Iberia Won

27–28 July 1809

Battle of Talavera

HISTORICAL AND ILLUSTRATIVE NOTES TO CANTO III.

This Canto describes the battles of Sauroren on the Pyrenees, with
the leading incidents in the minor combats of Buenza, Doña Maria,
Echallar and Ivantelly which followed. The first battle of Sauroren
took place on the 28th July, 1813, the fourth anniversary of the
battle of Talavera, and was remarkable for the extraordinary valour
displayed by the French under Soult, which, having obtained a
slight success at Buenza, they repeated with almost frantic efforts
at Echallar and Ivantelly on the 2nd August, their principal object
being to relieve San Sebastian. But in vain. Lord Wellington
described the first of these actions as “bludgeon work.” The loss
on both sides was very considerable; but it was here demonstrated
by our soldiers, in the words of Napier “that their opponents
however strongly posted could not stand before them.” The actions
will be found detailed in his History, book xxi. chap. 5.

The incident of the defence of the mountain top by flinging down
rocks, is taken from the previous combat, where it occurred as
described by Napier in the following words: “The British, shrunk in
numbers, also wanted ammunition, and a part of the eighty-second
under Major Fitzgerald was forced to roll down stones to defend the
rocks on which they were posted.” (_Hist. ibid._) The allusions to
Sisyphus and to Ajax will I trust be excused. It is difficult to
exaggerate such incidents. There was surely something Titanic in
the character of this Pyrenean warfare.

The first era of the Peninsular campaigns comprised our two first
victories of Roriça and Vimieiro, more intrinsically glorious
perhaps, than any of their successors, but rendered futile in
their consequences by the mistaken generosity of concession which
characterized the Convention of Cintra.

The second period of the War was commenced by the battle of
Talavera, previously to which Wellington found the Spanish General
Cuesta equally unmanageable, stubborn, and foolishly arrogant, as
the Portuguese General showed himself on the eve of the battle
of Roriça which commenced the first period of the War. In both
cases the results were the same. After a great deal of vapouring
about “doing the business themselves and not needing British
assistance,” both worthies retired, leaving the sole and undivided
honour of each day to the genius and fortune of Wellington. In
the preliminary combat of Alcabon, the Spanish division (4,000
infantry, 2,000 horse, and 8 guns) scampered off from before the
French, and it was manifest that they could not be depended on.
Wellington was therefore determined that they should withdraw to
Talavera, where there was strong ground suited for defence, on
which alone the Spaniards were likely to make a stand. Cuesta
boastingly replied that “he would fight where he stood.” The 27th,
at daylight, the British General renewed his solicitations, at
first fruitlessly; but when the enemy’s cavalry came in sight,
Cuesta sullenly yielded, yet turning to his staff with frantic
pride observed that “he had first made the Englishman go down on
his knees!” (Napier, _Hist. W. P._ b. viii. c. 2.) In the next
preliminary combat of Salinas, the Spanish army to the number of
11,000 men (including artillery) threw down their arms, and ran
away, declaring that the Allies were entirely routed! It might
have been so but that their example was despised. Thus undivided
glory was thrust upon Wellington; and ever after the part which the
Spaniards took was very subordinate.

After the battle of Talavera, the Spaniards were shamefully
defeated (having regard to the truth of History it is impossible
to use any other expression) by the French in two successive
actions--those of Arzobispo and Almonacid, at both of which they
threw down their arms and ran, and in the latter were slaughtered
in thousands--a result partly attributable to the bad conduct of
the men and partly to the bad guiding of their commander, Cuenca,
whose character was a concentration of all the worst possible
qualities of a General. “King” Joseph, who had retreated after the
battle of Baylen, now returned to Madrid. Embarrassed by these
disasters, by the perfidious withholding of supplies, by the
perpetual crossing and opposition of the Spanish juntas, which like
those of Portugal, instead of an aid, were for ever a thorn in the
side of their Liberator, Wellington, in the face of an overwhelming
French force, took the resolution of retiring into Portugal. The
conduct of the Spaniards may be best estimated from his own words,
stating his reasons for declining again to co-operate with them:

“But there was a more shameful consideration, namely, the constant
and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy.
We in England never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have
heard Spanish officers telling of nineteen or twenty actions of
the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo, accounts of
which, I believe, have never been published. * * * In the battle of
Talavera, in which the Spanish army, with very trifling exception,
was not engaged--whole corps threw away their arms, and ran off,
when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack. When
these dastardly soldiers run away, they plunder everything they
meet. In their flight from Talavera they plundered the baggage of
the British army, which was at that moment bravely engaged in their
cause.”

