A History of the British Army, vol. 8

HISTORY OF THE ARMY

On the afternoon of the 3rd, Massena concentrated his three corps at Alfaiates, and at night continued his retreat; the Second Corps falling back north-eastward eighteen or twenty miles to Fuentes de Onoro; the Sixth taking a more easterly course to Fuenteguinaldo, and the Eighth moving between the two to Campillo de Azava. On the 5th Reynier occupied Gallegos; Junot, the villages of Carpio and Marialva; and Loison the heights before Ciudad Rodrigo; while Montbrun’s dragoons were at El Bodon, and the Light Cavalry connected the Second Corps with the Sixth. Drouet therefore drew back Clapar6de’s division behind Almeida, while that of .Conroux remained in rear at San Felices de los Gallegos.

HISTORY OF THE ARMY

1811. called the Ribeira del Campo, and the more westerly the May 2. Dos Casas, the latter of which after a course of about two miles passes through the village of P050 Velho. Before this village is another swamp—in x 811 of small area and covered with woods, but now dotted only with scattered trees—which helps to swell the petty volume of its waters. From Nave de Haver downwards to the junc¬ tion of the two little streams the valley of the Dos Casas is so shallow as to present no great obstacle; but from that point it begins to betray the true characteristic of the Spanish rivers by digging itself a deeper bed. Never¬ theless the depression is still shallow and the banks of no very formidable gradient when, about a mile below its confluence with the Ribeira del Campo, the stream runs past Fuentes de Onoro. This low-lying village straggles along the western margin for three-quarters of a mile, the only building visible at any distance being the church, which is situated upon a point somewhat higher than the surrounding ground. Gardens and other enclosures fenced in by stone walls contribute to make the post in a high degree defensible. Below the village the valley becomes a rock-studded ravine which grows deeper and steeper as the waters are swollen by countless tiny tributaries, until underneath Fort Concepcion, about eight miles beyond Fuentes de Onoro, the stream flows at a level from three to four hundred feet below the summit of the ridge.

HISTORY OF THE ARMY

The rest were driven headlong over the water ; and more than one of the British followed them in the heat of the chase, to fall dead on the French side of the stream. D’Erlon brought forward his few remaining battalions to cover the rout; but he made no further attempt to capture the village, though his batteries still played furiously upon it. Undaunted by crumbling walls and quaking rafters, the Seventy-fourth and Eighty-eighth fortified themselves among the ruins until at length the fire ceased; for the battle of Fuentes de Onoro was over. 1

HISTORY OF THE ARMY

181 i. After such a confession as this, it is unprofitable May. to defend Wellington’s dispositions, though it may well be doubted whether he would have risked this action in Napoleon’s presence. The criticisms of Napier, as to the effect that would have been produced if the attack upon Wellington’s right had been properly developed and thrust home, are difficult to refute, and indeed were made by members of his head-quarters staff within a day or two of the action. The same officers, long before Napier wrote, perceived the danger which would have followed if Massena had thrown part of his cavalry on to Wellington’s line of communications, cut off his supplies, and forced him to recross the Coa at the most disadvantageous places. It may in fact be asserted that, in the abstract, Wellington’s decision to accept battle was indefensible, nor do I suppose that he would have taken it had he not been moved by other than military considerations—by the belief, namely, that, unless he could give the British public a successful general action at once in order to hearten them to their task, they would insist on the recall of the British army in the Peninsula. Indeed the chief misfortune of the miscarriage of his combinations at Sabugal was that it forced him, against his better judgment, to hazard the action of Fuentes de Onoro.

HISTORY OF THE ARMY

i8n.teenth Light Dragoons sufficed to thrust the French May 15. back in their turn. Long quite early in the day had sent word to Beresford that the French were advancing in force ; and d’Urban in reply had ordered Long to maintain his ground on the right bank of the stream till the latest possible moment, and only to cross the water if hard beset. There seems, however, to have been some difference of opinion between the members of Beresford’s staff upon this point; for the Adjutant-general, Colonel Rooke, directed Long to pass his regiments with all haste over the bridge and to abandon the right bank of the Albuera river altogether. Long obeyed, and the French at once occupied the deserted ground, with their picquets down to the water’s edge. D’Urban, as Beresford’s chief staff-officer, declared this dereliction of the right bank to be a grave mistake, as undoubtedly it was; and a few weeks later he went so far as to state, untruly, that in consequence of this incident Beresford had decided to supersede Long in the leadership of the cavalry by General Lumley. It is, however, certain that this change of command had already been decided upon on the previous day, so as to obviate any disputes concerning seniority with the Spanish brigades; 1 and it is equally true that the blunder, thus unhandsomely attributed by Beresford and d’Urban to Long, was really due to one of Beresford’s own staff-officers. Many years later when the battle of Albuera had become a theme of bitter controversy, Beresford admitted that he had been wrong in omitting to station infantry in a wood, which was traversed by the road from Santa Marta, upon some heights on the eastern bank of the river. He pleaded however that he was unaware even that Long had left Santa Marta, though his Quarter-master-general had that very morning recalled him to Albuera; and that he was

HISTORY OF THE ARMY . 205

The French foot in one disorderly horde then streamed over the Chicapierna, while Latour Maubourg shielded the retirement of the guns, and Soult’s last reserve of infantry, two battalions of Grenadiers, drawn up by the river, presented a front for the protection of the fugitives. After some delay Beresford brought up three Portuguese brigades and drove the Grenadiers back; but by that time Soult had massed his forty guns on the height between the two streams, and was not easily to be ousted. By the river Alten had long since driven out such few French skirmishers as had entered Albuera, so that the fighting had ceased also in that quarter. Thus after six or seven hours of desperate conflict the battle of Albuera came to an end.

