Battle of Salamanca

Background

By the summer of 1812 the war in Spain had turned in the Allies' favour. Wellington had taken Ciudad Rodrigo in January and Badajoz in April, the two fortresses that guarded the roads from Portugal into Spain. In May Hill destroyed the bridge at Almaraz on the Tagus, cutting the only direct link between Soult's army in Andalusia and Marmont's Army of Portugal in León. Napoleon was gathering his armies for Russia, and the French in Spain had lost experienced units to that campaign.

Wellington crossed the Agueda on 13 June and entered Salamanca, a major French depot, where three convents had been turned into forts. They surrendered on 27 June. Marmont had been counting on reinforcements from Caffarelli's Army of the North, but a British squadron under Sir Home Popham had appeared on the Biscay coast, and Spanish forces came down from the mountains to threaten Bilbao, so Caffarelli kept his infantry at home. Spanish troops from Galicia were blockading Astorga in Marmont's rear.

For most of July the two armies, each about 50,000 strong, manoeuvred against each other along the Douro and the Tormes, often marching in sight of each other, with Marmont repeatedly threatening Wellington's line of supply to Portugal. Wellington learned from an intercepted letter that King Joseph was marching from Madrid with about 13,000 more men to join Marmont. On 21 July both armies crossed the Tormes south of Salamanca. Wellington was preparing to fall back towards Ciudad Rodrigo, but he was still waiting for Marmont to make a mistake.

The armies

Wellington's army was about 50,000 strong. Some 30,500 were British, including about 3,500 cavalry. Some 18,000 were Portuguese, about a third of the whole. They served as brigades inside the British divisions, as the independent brigades of Pack and Bradford, and as D'Urban's dragoons. Carlos de España's Spanish division added about 3,400 men. The army had seven infantry divisions and the Light Division. In Stapleton Cotton's cavalry, Le Marchant's heavy brigade (3rd and 4th Dragoons, 5th Dragoon Guards) had about 1,000 sabres, alongside Anson's light dragoons, the King's German Legion horse and the Portuguese. The Allies had between 54 and 62 guns: sources disagree.

Marmont's Army of Portugal had about 48,500 men in eight infantry divisions, under Foy, Clausel, Ferey, Sarrut, Maucune, Brennier, Thomières and Bonnet, with Boyer's dragoons and Curto's light cavalry. It had 78 guns, more than Wellington. It was a veteran army, and for weeks in July it had outmanoeuvred Wellington and threatened his supply line. Its cavalry, however, was outnumbered.

Wellington's tactics relied on the reverse slope. Lines of infantry lay hidden behind crests, with skirmishers in front, until they rose to deliver volleys. Marmont, like Wellington, was trying to win by manoeuvre, without a pitched battle.

The battle

Morning: the Arapiles. At about 8 am French skirmishers, followed by Bonnet's whole division, came out of the woods south of the village of Arapiles and made for the Greater Arapile, an isolated flat-topped hill. Wellington sent the 7th Caçadores racing for it, but the French got there first. The British held the Lesser Arapile, within easy cannon-shot to the north. Through the late morning Wellington moved his reserves to the right, behind the ridges, out of French sight. Around midday he ordered the 1st and Light Divisions to attack the Greater Arapile, then cancelled the order on Beresford's advice.

Early afternoon: the French overextend. From the Greater Arapile Marmont could see some of the movement behind the British line and the dust on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. He took it for a retreat. A little before 2 pm he began to extend his left westward along a plateau about three miles long, towards the Pico de Miranda, to cut that road. Thomières led, with Maucune, Brennier and Clausel behind him. Foy and Ferey were still far to the east near Calvarisa de Arriba, and gaps opened between the divisions. By about 2 pm Pakenham's 3rd Division and D'Urban's Portuguese dragoons were waiting, hidden, in a dip near Aldea Tejada on the far right.

About 3.45 pm: Marmont falls. Seeing the gap, Wellington rode to Pakenham and ordered him forward. At about the same time a shell from a British gun on the Lesser Arapile struck Marmont as he was going down to his horse, breaking his right arm and two ribs. Command passed to Bonnet, who was wounded in turn within the hour, and then to Clausel. The left wing went into the crisis without a commander.