When Wellington came to this resolution to retire into Portugal,
he was at the head of only 17,000 British troops of all arms; the
“terror-stricken Spaniards” were literally an incumbrance. (Napier,
_Hist. W. P._ b. viii. c. 5.) Our troops, through the faithlessness
of their allies, were almost starving, and they were confronted
by 70,000 French! The wonder is that they were not utterly and
immediately crushed by the latter. But Soult was the only great
General then amongst the French commanders; and the promptness is
as much to be admired as the prudence with which Wellington retired
into Portugal.

3–5 May 1811

Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro

One can laugh at this distance of time at the monstrosities written
about these memorable struggles by French nobles and generals. Thus
Foy has the coolness to say of the relative numbers at Vimieiro,
“Les Anglois étaient deux contre un par rapport aux Français!”
(_Hist. Guerre. Pénins._, livre ix.) He further denies that it
was _a battle at all_. “Ils n’étaient pas desireux de changer un
avantage défensif bien caractérisé en une bataille dont le succès
leur paraissait incertain!” (_Ibid._)

The political sagacity and military skill of Wellington not only
maintained his position in the face of overwhelming difficulties,
but speedily took the offensive. The co-operation of (Lord)
Beresford, who was placed over the Portuguese army, organized by
the genius of Wellington, and led by British officers, must not be
overlooked. Massena was forced to retreat from Portugal; and as he
passed the border-line of the two Peninsular countries, Wellington
followed victorious and menacing, having achieved what at first
appeared utterly vain to attempt. The battle of Fuentes de Onoro
ensued, the French were forced to evacuate the fortress of Almeida,
and then followed a long career of victory to the British arms,
which was uninterrupted till our triumphant entry into Toulouse,
and the news of Napoléon’s abdication.

The battle of Fuentes de Onoro, fought on the 5th May, 1811, was
no very decided triumph, although most undoubtedly a victory,
since the principal object of the allies, the covering of the
blockade of Almeida, was successfully accomplished. The village of
Fuentes, so often attacked throughout the day, was unflinchingly
and gallantly defended; and on the chapel and crags which surmount
the town we maintained our ground to the last, while the French
retired a cannon-shot from the stream. My attention was invited
in a more lively degree by the neighbouring fortress of Almeida,
which was the scene of such repeated actions during the Peninsular
War, and where occurred the curious siege in 1844 by the forces of
the Portuguese government, when it was occupied by a revolutionary
party under the Conde do Bomfim, aiming at the subversion of Dona
Maria’s prerogative.

The battle of Albuera was fought on the 16th May, 1811, eleven
days after the battle of Fuentes de Onoro. At Albuera the personal
gallantry of Marshal Beresford was more conspicuous than the
generalship. Our loss in killed and wounded here was greater than
in any other action during the Peninsular War. Wellington arrived
on the field the third day after the battle. For several days
before it the Spaniards had been reduced to horse-flesh for a
subsistence! Yet on the whole they fought well. It was the terrific
charge and indomitable valour of the Fusiliers that gained the
day. Never was British infantry seen to greater advantage. “The
terrible balance hung for two hours, and twice trembling to the
sinister side, only yielded at last to the superlative vigour of
the fusiliers.” (Napier, _Hist. War in the Penins._ book xii. chap.
7.)

16 May 1811

Battle of Albuera

Determined to perfect the work, so far as in me lay, I last year
traversed the whole Peninsula from East to West, at the constant
risk of a very precarious life (which might thus, perhaps, become
not utterly valueless), and acquired the advantages to be derived
to my labours from visiting the following battle-grounds:--Bayonne
and the Adour, the Nive, St. Pierre, the Nivelle, the Bidasoa,
San Marcial, Vera, Sauroren, San Sebastian, Vitoria, Talavera,
Almaraz, Albuera, and Badajoz, having previously visited most of
the battle-fields in Portugal and in Northern and Southern Spain.

