Battle of Eylau

Background

After crushing Prussia at Jena–Auerstedt on 14 October 1806, Napoleon pushed east into Poland against the Russian armies coming to Prussia's aid. Fighting on the Wkra at Czarnowo on 23 December and at Pułtusk and Gołymin on 26 December won ground but no decision, and the Grande Armée went into winter quarters in Poland, exhausted.

In January 1807 the new Russian commander, Levin August von Bennigsen, moved most of his army north into East Prussia, with L'Estocq's Prussian corps on his right, to fall on the French left. He brushed aside Ney's outposts and struck Bernadotte at Mohrungen. Napoleon saw a chance to turn the tables: Bernadotte would fall back while the rest of the army marched north to get round the Russian left and cut Bennigsen off from the east. Cossacks captured a messenger carrying the plan to Bernadotte, and the forewarned Bennigsen retreated.

A week of hard pursuit followed, with rearguard fights at Bergfried on 3 February and Hof on 6 February. The roads and the winter weather spread the French columns out more than was Napoleon's habit, while the Russians stayed concentrated. At dusk on 6 February Bennigsen left Landsberg and, after a night march of about 9 miles, had his army in position beyond Preussisch Eylau by midday on the 7th, resolved to fight. A defeat would drive him back on Königsberg and the sea; a success might bring Austria, waiting for any sign of French weakness, into the war.

The armies

Napoleon had Soult's IV Corps, Augereau's VII Corps, the Imperial Guard and Murat's reserve cavalry on the field, about 49,000 men by the morning of 8 February. Davout's III Corps, 15,100 strong after the winter's losses and detachments, was marching in from the south-east, and Ney's VI Corps, about 14,500, was off to the north-west pursuing L'Estocq. Bernadotte's I Corps was too far away to take part. Augereau himself was so ill that he asked to give up his command on the morning of the battle. The reserve cavalry was unusually well mounted, on horses requisitioned in conquered Prussia.

Bennigsen had about 67,000 Russians from seven divisions on the field, with Tuchkov commanding the right, Sacken the centre, Tolstoy the left, Dokhturov the reserve and Golitsyn the cavalry. His artillery, about 460 guns against perhaps 300 French, was his great advantage: besides the batteries strung along the line there were three great batteries of 70, 60 and 40 guns, and 60 horse artillery pieces in reserve. L'Estocq's Prussian corps, reinforced by some Russian units, was expected on the right. The Russian commissariat had almost broken down, and both armies fought hungry and frozen.

The battle

CDB90 records Eylau as a single engagement, number 120 (EYLAU), on 8 February only, from 08:00 to 22:00; the evening fight of 7 February is not coded separately. Times are approximate and sources differ by up to an hour.

The fight for Eylau (7 February, 14:00–19:00). Murat's cavalry and Soult's corps reached the plateau west of Eylau at about 14:00 and attacked Bagration's rearguard. The French 18th Line, crossing the frozen Tenknitten lake, was broken by the St Petersburg Dragoons and lost an eagle, but flanking brigades forced Bagration back through the town. Napoleon had meant to halt and wait for Davout and Ney; instead the fighting spilled into Eylau itself and could not be broken off. At about 17:00 the church and cemetery were stormed and Barclay de Tolly was badly wounded. A Russian division retook the town by 18:00, then was withdrawn, and the French reoccupied it. Each side lost about 4,000 men. The night that followed was bitterly cold, with temperatures of about −10°C falling to about −17°C, and food scarce on both sides.

Augereau's disaster (8 February, 08:00–11:00). Bennigsen opened at about 08:00 with a heavy bombardment of Eylau. On the French left Legrand's division was thrown back. To pin the Russian centre and link up with Davout, Napoleon sent Augereau's corps and Saint-Hilaire's division forward at about 10:00. A blizzard blew straight into the faces of Augereau's men. They veered left, were fired on by their own guns, and came out of the snow in front of the 70-gun central battery. Grape, a bayonet charge by the Russian reserve and cavalry broke almost every regiment. The 14th Line, cut off on a mound, fought on in square until it was destroyed; Captain Marbot carried off its eagle. Augereau reported 929 killed and 4,271 wounded. A Russian column of perhaps 4,000–6,000 men pushed into Eylau close to Napoleon's post at the church; his duty squadron charged to buy time, and a Guard battalion and Bruyère's cavalry destroyed the column.

