Battle of Zorndorf

Background

In 1758 Prussia faced Austria, France, Sweden and Russia at once. After Rossbach and Leuthen the year before, Frederick II spent the spring besieging Olmütz in Moravia, until the loss of a great supply convoy forced him to give it up and fall back into Silesia. Meanwhile the Russians, who had taken Königsberg and occupied East Prussia in January, moved west through Poland. William Fermor concentrated his army at Posen at the end of June, crossed the Warthe at Landsberg on 10 August and entered the Neumark, the part of Brandenburg east of the Oder. From 15 August his guns bombarded Küstrin, the fortress where the Warthe meets the Oder, some 80 km from Berlin, while Cossacks laid the countryside waste.

Lieutenant-General Dohna's small Prussian army shadowed the invaders but could not stop them. Leaving Saxony and Silesia thinly held against Daun's Austrians, Frederick marched north with about 15,000 men, reached Frankfurt an der Oder on 20 August and joined Dohna at Manschnow on the 22nd, giving him about 37,000. While his guns cannonaded the Russians opposite Küstrin, he crossed the Oder about 19 km downstream at Alt-Güstebiese on 22–23 August, putting himself between Fermor and a detached Russian corps, and marched back south along the east bank. Fermor lifted the siege and took post on the open heath north of the village of Zorndorf, with the marshy Mietzel stream behind him. Frederick had the bridges over the Mietzel cut: he meant not merely to drive the Russians off but to trap and destroy them in the angle of the Oder and the Warthe.

The armies

The Prussians had about 36,000 men: 38 battalions, 83 squadrons and 193 guns, 117 of them heavy pieces and 76 battalion guns. Frederick's own regiments were veterans of Leuthen; Dohna's had been beaten by the Russians at Gross-Jägersdorf the year before, and Frederick distrusted them. The cavalry was the arm that mattered. Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz, the victor of Rossbach, led 36 squadrons of cuirassiers and hussars on the left, with a reserve of 20 squadrons of dragoons behind the infantry and 27 squadrons under Schorlemer on the right. Much of it had ridden through the night before the battle with almost no rest.

Fermor had somewhere between 39,000 and 52,000 men, depending on who is counting: 56 battalions, 50 squadrons, about 3,000 Cossacks and some 200 guns, most of them light regimental pieces, including the new 'secret' howitzers. The Observation Corps, a new formation under General Browne with its own artillery, was made up largely of young conscripts. The regular cavalry was weak and outnumbered. Fermor drew up his army in a great rectangle about 3 km long and 800 m deep, with its flanks refused, a formation the Russians had found sound in their Turkish wars but ill suited to meeting Frederick. Frederick held the Russians in contempt and ignored Field Marshal Keith, who had served the Tsars and warned him not to underestimate them.

The battle

CDB90 records Zorndorf as a single engagement, number 72 (ZORNDORF), from 10:00 to 19:30. The sources start the bombardment just before 09:00 and have fighting into the dark after 20:00. The times below follow Kronoskaf and are approximate.

The march round (03:00–08:00). Before dawn the Prussians crossed the Mietzel at the Neudamm mill and Kerstenbrügge. Guided by two local foresters, they marched through the Zicher woods and past Batzlow round the Russian eastern flank, then wheeled west through Wilkersdorf towards Zorndorf to strike what had been the Russian rear. On the way they came in sight of the Russian Wagenburg near Klein-Cammin; Frederick would not be distracted by it. Warned by his Cossacks, Fermor simply faced his army about, regiment by regiment, and pulled his new right wing back against the Zabern-Grund. At about 07:00 Russian hussars set Zorndorf alight, and the south wind blew the smoke into the Russians' faces.

The left-wing attack (09:00–12:00). Frederick found the Zabern-Grund too deep and boggy to cross in force, so his favoured oblique order was out. He chose a frontal blow on the Russian right, between the Zabern-Grund and the Galgen-Grund: Manteuffel's eight-battalion advance guard in front, Kanitz's left wing behind it, Dohna's right wing held back. About 60 Prussian guns pounded the packed Russian right for two hours. Shortly before 11:00 Manteuffel advanced, met the Russians at 40 paces in the dust and smoke, and was counter-attacked with the bayonet. Kanitz, worried by the widening gap with Dohna, had drifted right through the Steinbusch wood and hit the Russian centre instead, leaving Manteuffel's flank open. At about 11:45 Gaugreben's Russian cavalry burst out of the Zabern-Grund. The advance guard broke, Kanitz's men followed, and the Russian infantry surged after them, taking about two dozen guns.