The task which I have undertaken, and accomplished according to my
means, was an ambitious one, yet honourable. I scarcely dare to
hope for success. I feel the full force of the immortal Scott’s
address to the illustrious Wellington, in the Introduction to his
_Vision of Don Roderick_:--

With equal pain have I witnessed, having traversed Spain at the
period, the recent success of French intrigue and the spectacle
of renewed subserviency. The wedding-ring may replace the sword,
but the instrument, because less bloody, is not less fatal to
Liberty; and the words of Byron, at the close of the first Canto
of _Childe Harold_, become invested with prophetic and appalling
truthfulness:--

Not all the blood at Talavera shed,
Not all the marvels of Barosa’s fight,
Not Albuera lavish of the dead,
Have won for Spain her well asserted right.
When shall her Olive-Branch be free from blight?
When shall she breathe her from the blushing toil?
How many a doubtful day shall sink in night,
Ere the Frank robber turn him from his spoil,
And Freedom’s stranger-tree grow native of the soil!

_Lisbon, 1st March, 1847._

Nearly the entire of our modern military system dates from the
commencement of the Peninsular War. The cumbrous old system which
fought a whole campaign for a comfortable place for winter quarters
(a great aim with Turenne) was broken up rapidly by the vigour of
Napoléon, and our first débût under the Duke of York had taught
us that we must change our plan. In 1808, the very year of our
first victories in the Peninsula (Roriça and Vimieiro) the use of
hair-powder was for the first time discontinued in the British
army. Rifle corps were then first formed--in the first instance
as rather a hopeless experiment, our soldiers having been deemed
too slow and heavy for this practice; but, as the result proved,
with perfect success. From the Polish lancers whom we first saw
at Albuera we borrowed the idea of our corps of lancers, as we
afterwards took from the French cuirassiers the modern equipment
of our lifeguards. The brilliant appearance of our light dragoons
astonished the French on their first appearance in the Peninsula.
“Nos soldats, frappés de l’élégance de l’habit des dragons légers,
de leurs casques brillants, de la tournure svelte des hommes et
des chevaux, leur avaient donné le nom de _lindors_.”--Foy, _Hist.
Guerre Pénins._ liv. 2. For this rather theatrical display we
substituted with better taste in 1813 an uniform similar to that
worn by the German light cavalry. The Shrapnell shell, or spherical
case shot, (the invention of an English Colonel of that name) was
used for the first time during the Peninsular War with great effect.

The battle of Albuera was fought on the 16th May, 1811, eleven
days after the battle of Fuentes de Onoro. At Albuera the personal
gallantry of Marshal Beresford was more conspicuous than the
generalship. Our loss in killed and wounded here was greater than
in any other action during the Peninsular War. Wellington arrived
on the field the third day after the battle. For several days
before it the Spaniards had been reduced to horse-flesh for a
subsistence! Yet on the whole they fought well. It was the terrific
charge and indomitable valour of the Fusiliers that gained the
day. Never was British infantry seen to greater advantage. “The
terrible balance hung for two hours, and twice trembling to the
sinister side, only yielded at last to the superlative vigour of
the fusiliers.” (Napier, _Hist. War in the Penins._ book xii. chap.
7.)

22 July 1812

Battle of Salamanca

These scattering and consuming thunderbolts opened the eyes of the
Spaniards at last to the value of the British alliance, and threw
the defence of the Peninsula entirely into those heroic hands, by
which it was so brilliantly completed. The soldiery of Spain acted
thenceforth a subordinate part, and the boast after the battle of
Baylen, “We will not need the services of you _Ingleses_--we will
escort you home through France, but you will not have to strike
a blow!” was not again repeated. For six months of the next year
(till Wellington re-appeared on the scene) they continued their
despairing efforts against the French, but with uniform defeat and
failure. No fitting leaders appeared, and the efforts of the people
were worse than useless.

The _third_ era of the Peninsular campaigns commenced with the
third invasion of Portugal by the French army, which was this time
commanded by Massena. The battle of Busaco was the great event of
the commencement of this campaign. This powerful check was for the
time successful, but unable long to control a far superior force,
and the British army fell back within the lines of Torres Vedras.
Massena arrived in front of them, and made prodigious efforts
to pass. But this triumph of Wellington’s genius, and marvel of
engineering and strategic skill, was impregnable to all assaults,
and was at once the salvation of Portugal and the ultimate means
of rescuing Spain from the Invader. Emerging from his unassailable
redoubt, Wellington at last pursued the French beyond the frontier,
and defeated them on the Spanish soil in battle, action, and
assault, from Salamanca to Vitoria, from Vitoria to the Pyrenees.