Murat's charge (late morning). With his centre gaping, Napoleon sent Murat forward with about 10,700 horsemen, 70 to 80 squadrons. Grouchy's dragoons scattered the Russian cavalry pressing Saint-Hilaire; d'Hautpoul's cuirassiers rode through the Russian guns and both infantry lines for some 2,500 yards before the charge spent itself against the reserves near Anklappen. Bessières followed with the Guard cavalry. The Russian lines reformed behind them and the horsemen had to cut their way back; d'Hautpoul was mortally wounded, and the cavalry lost perhaps 1,000–1,500 men. Napoleon kept the Guard infantry in reserve.

Davout's turning attack (noon–about 17:00). Davout's divisions came into action around Serpallen and Klein Sausgarten, fighting through Russian cavalry counter-attacks; a 30-gun battery on the Kreegeberg supported the advance. By late afternoon the Russian left had been bent back at a right angle, Anklappen and Kutschitten had fallen and the road east was cut.

L'Estocq's counter-attack (late afternoon–22:00). L'Estocq had marched from Hussehnen at 08:00, shaking off Ney's attacks, and reached Althof at about 13:00. Summoned to the left, he marched behind the Russian line, gathered stragglers and stormed Kutschitten, wiping out its garrison, then drove Friant out of the birch wood beyond. Davout massed his guns and rallied his men, and the fighting died away at about 22:00.

Ney arrives (19:00–22:00). Ney received his orders only at 14:00; muffled by snow and wind, the sound of the guns had not reached him. His leading troops reached the field at about 19:00 and took Schloditten on the Russian right; a Russian counter-attack there was repulsed at about 22:00. At about 23:00, against the protests of several generals, Bennigsen ordered a retreat on Königsberg, and the Russians slipped away during the night.

Aftermath

Napoleon held the field, but it was a field of bloodstained snow and frozen corpses. Riding over it the next morning, Ney is recorded as saying "Quel massacre! Et sans résultat!" ("What a massacre! And without result!"). Losses were enormous and are still argued over: probably 25,000–30,000 French and 15,000–26,000 Russians and Prussians. Murphy reckons the Grande Armée lost more men here than at Austerlitz, Jena and Auerstedt combined, including over twenty generals killed or wounded and at least seven eagles. Napoleon's bulletin admitted 1,900 dead and 5,700 wounded, a figure s4 links to the phrase "to lie like a bulletin".

The French were in no state to pursue. Napoleon stayed near Eylau for some days, then withdrew to winter quarters, and offered Prussia a separate peace, which it refused. The war went on until his decisive victory at Friedland on 14 June 1807 and the treaties of Tilsit.

Eylau badly dented the belief that Napoleon could not be beaten, and pointed towards the costlier battles to come. He took pains to shape its memory: within a month the Louvre's director, Vivant Denon, had announced a competition for a painting of the Emperor on the battlefield, won by Antoine-Jean Gros. The battle also appears in Tolstoy's War and Peace and Balzac's Le Colonel Chabert.

Wargaming it

Eylau suits a grand-tactical game with brigades or divisions as units, played as two linked scenarios: the evening fight for the town on the 7th, and the full day on the 8th. Either could be played at battalion level, especially Augereau's attack or the fight for Eylau's church and cemetery.

The terrain is gentle, a shallow valley between two low plateaux with villages, birch woods and frozen lakes. Snow hid the lakes so well that troops crossed them unaware, so they should be passable ground rather than obstacles. The weather is the real terrain. Rules for sudden snowstorms that cut visibility to a few yards, scramble direction, cause friendly fire and damp muskets would let players feel why Augereau's corps marched into the great battery. The Russian superiority in guns, about 460 to 300, makes the French player work for every advance.

Timing drives the battle. Davout arrives around noon on the French right, L'Estocq in the late afternoon on the Russian left, Ney at nightfall on the French left; a variable arrival schedule gives strong replay value. The big what-ifs are both commanders' choices. Should Bennigsen have used his early superiority to roll up the weak French left before Davout came up, as Petre argues? Should Napoleon have sent the Guard in after Murat's charge? What if Ney's orders had reached him on the night of the 7th rather than at 14:00 next day? Victory conditions should reward casualties inflicted and army cohesion, not ground.

Maps and pictures

Paintings and prints

Paintings and prints of the battle, from the time and the century after, by year: free-to-use pictures from the battle's category on Wikimedia Commons. Each opens its file page there, with the full caption and source.