Seydlitz (12:00–13:00). Prince Moritz of Anhalt-Dessau led the dragoon reserve against the pursuers. Then Seydlitz, who had scouted passages across the Zabern-Grund, brought his 36 squadrons over it and fell on the flank and rear of the disordered Russians. Their cavalry was driven off and the right wing as far as the Galgen-Grund was cut to pieces in a no-quarter mêlée. Further from the sabres, Russian soldiers broke open the sutlers' spirit casks; when their officers staved the casks in, men drank from the puddles. Fermor, lightly wounded, was swept away to the rear and did not return until dark. Frederick rallied his broken infantry, leading the Bülow Fusiliers forward himself.

The second battle (13:00–18:00). The rest of the Russian army formed a new front along the Galgen-Grund, and Frederick turned to his right wing. At about 15:00, as Dohna's infantry moved up, Demiku's cavalry and Browne's Observation Corps struck. Horvat's hussars overran the right-hand Prussian battery and a fusilier battalion, and many Prussian infantry, seeing cavalry in the dust behind them, fled towards Wilkersdorf. Schorlemer's squadrons, then Seydlitz again at about 15:30, beat off the Russian horse. From about 16:00 Dohna's 20 battalions fought the Observation Corps with bayonets and musket butts, ammunition spent on both sides, until it gave ground around 18:00.

Evening (18:00–21:00). Demiku rallied some 2,000 foot and 1,000 horse with guns beyond the Galgen-Grund. Frederick's last attacks failed: Rautter's shaken battalions ran at the first cannon shot, the few Prussians who crossed the Galgen-Grund were thrown back, and others stopped to plunder the Russian baggage and army chest. Fighting died away in the dark. At about 21:00 the Russians drew off and bivouacked on the Drewitz heath, still facing the field.

Aftermath

Both armies were wrecked. The Prussians lost about 11,400–12,800 killed, wounded and captured, a third of the army. Russian losses are put at anywhere from 16,000 to over 21,000, perhaps two-fifths of the army, with five generals captured and some 100 guns, two dozen colours and the army chest lost; the Russians took 26 Prussian guns. That night Fermor had perhaps 28,000 men fit for duty and Frederick about 18,000. General Panin is said to have remarked that the Russian army had indeed kept much of the field, but it was 'either dead, wounded or drunk'.

On 26 August the armies faced each other and exchanged a long-range cannonade, but neither could attack again. That night the Russians slipped away to the Wagenburg at Klein-Cammin, and at the end of the month withdrew towards Landsberg to join Rumyantsev. Frederick, short of ammunition, left Dohna to follow them and on 2 September hurried off to Saxony.

Both sides claimed victory. Te Deums were sung in St Petersburg, Vienna and Paris, while Frederick's letters inflated the Russian numbers and losses. Because the Prussians kept the field and the Russians turned back, nineteenth-century writers generally called it a Prussian victory; most modern historians call it inconclusive. Carlyle thought it the bloodiest battle of the Seven Years' War. Frederick, who had despised the Russians, came away frustrated by their tenacity.

Wargaming it

Zorndorf is two battles on one field, and the ground shapes both. A table needs the three hollows running north-west across the plateau: the Zabern-Grund, steep and boggy and passable at only a few places; the wider Galgen-Grund, which splits the Russian army in two; and the Langen-Grund in the east. Add burning Zorndorf, the Steinbusch wood that blocks sight lines and divides the attack frontage, and the Mietzel marshes behind the Russians with every bridge cut. Dust, smoke and a hidden Russian right wing reward a fog-of-war rule.

With some 80,000 men, a grand-tactical scale with regiments or brigades as units suits the whole day. The morning attack on the Russian right, with Seydlitz waiting across the Zabern-Grund, makes a good battalion-level game, and the afternoon fight against the Observation Corps another. Rules should let Russian infantry stand and die rather than rout, and should track ammunition, since both sides ran out.

The decisions are rich. Does Frederick take the Wagenburg instead of fighting? Does Kanitz follow Manteuffel as ordered, rather than drift right? When does Seydlitz commit, and can he do it twice? Can Fermor, with weak cavalry and no line of retreat, do more than face about and endure? What ifs: a Mietzel bridge left standing, Rumyantsev's detached corps coming back, or Dohna's battalions holding their nerve.

Maps and pictures