One can laugh at this distance of time at the monstrosities written
about these memorable struggles by French nobles and generals. Thus
Foy has the coolness to say of the relative numbers at Vimieiro,
“Les Anglois étaient deux contre un par rapport aux Français!”
(_Hist. Guerre. Pénins._, livre ix.) He further denies that it
was _a battle at all_. “Ils n’étaient pas desireux de changer un
avantage défensif bien caractérisé en une bataille dont le succès
leur paraissait incertain!” (_Ibid._)

XIII.

For nought could baffle England’s trusted Chief,
Who Marmont’s lines on Salamanca’s plain
Smote like a thunderbolt, keen--rapid--brief,
And rent his legions like a shattered chain!
And at Vitoria wrenched the crown of Spain
From the poor tremulous Usurper’s hand,
The spoils of Empire seized, a countless train
Of cannon, standards, eagles--trophies grand--
Nor, fiery Jourdan, least, thy bâton of command!

XIV.

The ever memorable battle of Salamanca took place in the same
month of July in which three years before had been fought the
equally glorious battle of Talavera--and even in still more sultry
weather, so much so that before the engagement at Salamanca, on one
occasion when the French, pressing upon our rear, were scattered
by the bayonet, some of our men fainted with the heat. On the eve
of the battle, a terrific thunder-storm came on just as the enemy
were taking up their position. The sky was kindled with incessant
lightnings, and through the heavy rain which subsequently fell,
the French fires could be seen along their entire line. It is a
remarkable fact that nearly every one of our chief battles in the
Peninsula was heralded by a storm, as if Nature sympathized in the
contest. That of Salamanca was fought upon a plain surrounded by
ranges of hills--one of the few open and level tracts upon which
the rival armies met in the Peninsula, which seemed peculiarly
adapted for such a struggle, bearing at opposite and distant
points two striking rocky eminences, steep and rugged, called the
Arapiles (cut out, as it were, for rival generals) on which the
left of the French and the right of the Allies were posted. The
battle of Salamanca lasted only forty minutes. It originated in an
error of Marmont’s, which Wellington seized as thus described by
Napier: “Starting up, he repaired to the high ground, and observed
their movements for some time, with a stern contentment, for their
left wing was entirely separated from the centre. The fault was
flagrant, and he fixed it with the stroke of a thunder-bolt.”
(_Hist. War in the Penins._ book xviii. chap. 3.)

III. “The cannon fired for joy upon the morn,
That told the nation Salamanca’s skies,” &c.

The battle of Salamanca was fought on the 22nd July, 1812. The
author was born on the 27th December in the same year. “Salamanca
will always be referred to as the most skilful of Wellington’s
battles.” (Napier, _Hist. War in the Peninsula_, book xix. chap.
7.) This splendid achievement was designated by a French officer at
the time as “the beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes.”

V. “Length of days,
And honours of a Demigod,” &c.

21 June 1813

Battle of Vitoria

XXVII.

Upon thy buckler, Gaul, terrific rang
Vittoria’s powerful stroke, and reeling back
Thy phantom-King to tall Pyrene sprang;
Thy shattered Army, sorrowing deep for lack
Of conquest or of guiding, fell to wrack,
By the great arm of Arthur paralyzed,
Till rapid Soult, when loured the sky most black,
From Dresden rushed and chaos methodized:
No Marshal-Chief, be sure, Napoléon higher prized.

XXVIII.

This Canto describes the principal warlike operations between
the battle of Vittoria and the first battle of Sauroren, with a
description of the first part of which it terminates. The incidents
will be found in Napier’s _History_, book xxi. chap. 5.

XXVII. “Till rapid Soult,” &c.

Rapidity of conception and execution were marked features in
Marshal Soult’s military character. The decree by which Napoléon
appointed him his Lieutenant in Spain was issued at Dresden on
the 1st July, 1813, ten days after the battle of Vittoria. On the
eleventh day he was in the midst of the army in Spain! “The 12th,
Soult, travelling with surprising expedition, assumed the command
of the armies of the ‘north,’ the ‘centre,’ and the ‘south,’ now
reorganized in one body called ‘the Army of Spain.’ And he had
secret orders to put Joseph forcibly aside if necessary, but that
monarch voluntarily retired from the army.” Napier, _Hist. War in
the Penins._ book xxi. chap. 4. “Marshal Soult was one of the few
men whose indefatigable energy rendered them worthy lieutenants
of the emperor; and with singular zeal, vigour, and ability he
now served.”--_Ibid._ “Such was Soult’s activity that on the
16th all the combinations for a gigantic offensive movement were
digested.”--_Ibid._