HISTORY OF THE ARMY

It cannot be said that the commanders-in-chief upon either side distinguished themselves. Soult’s excellent dispositions, it is true, were miserably marred by Girard’s hasty use of unwieldly columns, while Godinot also was held to have seconded his chief extremely ill. But all this does not excuse Soult’s mismanagement of his reserves, nor the very inadequate employment of his overwhelming strength in cavalry. Still more remark¬ able is the fact that he did not realise the irresolution and blundering of his opponent. Napier, the historian of the Peninsular War, had no love for Beresford; and his criticisms upon that officer’s conduct of the engage¬ ment were very severe. But even these pale before the scathing judgment which was passed upon it in his most intimate correspondence by Wellington. “ The battle of Albuera was a strange concern. They were never determined to fight it; they did not occupy the ground as they ought; 1 they were ready to run away at every moment from the time it commenced till the French retired ; and if it had not been for me, who am nowsuffering from the loss and disorganisation occasioned by that battle, they would have written a whining report about it which would have driven the people in England mad.” “They” in the foregoing extract of course stands for Beresford ; and this trenchant summary of his behaviour is strictly true. Enough has been said of his omission to occupy the hill between the two streams with infantry, so as to compel the enemy to display his force; whereby the sacrifice of the right bank of the

CHAPTER VII

May 19. Arriving at Elvas on the 19th there reached him the Marshal’s report of the battle of Albuera, written in so despondent a tone that the Commander-in-Chief felt bound to send a little note of comfort to his dispirited subordinate. He was not, however, too well pleased, seeing that Sir William had managed to reduce his two British divisions to the strength of one; and, after

CHAPTER XV

Description of the field of the Arapiles . . . .*482

HISTORY OF THE ARMY

question the attack of Le Marchant’s brigade was a 1812 very brilliant stroke, produced great results, and was July not marred apparently by the headlong galloping which had brought disaster in many minor actions, and was to be still more fatal at Waterloo. The three regiments suffered little, comparatively speaking, _ their losses amounting to just one hundred ; but this was due to the vigour of their onslaught upon body after body of infantry, when the slightest hesitation would have been disastrous. The day of Salamanca therefore rightly remains one of the great days in the history of the British horse ; though their achievements must always sink into insignificance when compared with the perform¬ ance of Bock’s dragoons on the following day. The name of Garcia Hernandez will always be included among the great achievements of cavalry in the history of the world ; and too much praise cannot be given to the brave Germans who made the combat a military classic. Four squadrons only, each about one hundred and ten strong, were engaged, though no two of them together ; and three of them made successful charges, one upon a square fully formed of at least five hundred infantry ; another upon a moving column of twice that strength j and the third upon a half—formed mass of beaten cavalry and infantry. The most striking point in the affair is the perfect control which the officers held over their men, the quickness with which they decided upon their attack, and the promptitude with which they translated decision into action. An Englis squadron in the place of Decken’s would probably have started off at twice the speed, and, when called upon to wheel suddenly to the left, would have_ squandered itself over three hundred yards of front, with the result that it would either have reached the square in disorder or must have reduced its pace and reformed its ranks, giving the enemy time to set their teeth, close their array, and probably to receive the troopers with three volleys instead of two. If Decken had failed it is likely enough that Reitzenstein and Marschalck would have hesitated

CHAPTER XVII

1812. On the 24th of July Clausel brought his shattered July 24. troops into Arevalo ; and on the same day Joseph, who had marched from Madrid with fourteen thousand men on the 21st, fixed his headquarters at Blasco Sancho, between ten and fifteen miles to south and west of him, being still ignorant not only of the battle of Salamanca but even of the position of the Army of Portugal. On July 25. the 25th he received letters both from Marmont and Clausel, which revealed something of the truth. For the present, Clausel insisted, it was everything to him to reach Valladolid before the British, so as to evacuate the place of its hospitals and stores, and re-establish communication with the Army of the North ; but if the English should march upon Madrid, he undertook to remain upon the Douro. Meanwhile he added the dispiriting remark that by the time that Joseph had assembled the Armies of Aragon and of the South, he hoped to have twenty thousand men fit for service. Learning from the bearers of these letters that Clausel had already resumed his retreat northward upon Olmedo, Joseph made a rapid march to Espenar at the foot of the Guadarrama, so as to regain Madrid ; but, on the representation of both Clausel and Marmont that the British pursuit had slackened, and that they were anxious for the junction of his force with theirs, he turned north- July 27. ward to Segovia, which he entered on the 27th. He gave the two commanders, however, to understand that he would go no further, and that if they wished for his help they must join him at Segovia, since he had no intention

CHAPTER XVII

It is hardly surprising in these circumstances that Wellington’s halt on the 25 th was criticised by one of his officers as “ unlike a quick advance following up a great victory.” 2 A principal reason for the abandon¬ ment of the pursuit appears to have been the lagging of the supplies, which had been ordered back to Ciudad Rodrigo before the action of Salamanca, and were con¬ sequently far in rear. The recent scenes at Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo were evidently fresh in the Commander- in-Chief*s mind, and he mistrusted the discipline of his troops unless he could deliver to them their rations punctually. Moreover, Cotton was disabled, and there was no other officer whom he could trust to lead his cavalry. It is humiliating to our national pride to con¬ fess the fact, but a fact it seems to be, that many a good opportunity in the Peninsula was thrown away because the