Battle of Albuera

Background

By the spring of 1811 Masséna's Army of Portugal was in retreat from the Lines of Torres Vedras. Earlier that year Marshal Soult, commanding the Army of the South in Andalusia, had marched into Extremadura and taken Badajoz in March, after beating the Spanish at the Gebora. He then hurried back to Seville after Victor's defeat at Barrosa, leaving Mortier with about 11,000 men in the province and 3,000 in Badajoz itself.

Wellington sent Marshal Beresford south with about 23,000 Anglo-Portuguese to retake the fortress. A missing pontoon train and a flood that swept away an improvised bridge at Jerumenha cost him many days. He took Olivenza on 15 April and opened the siege of Badajoz on 4 May. Blake's Spanish army had landed at Ayamonte, and the Spanish generals agreed that Beresford, with the larger force, would command the combined armies.

Soult could not let Badajoz fall. He gathered just under 25,000 men, strong in cavalry, from the 5th Corps and from garrisons across Andalusia, and marched from Seville on the night of 9–10 May. Spanish patriots in Seville passed the news on, and Beresford knew of it by the afternoon of the 12th. He lifted the siege and concentrated on the road from Seville at Albuera, the best position for many miles south of Badajoz. Blake's three divisions arrived only at 11 pm on the 15th and camped in the dark. Soult believed they were still days away, and he planned his battle on that mistake.

The armies

Soult brought about 24,000 men and some 48 guns. The core was the 5th Corps under Girard, two divisions (Girard's own and Gazan's) of about 8,400 men. Werlé's large brigade of 5,600 and Godinot's of 3,500 were made up of battalions borrowed from other corps, with two battalions of combined grenadiers in reserve. Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, about 4,000 strong, included the 1st Lancers of the Vistula, Polish troops in French service. The 5th Corps had never faced British infantry before.

Beresford had about 35,000 men but only about 10,400 British, with fewer guns and only about 2,000–2,300 cavalry. His British infantry were William Stewart's 2nd Division (Colborne's, Hoghton's and Abercrombie's brigades), Cole's 4th Division (Myers's Fusilier brigade and Harvey's Portuguese brigade) and Alten's two King's German Legion battalions. Hamilton's Portuguese division and Collins's brigade added about 10,000 good Portuguese troops. Blake's Spaniards, about 12,000 in the divisions of Zayas, Ballasteros and Lardizabal, had marched hard, arrived in the dark and could barely manoeuvre, though Zayas's men would fight superbly. Carlos de España's brigade, survivors of the Gebora, was much less steady. Lumley, an old light dragoon, was given command of all the Allied cavalry only that morning.

The battle

The ground. The Allied position was a long, bare, gentle ridge running north-west of the Albuera stream, fordable almost anywhere. The village of Albuera stood on a knoll in front of the centre, with the bridge carrying the Seville road just to its south-east. On the French bank olive woods hid any movement, and a low wooded hill between the Nogales and Chicapierna brooks, which join just south of the village, screened the French left. Beresford put Hamilton's Portuguese on his left, Stewart's division across the road behind the village, Alten's Germans in the village, Cole's division in reserve and Blake's Spaniards on the right, the flank he thought least likely to be attacked.

Morning: the feint and the flank march. Soult's main body marched eleven miles from Santa Marta before dawn. From about 8 am Godinot's brigade, with Briche's light cavalry and two batteries, attacked the village, while Werlé and two brigades of dragoons made a show of attacking Blake's front. Deep in the olives, Girard and Gazan made a wide circuit to the left. Then French cavalry burst out across the brooks beyond the Allied right, scattering Loy's Spanish horse, and the 5th Corps climbed onto the plateau south of Blake. Beresford asked Blake to turn part of his line to face south. Blake, still believing the village was the real target, sent only one brigade of Zayas's division, four battalions with a battery. The French dragoons and Werlé's brigade swung round to join the flank attack. Beresford marched the whole 2nd Division south along the ridge, and moved Cole's division to face Latour-Maubourg's 3,500 horsemen.

Zayas holds. Zayas formed his four battalions across a dip in the plateau about a mile south of the village. Girard's division came on in a dense column with deployed battalions on either side, and for over an hour the two sides traded musketry at about sixty yards. The Spaniards lost 615 of 2,026 men and gave no ground.