XXIX. “His rugged spine full many a peak doth bear,
His ribs, huge ridges, part on either hand.”

18 June 1815

Battle of Waterloo

The astonishing developement which Napoléon gave to the infantry
service has been dwelt on by more than one writer. “L’infanterie
française, cette nation des camps,” says De Barante, _Des Communes
et de l’Aristocratie_. Napoléon gave to this arm a power and
vigour to which it was before a stranger. “Napoléon augmenta
le bataillon d’infanterie d’une autre compagnie d’élite, les
voltigeurs. Ce fut une idée heureuse que de rehausser dans l’estime
publique les hommes de petite taille, qui en général sont les plus
intelligens et les plus alertes.” (Foy, _Hist. Guerre Pénins._)
The consummation of the Emperor’s gigantic views was found in the
Imperial Guard. “La garde impériale représentait la gloire de
l’armée et la majesté de l’empire. On choisissait les officiers et
les soldats parmi ceux que les braves avaient signalés comme les
plus braves: tous étaient couverts de cicatrices.”--(Foy, _Hist.
Guerre Pénins._ liv. i.) Napoléon after the battle of Marengo
called them his “granite column.” At the height of his power his
Imperial Guard consisted of 68 battalions, 31 squadrons, and 80
pieces of artillery--in itself a powerful army. Never will the
exclamation of these devoted men on the field of Waterloo be
forgotten: “_La garde meurt et ne se rend pas!_”

“domi pugnans ceu Gallus.” To be sure, it is just possible that the
learned Theban may have meant that humble domestic fowl, a cock.
Erasmus reads “domi abditus.” There can be no doubt that a cock was
meant, and unquestionably it is a bellicose bird. The passage from
Pindar might be fairly rendered by the Latin adage: “Gallus in suo
sterquilinio,” which it is needless to turn into the vernacular.
There are symptoms of the French reforming this national vice, and
I therefore shall not dwell upon a somewhat disagreeable subject.

I am happy to be the first to record the true orthography of one
of our two first and not least important battles in the Peninsula,
Roriça and Vimieiro. They used to be invariably written Roleia
and “Vimeira.” Napier has considerably improved upon this,
making the latter “Vimiero.” But still he is wrong. The correct
word is “Vimieiro.” Even had I made no other discovery, my four
years’ residence in Portugal would not have been useless. True,
it may be said that the General has only “knocked an _i_ out of
it” in military fashion. But, though the error be confined to a
single letter, it would be only the change of a letter to call
Waterloo “Waterlog,” and who could excuse such a travesty of our
glorious victory? These mistakes in the orthography of the names
of Peninsular localities are common to all English writers, and
excellent a scholar as Southey was, they disfigure his History
as well as that of Napier. I find the names of these two battles
misdescribed as “Roleia” and “Vimieira” in the memoir by Sir B.
D’Urban lately reproduced at the elevation of Sir H. Hardinge to
the Peerage--should I not rather say the elevation of the Peerage
by the accession to it of that gallant and chivalrous Peninsular
veteran?

The French, too, write the names of these battles as erroneously.
They call them uniformly “Roliça” and “Vimeiro,” vide “_Histoire
de la Guerre de la Péninsule, par le Général Foy_,” “_Mémoires
par Pellot, Campagnes par De la Pène_,” _and_ “_Mémoires de M. la
Duchesse d’Abrantès_” passim. Napier in the twenty-fourth book of
his History takes leave of the comparative approach to accuracy
in his earlier books, and speaks of these battles every where as
“Roliça” and “Vimiera.” Specks in the sun!

“Great Arthur gave each noble youth a sword.”

The Duke of Wellington presented his sword to Sir Henry (now Lord)
Hardinge after the Battle of Waterloo.

XXXVIII. “And next to Heaven he loved his native land.
With Blanca there to fly when Spain was free,” &c.

III.

Shall I not sing thy triumph? I was born
Amid the thunder of thy victories!
The cannon fired for joy upon the morn
That told the nation Salamanca’s skies
Saw thy most skilful battle’s trophy rise--
Reached me still wombed. The fame of Waterloo,
That made each cheek to glow and lit all eyes,
Even to my infant ear half-conscious flew.
All Hail!--for to this Earth I soon must bid adieu.

IV.