. He holds a secondary point, Dresden, whilst the great question was now to gain a decisive victory. Dresden would after such a victory have, as a matter of course, fallen again into his hands ; but the loss of the two corps, which he left behind there, was destined to be felt bitterly by him on that battle-field of Leipzig, where not only the fate of Dresden, of Saxony, of Germany, nay, of the whole of Europe was to be decided.

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committed the mistake of leaving Saint-Cyr and Lobau behind at Dresden, so that altogether 30,000 men would be absent. But the Allies did not advance either quickly enough or in sufficiently close formation towards Leipzig, and were therefore hardly superior to the Emperor in point of numbers on the first day of the battle. On the other hand, they realized the gravity of the situation, and ordered up the 65,000 men who had been left behind at Dresden ; they would thus concentrate all the forces on the field of Leipzig, and obtain a decided superiority in numbers over the French.

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His army now took up the following positions : Ponia- towski defended the Pleisse at Dolitz and Connewitz ; Augereau's corps extended its lines from Dosen as far as the ponds of Lossing ; Victor held Probsthayda, to the west of which village Drouot had established his guns. Behind Augereau stood Kellermann's cavalry ; to the left was Oudinot, and behind Victor the cavalry corps of Bordesoult ~ and Pajol. All these formed the right wing under Murat's chief command. On the left wing stood Macdonald on the line Zuckelhausen — Holzhausen ; on his left rear the cavalry of Sebastiana, and in the second line Lauriston. As a general reserve the Old Guard was at Thonberg. Here, on the hill to the south-west of this little village, near a tobacco mill, the Emperor had taken up his station. Mortier had been sent to Lindenau, in order to take Bertrand's place there, Bertrand being sent elsewhere. On the northern side of the battlefield of Leipzig, Marmont stood at Schonfeld ; the Polish division, mentioned already, was near the farm of Pfaffendorf, Reynier was at Paunsdorf, holding Taucha, and Souham stood at Leipzig in reserve. The cavalry corps of Arrighi had been distributed between all these army corps.