Battle of Shaho

Background

After the battle of Liaoyang at the end of August 1904, Kuropatkin's Manchurian Army fell back on Mukden. He nonetheless reported Liaoyang as a victory to Nicholas II, which helped to secure the reinforcements then arriving over the newly completed Trans-Siberian Railway. Morale in his army was low.

The pressure to act came from Port Arthur. The besieged fortress and its fleet were in danger, and if it fell Nogi's Third Army would be free to move north and join Oyama, giving Japan numerical superiority. The Russians therefore had a reason to strike before the Japanese were reinforced, but Kuropatkin was reluctant to go far from Mukden with winter approaching and with no reliable maps.

His plan was to block the Japanese on the Sha. Stackelberg's Eastern Detachment would turn the Japanese right in the hills and counter-attack towards Liaoyang, while Bilderling's Western Detachment would move south across the plain to cut off Kuroki's First Army. The terrain favoured the Russians in one respect: the kaoliang (a tall millet) had been harvested, so the Japanese had lost their cover on the open ground in the centre and on the right. In the hills on the Russian left, by contrast, movement was slow.

The offensive was thus the Russians' attempt to relieve Port Arthur from the land side.

The armies

Oyama's armies were about 170,000 men in 170 battalions with four reserve brigades. Kuroki's First Army held the east, Oku's Second Army the west and Nozu's Fourth Army the centre, with Prince Kan'in's 2nd Cavalry Brigade on the flank and Ueda's 5th Division held in reserve.

Kuropatkin had about 210,000 men in nine corps and 261 battalions. Stackelberg's Eastern Detachment and Bilderling's Western Detachment were the two striking columns. His reserves were the 1st European Army Corps (Meyendorf), the 4th Siberian Army Corps (Zarubaev) and the 6th Siberian Army Corps (Sobolev), with the Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade under Mishchenko. CDB90 counts the artillery at 928 Russian and 612 Japanese guns.

The Russians were stronger on paper, but the command was brittle. Kuropatkin distrusted his generals and often sent orders directly to subordinates without informing Stackelberg or Bilderling. He would not use the field telephone, so couriers took hours to deliver his orders. The Japanese command had its own problems: Oyama was slow to accept Kuroki's reading of the Russian advance, as the course section shows.

The battle

The Russian advance, 5–9 October. On 5 October Bilderling's Western Detachment advanced about 25 km south across open country with little opposition and reached the Shli River on 7 October. Stackelberg's Eastern Detachment moved about 36 km through the hills and reached Bianyupusa on 8 October. Kuropatkin meant Oyama to think the plain was the main thrust. The ruse worked at first: Oyama was slow to accept Kuroki's assessment until Kuropatkin's written orders to Stackelberg were found on a Russian officer killed in a skirmish on 9 October.

The Japanese counter-offensive, 10–12 October. On 10 October Oyama ordered a major counter-attack in the centre. Kuroki's First Army would hold Stackelberg, while the Second and Fourth Armies struck at Bilderling in flanking moves. The Russians took heavy losses in the east and were pushed back in the west, and Kuropatkin formed a Central Detachment from the 1st European and 4th Siberian Corps to fill the gap. On 11 October the Japanese 4th Division turned the Russian right and forced Bilderling back. On the left Stackelberg attacked the Japanese 12th Division near the Yantai coal mines and lost about 5,000 men by nightfall; the 12th Division also suffered heavily but held. On 12 October Prince Kan'in's cavalry attacked the Russian left, which was also pushed back.

Sankaisekisan, 12–13 October. This low ridge south of the river, about 100 feet high, overlooks the plain south of Mukden. The Russians had occupied it on 9 October. On the night of 12 October the Japanese 10th Division assaulted it and took it by early on the 13th against stiff resistance.

The Russian withdrawal, 13–15 October. Kuropatkin refused Stackelberg's request to attack westward, so Stackelberg began pulling back north. Oyama sent Ueda's 5th Division to cut him off, but failed. By 14 October the Japanese had crossed to the south bank of the Sha, and the Second Army had broken through the Russian line. The Russians withdrew in relatively good order, largely because the 6th Siberian Corps held the rearguard and took heavy casualties.

The ridge retaken, 16–17 October. Japanese guns on Sankaisekisan, which the Russians called One-Tree Hill, now threatened the Russian line. Kuropatkin ordered it retaken at all costs. The Russians attacked at night on 16 October from both ends of the ridge and had it by 17 October. Kuropatkin then called off the offensive and both sides began to dig in for the winter, in some places only a few metres apart.

Aftermath

The losses were heavy on both sides: about 41,000 Russian and about 20,000 Japanese, by the figures in the main source. The Russian numbers include some 4,900 missing.

Strategically the result is usually called inconclusive. The Japanese advanced some 25 km towards Mukden, but the Russians stopped Oyama's planned counter-offensive and the hope of relieving Port Arthur by land was effectively over. Kuropatkin used the recapture of One-Tree Hill to telegraph the Tsar that the Russians had won. On 25 October the Tsar removed Alekseyev from command and gave Kuropatkin full command of Russian forces.

Kuropatkin was unwilling to keep attacking in the face of heavy losses, and the Japanese did not exploit the situation. Their advance towards Mukden stopped, and both armies dug in for winter. The next major fight was Sandepu (Heikoutai).

The battle is remembered as the second large-scale land battle of the war. The argument over it centres on Kuropatkin, and on whether he should have pressed on after the first days; the main source does not settle that.

Wargaming it

Shaho suits a corps-level game at about a brigade or regiment per counter, over three to four days and a front of about 60 km. At that scale a table game should be played as two linked operations, the hills in the east and the plain in the west, with the railway and the Sankaisekisan ridge as the centre.

What makes it interesting is the fog of war on both sides. Kuropatkin's ruse and the captured order are good material for hidden movement and for a Japanese player who has to guess which Russian column is the real one. A rule that delays Russian orders, because couriers take hours and Kuropatkin sends orders around his generals, reproduces the Russian problem better than extra Japanese bonuses. The Japanese player has the harder first decision: when to commit to the plain rather than the hills.

Sankaisekisan is the key terrain, and its changing hands twice is a natural scenario in itself, at a smaller scale with battalions. The Russian victory conditions need care: a pure win-by-casualties will favour the Japanese, but capturing ground and relieving pressure on Port Arthur are what Kuropatkin intended.

A good "what if" is a firmer Russian push at Stackelberg's end. Kuropatkin refused Stackelberg permission to attack west on 13 October. Allowing it is the most obvious change to test.

Maps and pictures