About 4–5 pm: the left wing destroyed. Pakenham and D'Urban struck the head of Thomières's column from the west. Thomières was killed and his division broken, and his 101st Line lost about 1,000 of its 1,449 men. At about 4.40 pm Leith's 5th Division and two brigades of Cole's 4th, with Bradford's Portuguese on their right, came over the crest against Maucune. Maucune had formed squares against the British cavalry, and Leith's volleys broke them. Le Marchant's heavy brigade then charged diagonally into the flank. It rode down two battalions of the 66th Line, then the 15th, and then broke the 22nd Line of Brennier's division as it was coming up. Le Marchant was killed in the mêlée. In less than an hour two French divisions had been destroyed and a third shattered.

About 5–7 pm: Clausel strikes back. In the centre the attacks failed. Cole's 4th Division attacked Bonnet's division below the Greater Arapile while Pack's Portuguese assaulted the hill itself; a French battery on the summit helped throw both back, Pack's men losing 386. Clausel then counterattacked with his own and Bonnet's divisions, supported by Boyer's dragoons. They broke Cole's battered brigades and drove into the 6th Division. Beresford brought up Spry's Portuguese brigade, and Wellington committed Clinton's 6th Division and then the 1st and 7th. The counterattack was stopped, and the French army began to retreat.

Dusk: Ferey's rearguard. Clausel ordered Ferey's division to hold the edge of the forest at all costs. Ferey formed a line three deep, with squares on its flanks. For nearly an hour it held off Clinton's 6th Division, which suffered the heaviest losses of any Allied division that day. Ferey was killed by a cannonball before the line finally broke. From 8 pm until 3 am the routed army streamed east across the bridge and ford at Alba de Tormes. Wellington sent his pursuit by another road, because he believed a Spanish garrison held the castle at Alba. España had withdrawn it without telling him.

Aftermath

The Army of Portugal lost about 14,000 men, nearly 7,000 of them prisoners, along with 20 guns and two eagles. Thomières and Ferey were killed, and Marmont, Bonnet and Clausel were wounded. Wellington's losses were a little over 5,000, a third of them Portuguese; the 6th Division alone lost about 1,500. Allied losses among senior officers were also heavy: Le Marchant was killed, and Cotton, Leith, Cole, Beresford and Victor Alten were wounded. The next day the King's German Legion dragoons broke French infantry squares at Garcia Hernandez. Foy's division covered the retreat.

The Allies entered Madrid on 12 August, the first time since 1808 that the capital had been freed. King Joseph's government never recovered, and the French abandoned Andalusia for good. The victory did not decide the campaign. Wellington's siege of Burgos failed, and in the autumn, with French armies concentrating against him, he retreated to Portugal. But the battle changed his reputation from that of a cautious defensive general to that of a bold attacker. It also encouraged the British government to keep fighting in Spain.

Two arguments continue. One is how far Marmont's wound, rather than his own dispositions, lost the battle: Foy thought the left wing was already beaten. The other is whether the Spanish withdrawal from Alba de Tormes was a failure of nerve or a misunderstanding between allies. Two hills dominate the battlefield, which remains largely unchanged, with a memorial on the Greater Arapile and an interpretation centre in the village.

Wargaming it

Salamanca is a big battle that can be gamed whole. The decisive action took place on a front of about three miles, and most of it was over in a few hours, so a game at brigade level with 15- or 20-minute turns works. At battalion level, Pakenham against Thomières and Leith and Le Marchant against Maucune and Brennier make tight, self-contained scenarios.

The key terrain is the two Arapiles, which give artillery and observation; the long plateau running west to the Pico de Miranda; the dips and reverse slopes that hid Wellington's reserves; and the forest along the southern edge, which covered the French retreat to Alba.

The game turns on hidden movement and command friction. The French player should not see the Allied reserves until they move, so umpired or blind deployment helps. Marmont's wound and Bonnet's soon after can be modelled as a command gap of uncertain length on the French left. The French divisions arrive one by one, which rewards an Allied player who strikes each in turn. Le Marchant's charge shows heavy cavalry used well against infantry already engaged by other infantry.

The obvious what-ifs: Marmont stays unhurt and stops Maucune and Thomières in time; Foy and Ferey close up earlier; Wellington's midday attack on the Greater Arapile goes ahead; or the Spanish hold the bridge at Alba, trapping Clausel against the Tormes. A campaign game could also include Joseph's reinforcements, which were days away.

Maps and pictures

Paintings and prints

Paintings and prints of the battle, from the time and the century after, by year: free-to-use pictures from the battle's category on Wikimedia Commons. Each opens its file page there, with the full caption and source.