About 10 am: the destruction of Colborne's brigade. Stewart, without orders, sent Colborne's leading three battalions straight past Zayas's right into Girard's open flank. Their volleys broke the end of the French column, and they went forward with the bayonet. At that moment a blinding storm of rain and hail swept in, and Latour-Maubourg sent the Vistula Lancers and the 2nd Hussars, about 800 horsemen, into the brigade's flank and rear. In about five minutes the Buffs, the 2/48th and the 2/66th were ridden down. Five of the brigade's six colours and Cleeves's German battery were taken. Only the 2/31st, still behind, formed square. Some lancers reached Beresford's staff, and the marshal threw one from his saddle.

Late morning: Hoghton's brigade. Gazan's division pushed into the front line in confusion, and some 8,000 French faced Hoghton's brigade (29th, 1/48th and 1/57th) and the 2/31st, about 1,900 men in two ranks, at close range under grape. Hoghton and Duckworth of the 48th were killed. Inglis of the 57th, lying wounded, is reported to have urged his men to 'die hard', which gave the regiment its nickname. Soult, learning from a prisoner that Blake was present, went over to the defensive and held his reserves back. Beresford waited for Hamilton's Portuguese, who could not be found in time.

Early afternoon: the Fusiliers. Urged on by Colonel Henry Hardinge, Cole advanced on his own responsibility with about 5,000 men in line. Latour-Maubourg's dragoons charged Harvey's Portuguese, who drove them off with volleys from line. Myers's three Fusilier battalions met Werlé's nine battalions in three deep columns at thirty or forty paces; after perhaps twenty minutes the French broke. Abercrombie wheeled in on the other flank, and the 5th Corps fled across the Chicapierna. Soult's massed guns and cavalry stopped any pursuit, and rain fell again on the field.

Aftermath

Albuera was, in Oman's words, the bloodiest fight of the Peninsular War in proportion to the numbers engaged. The British lost 4,159 of 10,449 men; the brigades of Colborne, Hoghton and Myers lost 3,502 of 5,732 between them. Myers was killed. French losses were probably close to 8,000, though Soult admitted only 2,800. Some 10,000 wounded lay on the field that night.

The armies faced each other all through 17 May. Soult slipped away before dawn on the 18th, sending his wounded and about 500 British prisoners south, and leaving several hundred badly hurt men behind. Badajoz was invested again on the 19th, but the siege was abandoned on 10 June when Soult and Marmont combined against Wellington. Wellington is reported to have said that another such battle would ruin the army. He blamed Blake's slowness: the Spanish, he wrote, 'stood like stocks' but could not be moved.

The argument began at once. Napier, Beresford's bitter enemy, wrote that no general ever won so great a battle with so little gain in reputation, and gave the credit to Hardinge and Cole. Beresford replied in print. Oman blames Blake first and Stewart's rash attack second, but agrees that Cole was slow to be used. Byron's 'O Albuera, glorious field of grief!' and the 57th's name of 'Die-Hards', still marked each 16 May, keep it in British memory.

Wargaming it

Albuera is a compact battle on a front of three or four miles, fought out in about six hours, and it suits brigade-level games with 20- or 30-minute turns. The fight on the southern plateau, Zayas and Colborne against Girard, then Hoghton against Gazan and the Fusiliers against Werlé, makes a superb battalion-level scenario on a table only a mile or so wide.

The key terrain is subtle: a bare, gentle ridge, a fordable stream, a village outwork and olive woods on the French side that hide everything. The French player's flank march works best with hidden movement or an umpire, and the Allied player should not know at first that the village attack is a feint. Blake's reluctance to turn his line can be modelled as a command delay.

The weather matters. A sudden storm that blinds infantry, damps musketry and lets cavalry close unseen is the engine of the battle's most famous moment. The French have the great advantage in cavalry; the Allies have the numbers, but much of their army is hard to move.

The what-ifs are rich. Blake turns three brigades, not one; Stewart waits and attacks with the whole 2nd Division; Soult commits Werlé while Hoghton is dying; Hardinge never reaches Cole; or Soult learns that Blake has arrived and declines battle altogether.

Maps and pictures

Paintings and prints

Paintings and prints of the battle, from the time and the century after, by year: free-to-use pictures from the battle's category on Wikimedia Commons. Each opens its file page there, with the full caption and source.